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161 Summary Conclusion
Most theology, like most fiction, is essentially auto­
biographical. Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, Tillich, worked 
out their systems in their own ways and lived them in 
their lives. And if you press them far enough, even at 
their most cerebral and forbidding, you will find an 
experience of flesh and blood, a human face smiling or 
frowning or weeping or covering its eyes before Bomething • 
that happened once - maybe no more than a child falling 
sick, a thunderstorm, a dream, and yet it made a 
difference which no theology can ever convey or entirely 
conceal.
This work arises from an event in my own personal 
history. It is a part of an ongoing process in which I 
am attempting to understand that event, to set it into 
its context not only within my own life but also within 
our wider, collective human experience. Because this 
personal experience lies behind all that follows, and 
because it is important for the reader to bear in mind 
that I write out of the context of experience and not 
from the vacuum of scientific detachment, I feel it 
essential to present a summary account of what happened 
to me..
Eight years ago, when I was in my mid-thirties, 
a profound disaster occurred in my personal life, a 
disaster which had repercussions in every area of my 
life. At first I responded frantically, striving to put 
things right, to overcome the bad consequences, to restore 
equilibrium. Gradually, as it became clearer that I was 
helpless to mend the situation, a deepening depression 
overcame me. As weeks turned into months I became more 
and more ill - if this kind of state can properly be 
described as an illness. I was having what is rather 
vaguely called a "nervous breakdown". I isolated myself 
from all but a few very close friends. I developed the 
physical and functional symptoms of acute depression - 
sleeplessness, loss of appetite and weight, haggard 
appearance, inability to concentrate or even think 
coherently. Alongside all the inner feelings and self-
1 "The Alphabet of Grace" Frederick Buechner.
Seaburg Press NY 1970
remorse, etc. My doctor offered me medication,, which 
for reasons I still am not clear about I refused.
Some six months after its initiation this process 
came to a kind of climax. By this time I felt myself 
to be reduced to virtually nothing. I was doing nothing 
and thinking nothing, existing day by day with an awful 
sense of emptiness and utter worthlessness. One day the 
inner pain became acute, unbearable, and I physically 
collapsed. It was while I lay in a state of crumpled, 
total dejection that there came suddenly, spontaneously 
and seemingly from nowhere a complete transformation. 
Perhaps I might quote from an article I wrote a few 
months lateri
......as I lay on the floor, utterly limp, inert and
broken, it happened. I felt as though a great, warm, 
dark, gentle and oh-so-tender hand was softly gathering 
my broken body into its loving grasp which warmed and 
soothed and brought life again. I was being thawed 
into being again by a caress which I cannot begin to 
describe. For the first time in my life I knew love. 
And I knew it when I knew that I didn't deserve it.
I was so broken as not to deserve it. For love is 
simply given. And there on the floor of my study, I 
knew love.
Don*t ask me where it came from. Certainly not 
from me. And certainly not from any other human being. 
It came from within me and yet was all around me. I 
went to bed and slept for almost twenty-four hours.
When I awoke I was still me but I felt utterly 
different...... ,0\
Unfortunately we do not have a single word to 
describe the new condition in which I found myself, as 
words such as "depression" or "breakdown" or "despair" 
serve for the previous state. It was a condition 
compounded partly of feelings and partly of knowledge, 
though this latter was not in terms of any new informa­
tion as such, but rather of new understandings and 
interpretations of what had long been known. Things 
suddenly made sense, or if they did not make sense, I 
was no longer concerned about my inability to understand.
2 Journal of the Unitarian Ministry Vol 1 No 9 1979
a relaxed sense of trust; a heightened perception of the 
beauty and worth of things; a loss of striving after self- 
imposed ideals and standards; and, above all, the sense 
of being loved, valued, of worth, though by or to whom 
remained shadowy.
Some will doubtless wish to criticise such language 
as being woolly, sentimental, unobjective. It is not; 
it is a by-no-means-inaccurate attempt to describe the 
inner states accompanying the experience, to say 
subjectively what went on. In those few hours I realised 
that I was "better" in the sense of being cured of the 
breakdown and depression. This "cure" may fruitfully be 
compared with the normal processes of "cure" of such 
conditions. But there was a wider and deeper aspect to 
the "cure". Not only was I better than I had been in the 
depression; Iwas also better than I had been before the 
depression, before the event which set the described events 
into action. I knew with complete certainty that I had 
been deeply and irrevocably changed for the better.
Since those months in 1976 I have been engaged in 
a long task of trying to understand what had happened, 
and as mentioned earlier this present work is a part of 
that task. My primary datum was the experience; 
secondary data the undoubted changes which had occurred 
to me. I say "undoubted", but in fact for some time I 
wondered whether it had all been a dream or hallucination. 
Then I would recall that the despair and pain had been 
real enough, and their sudden ending a fact. Also, my 
sense of being deeply altered was confirmed by close 
friends of many years standing who detected a profound 
though subtle change in me.
But whence had come the cure, the sudden and 
dramatic healing, restoration and even improvement?
I had used no medication, so the use or ceasing to use 
drugs could not be responsible. There had been no change 
whatsoever in my circumstances. There had been no 
alleviation of my depressed feeling state, no change 
within myself of attitude or of exterior circumstance.
despair had been transformed into a sort of bliss.
Having accepted that the experience was real enough,
I then wondered whether I was highly unusual, maybe 
unique. This was resolved when in the course of the 
following eighteen months, two members of the congrega­
tion to which I minister underwent similar experiences 
of acute anxiety and depressions which were suddenly and 
spontaneously relieved. In neither case was the despair 
as acute as in my case; in neither case was the.reversal 
quite so sudden, nor did it have the same measure of 
dramatic effect. But I believe that a similar kind of 
process was happening, enough to reassure me that this 
kind of experience is by no means unique to myself.
I was intrigued to know more about the experience. 
What are its dynamics? What is the source of the sudden 
reversal? There is undoubtedly a large store of 
"received wisdom" circulating which maintains that 
suffering is in some way ultimately for our benefit; 
that he who endures suffering will eventually be 
enhanced in stature, maturity, wisdom; and that suffering 
is a pathway to revelation. Such opinions find many 
expressions:
"Knowledge by suffering entereth;" 
or
If God is anything, he is understanding  Understanding
is acquired by means of suffering or distress or 
experience. Will, desire, love, pain, envy, etc., are 
all natural. But understanding is acquired. ^
Yet there must be acknowledged a strain of sentimentalism 
in such opinions. Suffering in whatever form can be and 
often - perhaps usually - is destructive, and I feel that 
the two previous quotations must be offset by a third:
For instance, there is a widespread idea that suffering 
is in some way a remedial experience. Yet I do not 
believe that suffering necessarily makes a man more
3 Elizabeth Barrett Browning "A Vision of Poets" 
\ William Blake "Proverbs of Hell"
interesting. Many travellers are first-class bores!
However, even when as in my case the suffering 
was ultimately enhancing, the "received wisdom" is 
curiously vague on how the process works. I was left 
with questions about its nature, its frequency, its 
significance in people's lives. How is it to be 
interpreted and understood? What are the religious 
and psychological causes and effects involved? These 
and other questions cluster around the singular nature 
of the experience; the attempt to answer them requires 
an assessment of just what kind of experience this is.
For our assumptions about the nature and category of 
the experience will determine the area in which we seek 
our answers. In particular, are we here dealing with 
the worlds of psychology or religion? Or perhaps - if 
possible - both?
Obviously the experienc e such as I have described 
comes within the purview of the psychological disciplines. 
But we must beware of simply accepting conventional 
appropiations. Nowadays depression is widely regarded 
as a psychological complaint, an illness, with symptoms 
both mental and affective. Its relief is regarded as 
a cure. To some extent its resolution, even sudden 
resolution as in my case, is amenable to psychological 
interpretation.
But is the psychological interpretation the only 
one? And is it adequate to cover all the features of 
an experience such as mine? Does not the experience 
have features which are more readily to be associated 
with the world of religion? For a number of reasons, 
one of which is the straightforward one that I am a 
minister of religion and therefore seek religious 
interpretations of all manner of events, I believe that 
such experiences do have religious aspects of great 
significance. The actual content of the experience and
5 John Allen "The Problem of Suffering" P. 17 
BBC Publications 1962
love, fulfilment, etc., show xne muucuAauc ___
religious experience and language. There is, too, the 
sense of "otherness"; of being at the receiving end, able 
onty- to receive, and being thereby subject to an 
inexorable process. That I, a minister, should have 
such categories of interpretation and the appropriate 
vocabulary available is understandable. But what if 
others with no vested religious commitment or even 
interest were to have similar experiences and feel 
compelled to describe and interpret them in religious 
terms? This would indicate a religious dimension to the 
experience which demands to be recognised.
A feature which theology and psychology have in 
common is a lack of specificity in the disciplines.
Each has "elastic" boundaries which can be stretched 
to incorporate all manner of data. Theologians recognise 
that all experience, all reality, can be interpreted 
as issuing from the Divine. Similarly, in-as~much-as 
all experience is experienced by the psyche, so all 
can come within the scope of psychological interpretation. 
There is, perhaps, a tendency today to reduce religious 
experience to the psychological; to stretch the boundaries 
of psychology until they engulf all religious experience, 
leaving only the realm of metaphysics to the theologian. 
Perhaps to reduce either to the other is a mistake.
Perhaps the psychological and religious worlds are 
complementary, each able to enhance the understanding 
offered by the other. It is within terms of such 
complementarity that I seek to work.
To summarise: because of such an experience 
happening to me, I wish to examine the phenomenon of 
conditions of despair being resolved seemingly 
spontaneously and resulting in a change in the 
experiencer for the better, a change which is long-term 
if not permenant. I wish to approach the matter from 
a variety of angles. Firstly, to determine whether the 
experience happens with any significant frequency.
as a religious experience of significance. Thirdly, to 
consider some psychological interpretations of the 
phenomenon. And, lastly, to view it from the religious 
angle, particularly in terms of our consciousness of 
sin and being forgiven.
The Phenomena of Religious Experience
In this chapter I wish to review some contemporary 
research on religious experience; to consider some of 
the features of religious experience revealed by that 
research; to reflect upon how we should approach and 
interpret such data; and to determine whether or not 
distress plays a significant part in association.
In 1965 two American sociologists with a special 
interest in the sociology of religion distributed a 
questionnaire to a sample of nearly 3,000 people. One 
of the questions asked whether the respondents had ever 
had "a feeling you were somehow in the presence of God?”
The researchers, Glock and Stark, were more than a little 
surprised at the response to this question. Remember 
that the mid-sixties was the era of the Death of God, of 
Secular Theology, of theologians asserting that man had 
come of age and had no further need of religious faith.
Yet to this question k5% of those claiming to be 
Protestants and of those claiming to be Roman Catholics 
were sure that they had felt the presence of God. In 
addition, a further 28$ of the Protestants and 23$ of 
the Roman Catholics thought that they had, but were not 
sure. Glock and Stark felt that this was a significantly 
high proportion, and was quite unexpected by them. They 
comment:
There are few cues in the culture which would lead an 
observer to predict so high a rate of supernaturalism in 
what seems to be an increasingly modern, scientific 
and secularised society.
6c.Y!Glock and/Stark "Religion and Society in Tension" 
Rand McNally1 Chicago 1965
the first authenticated recognition of a significant 
amount of religious experience in modern Western society.
It is important in showing the scale of that experience.
It also serves a cautionary function in that it alerts 
us to the precariousness of some of our assumptions 
about what is currently the case in people's lives.
Glock and Stark, and I suspect many others, were and still 
are tempted to assume that religious experience hardly 
exists today because they likewise assume the widely- 
projected image of our age as being scientifically 
rational and secular. It should also alert us to be on 
our guard against the temptation to refuse people their 
own experiences. Because of scientific (or quasi-scientific) 
assumptions and dogmas we assume that such few religious 
experiences as may happen can be reduced to and understood 
in terms of, eg. brain chemistry or shifts in hormone 
balance. By so assuming we abrogate the person's 
experience, unjustifiably so. We need to listen more .and 
assume less. There is a gulf of difference between a 
religious experience and the experience of a person 
having a religious experience. If we would learn more 
of the former we need to be able to accept what people 
are able to tell us. Of prime importance are:
......the accounts which by introspection each individual
can give us of the patterntaking shape within himself.  ^ j
In the late 1960's in Great Britain, Sir Alister 
Hardy, eminent marine biologist and theorist of evolution, 
was becoming increasingly interested in the phenomena in 
peoples lives which they interpreted as carrying religious 
significance. His initial concern was to wonder whether 
such phenomena carry any evolutionary function. Although 
he was familiar with much of the work done on the physiology 
of trance and meditational states, the analysis of their
7 Robinson, E "Tolerating the Paradoxical"
Religious Experience Research Unit Oxford 1978
that such work missed out the essential sense for the 
individual of what the experience felt like and what 
regulative significance it had for him. With financial 
hacking from a number of trusts and in accommodation 
supplied by Manchester College, Oxford, he set up a unit 
(the Religious Experience Research Unit, hereafter referred 
to as RERU) to study the phenomena of claimed religious 
experience. The inception was 1969.
Because he felt that it was the subjective accounts
and interpretations which were of the highest importance,
Sir Alister simply asked people to send him accounts in 
their own words of experiences which they deemed to be
"religious". The delineation of the experiences he 
deliberately left rather vague. His first requests were
publicised through theological periodicals and the
response was disappointingly small. However, the national
press showed interest in his scheme and published his
request, together with some interviews and information
about the aims of the project. In response to the
publicity in the Guardian, The Observer, The Times and
the Daily Mail there came a much greater response. By
198^ the RERU had on its files some ^,000 accounts of
experiences which the correspondents felt to be religiously
significant for them. Of these, some 3»000 came within
months of the initial press appeals, the remainder trickling
in during the intervening years in response to further
publicity, books and papers published by the Unit,
lectures, etc.
In addition, the RERU has co-sponsored a more 
carefully monitored research sample of people's religious 
experiences conducted during the 1970's by David Hay and 
Ann Morrisey from Nottingham University. Their work is 
based partly on a student questionnaire, partly on "bought 
space" in a National Opinion Poll survey and partly on 
personally-conducted interviews of a cross section of 
Midlands people. Their findings confirm and augment the 
RERU observations, but provide a more authentically 
random sample as a data base and a more precise 
statistical profile.
is of prime importance; I certainly believe that it is 
very useful, although there are areas of the investigation 
to which statistical precision is irrelevant. (See 
below) It is useful, for instance, in indicating how 
widespread is the conviction among contemporary folk that 
they do have religious experience. For example, in the 
interview sample (which Hay and Morrisey believe to be 
more representative as the personal element involved 
enabled people to overcome a seemingly-widespread 
reluctance to talk about such things) 62$ of those 
interviewed believed that they had, had an experience or 
experiences which were religious in content. This figure 
compares strikingly with the finding from Glock and 
Stark's work in America some fifteen years earlier.
These two pieces of research would indicate that in an 
age widely assumed to be irreligious, among a population 
widely assumed to have no place for God in their lives, 
a high proportion of that population believe in a 
supernatural dimension to their lives on the basis of 
personal experience.
The RERU accounts do not have this statistical 
precision. They were volunteered by people who happened 
to read Sir Alister's requests and felt moved to respond.
Of those who did respond, the majority are women and there 
is a preponderance of people in the 50-60 age range. 
However, the age of the correspondents is no indication 
of the age at which the experiences happened, as often 
they explain that the events they describe happened some 
time ago. £here is some evidence to suggest that the 
conventional kinds of religious conversion (8) and also 
"nature mysticism" experiences tend to happen most 
frequently to those in their adolescent or immediately 
post adolescent years. (9) Therefore the distribution 
of age and sex in the RERU correspondents may not 
accurately reflect the actual occurrence of the experiences
8 vide 1 Spinks GS "Psychology and Religion" Methuen 1963
Allport G "The Individual and His Religion" Constable 19 
Thouless, Robert H "An Introduction to the 
Psychology of Religion" Cambridge UP 1971
9 Paffard Michael "Inglorious Wordsworths"
Hodder and Staughton 1973
although women tend to have such experiences more than 
men, the disproportion between the sexes of the RERU 
correspondents may be exaggerated. In the interviews 
conducted by Hay and Morrisey the proportion of those 
acknowledging religious experiences was kVfo women and 
31$ men from the total sample.
Sir Alister Hardy has come under criticism for the 
"casual" way in which he collected his data. Certainly, 
hot enough accurate sampling has been done in this area 
to satisfy those who believe that such accurate sampling 
is important. Sociologists and psychologists in 
particular are accustomed to collecting data in such 
accurate ways, believing that a crisply-defined profile 
is important, and that without this no conclusions can 
be considered "scientific". But this is to confuse 
objects of study. There is the quite valid aim of • 
studying the people who have religious experiences; 
for this statistical data is important. However, in 
the attempt to study the nature of the experience itself, 
statistics are perhaps useful, but not necessary. We 
must be careful to distinguish the experience from the 
experiencer as the objects of our attention, even though 
they cannot be separated within the operation of 
experiencing. Of the two, the experience, is far more 
elusive. David Bakan pinpoints this elusiveness when 
speaking of the experience of paini
The problem inhe^s in the fact that pain is 'private*.
If one insists that the data of psychology shall be 
'public' then pain has to be ruled out as being beyond 
the enclosing limit.
I am not at all sure that the assumptions which 
lie behind the disciplines of statistical psychology 
and sociology can be or need to be imported into our 
attempts to study religious experience per se. Such
10 Bakan, D. "Disease, Pain and Sacrifice" U of Chicago 
1968 P. 60
beings as experiencers to be quantified and measured, 
the essentially conscious and self-conscious dimensions 
of the experience disappear. We are thus examining 
the experiencer, rather than attempting to stand alongside 
him and share and thus understand his experience. (ioa)
It is possible that a concentration on gathering 
precise and quantifiable statistical data will lead us 
to miss the greater challenge of seeking to understand 
the nature of the experience itself. As Karl Jaspers 
has observed, what matters in the researching of human 
experiences is
  the extent of the inner exploration, it$ depth,
rather than the number of cases consulted. In 
phenomenological method, the analysis aims at uncovering 
comprehensible, rational relationships between the 
elements in a patients account of his experience, (n)
That the techniques of precise statistical analysis may 
be not only inappropriate but positively harmful in that 
they detract from the main thrust of inquiry is suggested 
by Edward Robinsoni
However hard it may be to persuade the academic world 
that a study of mankind that is not supported by a 
battery of figures and statistics can claim to be 
scientific, it may well be positively unscientific to 
bring to the study of man a method or a technique that 
may be enlightening when applied to a quite different 
object, but when used on human beings achieves clarity 
and precision only at the expense of something else* 
the 'total living situation9. (12)
The collection of numbers of examples may be 
reassuring for the people who have the experience; it 
indicates that they are not alone. Religious experience 
can be both frightening and disturbing in itself, and 
also in its present-day implications that the experiencer 
may be going mad. But the reassurance that he is not 
alone does not provide him with any real clue or insight 
into the meaning of what has happened to him, and this 
is the heart of the matter. Statistics may draw our
10a See also* Smail, David "Illusion and Reality1 the
meaning of anxiety" JM Dent & Sons London p. 127-128
11 Jaspers, Karl. "General Psychopathology" Collins I96I
12 Robinson, E. "Tolerating the Paradoxical" RERU Oxford 1978
may be salient, but they cannot offer interpretation or 
understanding.
For these reasons, together with the practical 
matter of the time available, I did not concern myself 
to study all ^,000 autographs during my visit to the 
Religious Experience Research Unit. Fortunately, a 
massive reclassification of the original material is 
being undertaken, with data being selected for publication, 
so it was possible for me to be guided toward certain 
groups of material which were representative.
Although each account bore the stamp of the 
contributor's individuality, and no two therefore were 
alike, none the less broad patterns of similarity were 
apparent. However, one cannot but be struck by the wide 
diversity of experiences which people have reported and 
which they felt carried religious significance. There 
are accounts of being dissociated from one's body; of 
prayer having been answered; of striking changes of’ 
feeling or mood; of sudden feelings of being aware of 
deeper levels of reality, akin to alterations of 
perception; of being in harmony or at one with the world; 
of breathtaking beauty in ordinary things; of the sense 
of a benevolent purpose or power underlying all things*
^he task of classifying the contents of the reports goes 
on, although interim reports have been published. (13) 
However, certain features of "approach" to the experiences 
are noteworthy because they recur time and again. I will 
mention four which are of importance for my purposes and 
which are widespread and frequent in the accounts.
Firstly, significant religious experiences of this 
type almost always happen when one is alone. This feature 
itself suggests that the attempt to understand the experience 
sympathetically will be very different from attempts to 
analyse induced states of trance, group meditation, con­
version, etc.i all of which have a group context. The
13 Hardy, A. "The Spiritual Nature of Man" London Press 1979 
Beardsworth,T. "A sense of Presence" RERU 1977 
Robinson, E. "Living the Questions" RERU 1978
in such situations cannot, therefore, be simply transferred 
to the solitary, spontaneous religious experience. The 
place where the experience occurs varies enormously - in 
open countryside, in church, in the bath, in the 
sitting room, and so on. It seems that there is no place 
which cannot provide the setting for a religious experience, 
and that the "holiness" of the surroundings is virtually . 
irrelevant. But the solitariness is striking and important 
as a recurring feature. When a person is not physically 
alone, he is usually . in^the situation of being 
emotionally "alone in acrowd", wrapped in his own 
subjective feelings - for example, at a symphony concert. 
(1*0 There are exceptions to this rule, though they are 
comparatively few. Some accounts describe religious 
experiences happening on communal occasions, eg. in church, 
or with one other person, eg. makirglove. But on the 
whole, religious experience can be considered a solitary 
happening, an interesting contemporary confirmation of 
the ancient recognition of the need of the holy person 
to be alone from time to time.
Secondly, such experiences are very difficult to 
describe. Time after time people comment on how difficult 
if not impossible it is adequately to convey in words the 
quality, power and content of the experience. In the 
ultimate analysis all personal experience is private, 
incommunicable; but we can identify common areas of 
shared feeling and perception and we can communicate from 
one to another these shared areas with a measure of 
confidence that we make ourselves understood. However, 
there seems to be an awareness that religious experiences 
do not come into this category. Partly this is because 
it is often assumed that such experiences, far from being 
shared as common knowledge, are in fact very rare, and 
that to speak of them will strike no corresponding chord 
in the listener from the latter*s own experience. But
See alsoi Allen,W. "The Timeless Moment" 
Faber & Faber
is considered to be very odd, requiring for its descriptions 
combinations of words which are unusual, perhaps 
paradoxical. In addition, the religious experience is 
often an extreme experience with extreme powers of 
feeling, such as will make a word like "happy" seem 
entirely inadequate. There is a disparity between the 
feelings conventionally described by such words and the 
feelings pertaining to the religious experience. It is 
as though the words "run out", their meanings have to be 
stretched to and beyond breaking point.
Many times, even after quite long, intricate and 
articulate attempts at description, a RERU correspondent 
will add apologetically, "But that is so inadequate to 
convey the feeling" or words to that intent. It is as 
though the content of the experience was "in that direction" 
but much further, much fuller. Here again, of course, 
there are striking similarities between these contemporary 
accounts and the classical accounts of religious 
experience. An emphasis on the ultimate ineffability 
of religious experience, is a universal feature of the 
world's religious literature. Indeed, one Oriental 
classic, the "Tao Te Ching", begins by declaring the 
hopelessness of the task it is setting out to achieve - 
",J*he way that can be spoken of is not the true Way."
Thirdly, religious experiences carry a high level 
of self-authentication. They are powerfully"arresting" 
events in people's lives. One of the more puzzling and 
thought-provokiing features of such experiences is the 
way in which the single and highly unusual experience 
becomes the touchstone of all else. The experience is 
not understood in terms of conventional experience and 
understanding, but vice versa. Conventional experience 
is interpreted, or - perhaps better - re-interpreted, 
in the light of the religious experience. If it is 
possible to speak of a scale of credibility or authority 
covering different kinds of experience and knowledge, 
then religious experience comes very high on that scale.
into two broad types. One is the interpretation in a 
new way of everyday data of experience. For instance, 
many folk in distress will turn to prayer with some 
kind of desperate hope to impel them. The RERU accounts 
contain a number which describe the moment when it is 
realised that such prayer has been effective, even though 
that which is being prayed for has not been acheived.
This seemingly-parodoxical situation occurs when the 
praying person becomes able to accept the circumstances 
which have precipitated the crisis; what alters in many 
cases is the person's attitude toward the circumstances. 
This moment of change has a profound heuristic quality, 
binding together into a harmonious whole a disparate 
gallery of circumstances. It provides an experience of 
deep understanding and acceptance which affords relief, 
joy, tears of happiness, etc. The prayer is answered, 
though not in the childish way originally hoped for.
Such an assertion as "My prayer was answered" is, of 
course, impossible to check because there are no poss­
ibilities of any control process. It can be argued that 
the change in attitude would have arrived anyway. Some 
of the RERU correspondents are quite aware of this, and 
on occasions are moved to apologise for what they 
recognise as the logical or scientific weakness of their 
position. Nonetheless, they assert that the.practice of 
prayer was an important element of the change.
The second kind of self-authentication is that 
offered by the nature of the experience itself. In 
the previous variety just described the experience _is 
the understanding, a completely new kind of understanding 
which is of itself, in its newness,- impressive. In this 
second variety the experience may bring the very opposite 
of understanding; it may in itself constitute a profound 
and disturbing puzzle.
For instance, a number of correspondents report 
occasions when they felt their conscious, perceiving 
selves to be detached from their bodies, able to look 
down upon and observe their physical selves and watch
different perspective. Usually such dissociations 
occur in times of great stress or danger, and the 
alteration in self-perception is accompanied by a 
corresponding alteration in feeling state, eg. from fear 
and distress to calmness, acceptance, resignation. All 
this is simply a datum of experience. It may be - indeed, 
it most certainly is'. - a very peculiar and unusual datum 
requiring investigation, but this does not invalidate its 
claim upon the experiencer. The experiencer knows it 
happens or happened because he is/was involved subject­
ively in the event. He may be as puzzled as anyone 
else about how to understand it, but its occurrence is 
authentic for him.
We who hear or read his report have to decide upon 
the extent to which we deem him a trustworthy witness to 
his own perceptions. We may ask whether he is lying, or 
hallucinating, or whatever. But it is the very oddness 
of the experience which usually leads the experiencer into 
a long spell of asking himself the same questions. Was 
I dreaming? Was I ill? These are questions which arise 
in the wake of such experiences. The experiencer casts 
large doubt upon his own credibility to witness to 
himself. Ultimately it is the very strangeness and 
incomprehensibility of the experience which endows it 
with exceptional authenticity. It is very important for 
the experiencer, for the sake of his own peace of mind, 
to establish whether the event happened, and usually 
much mental effort is expended in distinguishing between 
religious experiences and ordinary sleeping dreams, for 
example, a number of RERU correspondents mention an initial 
urge to classify the experience as a dream, but eventually 
conclude that it could not have been. It is salutary 
that they prefer to live with the awkwardness of the 
experience and all its disturbing after-effects, rather 
than feel an element of self-deception by consigning it 
to the world of more conventional experience.
such experiences in authenticating themselves is the 
fact revealed by repeated assertion that although the 
event may have been fleeting, and unique in a person's 
life, it carries great significance for him and is never 
forgotten. Sometimes it sets off a lifelong process of 
reflection upon its significance.
A person who begins to feel something never experienced 
before will try to interpret the feeling, and the 
interpretation my be fantastic. But the cause of the 
experience will, in due course, proclaim its true meaning^
The experience can also initiate profound changes 
within the experiencer. An example is No. 3122 from the 
RERU files. After a sudden reversal of feeling which 
ended a long period of deep and serious depression with 
an overwhelming experience of love, the correspondent 
adds, "This was the end of the depression; and such 
depression has never returned, even in the face of dire 
adversity." He adds that other people close to him 
detected in him a new "lightness, cheeriness, a kind of 
radiance".
It is as though the experiences bring reassurance 
of a different kind of reality which exists alongside 
the humdrum and everyday, a reality which the experiencers 
have been priveleged to catch some glimpse of. Several 
acknowledge the support and encouragement this knowledge 
gave to them when their lives were beset by grief and 
difficulties. It is as though they have a fundamentally 
more optimistic and constructive attitude toward life 
because they have seen through to a more real or abiding 
leality.
Following on from this last point is the fourth 
feature of religious experience which I wish to mentionj 
namely, that the tone, content or implication of the 
experience is almost invariably benevolent. The experience 
makes the person feel good and aware of goodness. It is
15 Telfer, W. "The Forgiveness of Sins" SCM 1959 P*20
iments, but the figure was less than *K5$ in the first 
3i000 accounts analysed. (This may be because the request 
was for religious experiences, and this may have implied 
that such experiences must only be good.) The smallness 
of the proportion reporting evil as the main character­
istic of their experience is reflected in the work of 
Hay and Morrisey, although they do not offer statistics. 
Suffice it to say that, within the limits of the sampling 
techniques, the great majority report that the experience 
acquainted them with a power or means for good, and that 
the feeling tone following the experience was itself 
highly optimistic.
Thus analysis of the RERU accounts, with supportive 
data from the Nottingham research, indicate these four 
salient characteristics of contemporary religious 
experiences. They happen when the person is alone;■they 
are difficult to describe; they carry a high degree of 
authority and authenticity; they are benevolent.
Just as there seems little specific with regard to 
the place in whih the experiences occur, so there seems 
to be no particular set of circumstances which can 
trigger them off. This is in contradiction to the 
suggestions of Marghanita Laski, who believed that there 
are certain kinds of "triggers" for such experiences.
(16) It is worth noting that she was particularly 
concerned with group experiences and with self-induced 
states of trance and ecstasy. I believe that there are 
important differences between such events and the 
experiences reported by the RERU correspondents, not the 
least being the matter of volition. A shaman, for instance, 
will deliberately set out to induce a trance state within 
himself' in order to acheive a specific ritual process.
He uses techniques which he has learned and adapted 
during a long apprenticeship, Such techniques may include 
physical activity to the point of exhaustion - particularly 
frantic dancing - or the alteration of balance by steady
16 Laski, M. "Ecstasy" Cresset Press 1961
a whole range of different types of drugs. This contrasts 
with the great majority of the RERU accounts in which 
the experience came unhidden, spontaneously, catching the 
experiencer unawares. It should also be noted that more 
recent work among Siberian shamans suggests that their 
methods and techniques do not always succeed in triggering 
off the desired effect; in such circumstances the shamans 
sham',
Sir Alister Hardy points out that there seems to 
be no area of human activity which cannot give rise to 
or trigger off an experience with religious significance 
for the experiencer. (18) However, analysis of the 
accounts indicates certain clusters of events or 
circumstances which occur with particular frequency as 
precursors to such experiences. They include the 
contemplation of the natural world; prayer and meditation; 
music; visual arts and architecture. The first of these, 
the contemplation of nature, is a source of religious 
inspiration at least as old as our sacred literature. 
Paffard notes "that within this category "nature" 
(unspecified), music hills and mountains, sunsets and 
sunrise are the most commonly-mentioned associates of 
nature-mysticism experiences. The inclusion of music in 
this list is somewhat thought-provoking'. (19)
Of particular concern to me was to discover whether 
distress, depression, despair and kindred feeling-states 
played any significant role in association with religious 
experiences. I found that they did. Hardy acknowledges 
that
..... the number of people who have come to find a greater 
spiritual awareness through states of depression forms 
indeed a relatively large proportion. (20)
17 Holm, Nils G. "Religious Ecstasy" Almquist & Wiksell
International Paper 6 by Anna-Leena Siikala.
18 Hardy, A.. "The Spiritual Nature of Man" Clarendon
Press 1979
19 Paffard, M. "Inglorious Wordsworths" Hodder &
Staughton 1973
20 Hardy, A. Ibid
despair can (the word "can" needs to be noted; it does
not always follow) be important in widening and deepening
our religious insight seems to be borne out by observations
based on the RERU material.
In the Nottingham work Hay refines the link between
distress and religious experience. He is unhappy about
calling distress a "trigger" in the sense that it sets
off the experience. When asked specifically what if
anything had seemed to cause their experience, very few
of his interviewees mentioned any particular jaenomenon.
A few mentioned prayer, or a particular situation, or
some sort of stress. But the majority (73$) could think
of nothing with which they would link their experience
casually. However, when the question was revised so that
the interviewees were requested merely to describe their
state of mind at the time, without making causal inference,
distress proved to be a very significant feature. To
the question, "What was your state of mind before you
had the experience?" the response wasi
Distressed or ill at ease 50$
Confused 6$
Curious or Searching 5$
Praying or Concentrating 5$
Nothing Special 3^$
When one reflects that prayer, searching for solutions,
concentrated preoccupation, etc., are all associated
features of states of distress and depression, the
above becomes highly significant.
Although there is no attempt on the part of either
Hardy or Hay to suggest any possible mechanisms to account
for the link between distress and religious experience,
they do emphasise the associative link between the two
as a phenomenological fact of striking frequency. A
person in distress is potentially the recipient of an
experience which will widen his religious sensibility.
What kind of proportion of distressed people do in fact
receive such experiences is unknown. Therefore, it is
impossible to estimate the extent to which the potential
for religious experience is increased by distress.
in full a fairly typical report from the RERU materiali
No. 271
My experience was of a typical mystical kind, yet I think 
stronger and more lasting than is usually reported. All 
of a sudden, when I was walking in the country near my 
home (not taking a walk, just going to the mail-box) 
everything came alive around about me, and seemed to glow 
and breathe with animation - even the sticks and stones 
at my feet, and the mountains across the valleyj the trees 
particularly I remember. It was a very beautiful and 
profoundly disturbing and frightening experience. I know 
now that this is the kind of vision people have after 
taking mescalin. The effect did not fade for a long time? 
at night the stars came alive, and for a week or two, 
day and night, I saw things this way. I did not tell 
anyone about it, and gradually the effect faded, though 
for many weeks I could reproduce it at will. I was filled 
at the same time with a feeling of one-ness with the 
world, and of the unity of all things. I was filled also 
with many other strange feelings which I could not under­
stand or expcess; later I formulated these as the union 
of opposites, the transcendence of good and evil and 
things of that kind. I was frightened and puzzled and 
I was under great strain, particularly as I had to keep 
my feelings to myself. I was afraid for my sanity. I 
had never heard of anything like this before and I began 
to read avidly, trying to understand what had happened 
to me. I really had not the faintest idea where to begin, 
and it took a long, long time - months, I think - before 
I found Freda Fordham's "Jung" and I cried when I read 
it, because I knew that Jung understood what it meant for 
people to have experiences like mine. 1  was deeply 
grateful and felt I could safely say I was not insane.
It took several years of battle within myself, however, 
before I felt I could say I was really sane - a battle 
between my consciousness and unconsciousness went on all 
that time; I could see there was value in both, and I 
was determined not to lose either, though I felt all the 
time as ^ though I was being torn apart. All that time I 
was trying, and I am still trying, to explain the experience. 
I think I understand it now, but it is very hard to put 
into words.
I had been under great emotional strain for many 
years before the event, and this had become extreme in 
the immediately preceding months. I believe I had been 
forced back and back into myself until I reached the 
very depths of my nature and could go no farther; when 
this happened I think there was an equally extreme 
reaction; I think the vision I had was a projection of 
what was in myself. Perhaps thepotentiality for such a 
vision lies deep in the impersonal unconscious of everyone, 
way below the places of the personal unconscious 
emphasised by Freud, in places much better understood 
by Jung.
nearxy Twenty years. x nave never xuao one &e.uej.-ca.x 
effect of the experience. Since then I have been a 
religious person, because, it seems to me, I have a 
religious nature. I belong to no church. I do not 
believe in a personal God, I have no knowledge of 
everlasting life. If I have to describe myself I can 
only say I am a pantheist.
This experience comes into the category of religious 
experience which Ninian Smart classifies as "nature 
mysticism", ie. a modified, enhanced and in some way 
unifying and harmonious perception of the natural world, 
sometimes with the sense also of a power arranging that 
world inorder. The quoted experience is unusual in that 
it seems to have lasted longer than is usually the case, 
and the author inhis first sentence indicates his 
awareness of this. He is obviously familiar with the 
literature on the subject, but this familiarity seems to 
have come after the event.
The quoted account is useful in exemplifying many 
features found in other accounts, including the four 
salient characteristics which I have expanded upon. The 
experience comes spontaneously, unbidden, while he is 
alone. It is ineffable, "very hard to put into words".
It carried great authority, as he has spent many years 
reflecting upon it. Although one does not get an 
immediate sense of the experience as being benevolent, 
he does describe it as being "beautiful" and it is 
obviously very precious to him.
At the same time, it has a threatening or dangerous 
aspect. In the same sentence in which he calls it 
"beautiful" he also says it was a "profoundly disturbing 
and frightening experience". Later he adds that it 
left him "puzzled" as well as frightened, and placed him 
under strain because he felt unable to share the experience. 
He wondered whether or not he might be going mad.
He describes well his attempts to interpret and 
understand the experience. It is clear that, before it 
happened, he had no knowledge of mystical or psychodynamic
uonsiaeraDxe casxmg arouna Derore he was able to begin 
to make sense of it. Eventually, he comes to use Carl 
Jung's psychodynamic theories to provide some kind of 
model to aid his understanding. But perhaps more important, 
in Jung he found the reassurance that someone understood, 
that he was not alone, that others had experienced similar 
things and explored similar paths. Tlis use of Jung's 
theories is by no means unique among those who have such 
experiences. And Jung himself is unusual in being a major 
psychological theorist who takes very seriously the things 
of religion, and their importance for the development of 
the whole person. (21)
The correspondent specifically describes his state
of mind at the time of the experience, and his later concern
for his sanity. He tells us that he had been "under great
emotional strain for many years before the event, and this
had become extreme in the immediately preceding months".
He also mentions his sense of there having been a struggle
between different parts of himself, parts which seem to
be. .
have had an almost independent self and anxious to/jpreserved.
In this case there is more than simply an observed 
association between the experience and his state c^ f mind.
He endeavours to work out a causal connection between his 
distressed state and the inner processes which resulted 
in the experience. This he does, by blending some of the 
assumptions of depth psychology with what seems to be a 
fairly straight-forward model from Newtonian physics, one 
of action and reaction. It is as though "he" - presumably 
that part of himself defined by self-conscious boundaries - 
is some kind of solid and elastic body falling through 
space until he hits the bottom and bounces back up again.
His visionary experience is then understood as a projection 
of what was going on within himself. I must confess that 
I find it difficult to accept this; I can see no reason 
why this projection should occur. In addition, I do not 
think he is accurate in calling his experience a "vision"; 
it was a state of heightened perception of what was around
21 See WS Stewart "The Divided Self"(George Allen & Unwim 196*0 
for an extended account of religious experiences as a 
threat to sanity and the help obtained from Jung's 
theories.
uaucisuciiia or maxe sense of the disturbing event, and 
find important his emphasis on the direct link between 
his state of distress and the occurrence.
It is not easy to estimate what proportion of the 
I* Aukttss-k total RERU material associates religious experience^ /, not 
Precursors* Also, many correspondents do not mention 
wiWei v*. this factor in their accounts. But in some categories
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one can hazard some guess. For instance, in the experiences 
featuring dissociated consciousness (that is, feelings 
of being quite conscious and yet detached from one's body)
28$ of the experiences were specifically mentioned as 
being associated with times of difficulty and stress.
For example, Correspondent No. 3190 describes herself as 
extremely depressed* "deep, gnawing, crumbling despair.... 
so disruptive that I finally gave up my classwork." She 
describes how she lay in her room, sobbing and calling 
to God. Suddenly she felt herself floating near the 
ceiling'. She felt " .... very warm, very calm, and very 
expansive....1 felt no fear at all, only warmth, ecstatic 
joy and at-one-ness with something so powerful that I 
could not then, and cannot now, describe it. The entire 
experience could not have lasted more than a few seconds. 
But in those few seconds I became whole in a way I had 
never been whole before."
In the category of prayer being answered, we may 
assume virtually a 100$ distress factor, presuming that 
supplicatory or petitioning prayer is usually associated 
with some form of distess, In fact, of the experiences 
which centre around a belief that prayer has been 
answered, some 64$ specifically mention that they were 
in a domestic crisis of some kind, 40 $ acknowledge their 
prayer as arising from severe unhappiness, agony of mind, 
fear or a sense of meaninglessness, and 3$ describe a 
crisis of guilt or consciousness of sin. Again, what are 
we to make of experiences which bring a sense of relief 
to those in terminal illness, or what was thought to be 
terminal illness? Here again is a sample in which one
of the circumstances.
For the reasons set out earlier, I confess that I 
am not too concerned about the precise proportions. It 
is enough for me that both the RERU andthe Nottingham 
samples would seem to indicate that between a third and 
a half of those who report having had experiences of a 
religious significance should also report that the 
experience was associated with a period of depression 
or distress.
Before drawing this chapter to a close by considering 
the general implications of the foregoing, I think it 
would be useful to set out some guidelines on what I 
believe to be the correct approach to such accounts and 
such experiences. I suggest that fundamental to our 
attitude should be the qualities of humility and respect| 
we are in the presence of something which carries the most 
profound importance for the folk who have such experiences. 
And we must always remember that the best authority on 
what and how a person feels and thinks is that person 
himself. It is both a mistake and an affront to tell 
another person what he is "really feeling", to tell him 
that he "doesn't really think that".
It is a considerable presumption to claim to interpret 
another person's experience better than he can himself. (22)
Alas, such considerable presumption is not uncommon*.
We must bear in mind that the experience is the 
subject's datum, not ours. We only come to it through 
him; his often struggling attempt to describe it and reveal 
its significance for him is our datum. These two data 
are very different, and we as observers have only a limited 
access to the first via the second. Because of this 
inherent limit we do well to err on the side of caution 
in our assertions.
22 Robinson, E. "Tolerating the Paradoxical" 
RERU Oxford 1978
is done with sensitivity, any attempt to offer an 
explanation is usually gratefully received. Folk who 
suddenly have a very different kind of experience 
bursting into their conventional consciousness find it 
disturbing, alien and anxiety-making. If we can enable 
such folk to realise that they are not alone, it can be 
a source of much reassurance and comfort. The task of 
understanding the experience, no matter how inadequately, 
is one way of taking control of an event which initially 
seemed to take control of us, of familiarising ouselves 
with it and gradually absorbing it into the more 
conventional categories of understanding. If we can 
assista person in his task of understanding by offering 
words, concepts, models to try out and see which, if 
any, fit, then again such an offer is gratefully received.
We must, though, be very careful to avoid any 
tendency to "explain away". This belittles the experience 
and insults the experiencer. There is, alas, a tendency 
to reduce the experience to a number of component .• 
factors and then limit the understanding to a selected 
one or two such factors. An anecdote may illustrate what 
I mean. An acquaintance underwent a somewhat similar 
kind of experience to those under consideration , and 
discussed the matter with a friend who was a doctor. The 
doctor, probably only half-seriously, suggested thatit 
wasprobably to do with his body chemistry. To which my 
acquaintance commented that if his experience was the 
consequence of bad digestion, there was an awful lot 
wrong with good digestion1. The "chemical reduction" is 
common, though. Because certain trance and ecstatic 
states are accompanied by changes in human physiology and 
body chemistry, this does not necessarily mean that such 
changes cause religious experience, and most certainly 
does not mean that religious experiences are of the nature 
of changes in body chemistry.
The assessment of religious experiences is, perhaps, 
as much an aesthetic as a scientific matter. The struggle
sensations and perceptions, is akin to the artist's task 
perhaps more than any other. We who observe must be 
alert to the patterns of events, to the relationships and 
significances of nuances, as well as searching out the 
quantifiable data which can be compared and statistically 
evaluated. This is why the RERU material makes good its 
def iciencies in terms of statistical profiles by having 
people describe their experiences in their own way, 
reflecting their own emphases, recalling what was important 
and what was not according to their own evaluation of 
what has happened to them. As already stressed, we must 
be cauti ous to resist the temptation to stress that an 
event we consider is important is in fact important if 
it is not registered as such by the experiencer. That,
I submit, is not for us to say.
With these provisos in mind, I believe that we can 
confidently assert that such mental/emotional states 
variously described as depression, distress, anxiety, 
stress, etc., have a statistically significant association 
with religious experiences of various kinds, and that 
from the subjective viewpoint of the experiencer such 
states appear to be important within the total breadth of 
the experience; they are recognised as being, insome way 
usually not defined/significant as precursors, At the 
moment we can only say that they are "associated" with 
religious experiences; it is a mistake to think of them 
as "triggers" in the way that Laski uses the term.
We cannot say that depressive states trigger off 
religious experiences for two reasons. Firstly, because 
we have insufficient knowledge of what is going on in the 
total experience to point out chains of connection, saying 
that such-and-such causes or triggers off such-and-such, 
Secondly, because even the speculation about such causal 
chains brings us up against a logical hiatus which is 
quite striking. The sudden development of a state of 
bliss from a state of depression involves a gross incon­
gruity. In our usual analysis of states of being we do
the contary. But in these special experiences, they do 
seem closely associated, and it is this incongruity which 
often lends an additional claim for attention to the 
experience.
To summarise the conclusions of this chapter*
1. Contrary to what might be the general expectation, 
many people have experiences which they interpret as 
being in some way "religious".
2. ^he experiences vary greatly but have certain common 
elements, particularly* solitariness, ineffability, 
authority and authenticity, benevolence, enduring impact 
in memory and /or in lifesljle.
3. In a significant proportion of cases a bad or negative 
state of mind and/or emotion - expessed as despair, anxiety, 
depression, etc. - is associated with the experience as
it s precursor or ambience.
4. We who observe such experiences through the 
descriptions of those who have the experiences must 
respect the subjective integrity of the experience for 
the experiencer.
I am grateful to the staff of the Religious Experience 
Research Unit for their help, and for permission to use 
and quote from their material.
Some Biblical Considerations* Part 1 - Jacob
The Bible's acceptance as canon is evidence that it has 
been judged as not being unique to its authors. (1)
The large-scale collection of examples of human experience 
and behaviour, together with the statistical evaluation of 
such information, is a 20th Century phenomenon. Work such 
as that undertaken by the Religious Experience Research 
Unit in Oxford, by Hay and-Morisy in Nottingham, together 
with the innumerable sociological, psychological, ethno­
graphic, etc. etc., surveys conducted nowadays, is regarded 
as part of the scientific establishment. Such work rests 
on two foundations; our contemporary ability to collect, 
store and retrieve vast amounts of information, and the 
theoretical development of probability and statistical 
analysis as the tool for evaluating it all. Modern man 
seeks both the confirmation of his experience (ie. that 
it is acceptable) and its significance (ie. what it means) 
by comparing it with that of his fellows on a large scale. 
Attention and thought can then be directed at what is 
statistically probable and widespread and what rare and 
unusual, and each examined as such. Such highly-sophisti­
cated abstracts are then often claimed to be "objective".
Until Comparatively recently these methods were 
unobtainable. We had different ways of evaluating our 
experience. Of these the most ancient is that of the 
hero/exampler - the man or woman whose life story is 
known and retold, orally or literally, and who becomes 
a paradigm for certain kinds of human life and experience. 
As a method it is almost diametrically opposite to 
contemporary techniques. Whereas today we collect 
thousands of examples of ordinary foks* experiences and 
actions, aggregate the salient features and reassemble 
them as the "typical person", in the past one "typical
1. Bakan, David "Disease, Pain and Sacrifice" U. of 
Chicago 1968 p .98
of ordinary folk. They would "recognise" features of 
themselves in the hero, just as today we recognise features 
of ourselves in the abstracts from opinion polls. I 
would dare to suggest, however, that the hero figure 
remains a far more powerful and illuminating source of 
self-understanding than do opinion poll abstracts'.
The stories of humankind's heros and examplers have 
certain qualities in common, regardless of their provenance. 
They have to be memorable and attention-demanding, and 
therefore are invariably interesting and often exciting.
They have to be jiausible, no matter how much certain features 
or episodes are exaggerated; such stories are never fantasy. 
Above all, they have to be "true"; that is, they must 
reflect in an undistorted even though magnified way, the 
experiences shared by humanity, and must offer coherent 
and acceptable interpretations of those experiences. Such 
stories are thus always presented in the guise of history, 
usually the history of an individual within the wider 
history of his community. Thus the story offers to its 
.t . • hearers an interpretation and understanding of both
i ^ c u e c L f c - i d * - .  ^ s # ■
tier' individual and collective experiences. The fact that such 
stories are required to appear in the guise of histor^or 
that they are fiction.
If the story of a particular hero/examplar is 
particularly fitted for its task, it becomes paradigmatic. 
Because it offers some true and insightful observations 
about being a human, it is accorded authority as a means 
of revelation and understanding. The deeper, truer and 
more widely applicable its observations, the more accurately 
and effectively it says them, the higher will be its 
value .-to the community and the higher the corresponding 
respect in which it is held. This is one of the ways 
(note* one of the ways) in which a story or a tradition 
acquires canonical status.
No story can say all things to all people. But 
within a collection of such stories it is possible that
of authoritative and illuminating interpretation for his 
own life. In some such way are accumulated the collections 
of stories, legends, traditions, etc., which form the 
hasis of any collective and coherent culturally-hounded 
community. A trustworthy means for diagnosing the 
culture to which any given community belongs is to look 
at the stories told within that community, for that will 
show which wider cultural heritage it shares. (2)
The repository of a culture*s legend-base can take 
different forms; it may be the gathering of elders or a 
priestly caste, who know the stories by rote; it may be 
a unique collection of paintings or documents; it may be 
a book. Whatever it may be, it will be regarded as 
having peculiar authority and be accorded marked respect.
In time, because of the authority and respect in 
which it is held, the legend-base will acquire a 
reciprocal relationship with its community. Not only 
will it be regarded as a resource for helping people to 
understand their lives; it will come to be regarded as a 
source of paradigms for how life ought to be lived. Thus 
it will mould peoples lives into the patterns of inter­
pretations it offers, and each then offers an enhanced 
confirmation of the other; that is, because it offers 
such an accurate understanding it has authority, because 
it is so authoritative people live lives according to its 
precepts, which it then interprets ever more accurately.
I believe that the hero-sagas of the Old Testament 
conform roughly to this pattern. They fulfil the dual 
function of both conforming and confirming human experience. 
In the lives of the heroes are found the materials which 
enable us to .understand what it is to be human and alsof  o \ -
the chosen/God, and which encourage us in our understandings 
to go on and be these things. This is so whether the 
materials are in the form of sagas which have been shaped 
by retelling over generations, such as the hero-stories 
of the Pentateuch, Judges, Samuel and Kings, or whether
2 See, for an example of this method, the four volumes 
of Claude Levi-Strauss* "Introduction to a Science 
of Mythology" Jonathan Cape 1970-81
formed with this end in view, eg. Job, Jonah, Daniel.
If the foregoing assumptions are correct, we should 
expect to find in the Old Testament (as in any other 
collected and sacred tradition) stories of individuals 
which reflect human experience as it is widely shared, 
and which offer religious understanding of such experience.
A qlose and accurate study of the hero/examplar will "r 
illumine our contemporary experience. The fact that such 
stories have been regarded as authoritative for so many 
generations is an indication of their ability to offer 
meaningful and trustworthy interpretations. A story 
which failed to do this would not be useful and, no matter 
how temporarily interesting or entertaining, would drop 
out of use. In stories such as these, accuracy of insight 
is the prime survival factor.
I therefore approached the Old Testament to see 
whether there are in it stories which in any way seem to 
reflect, in their narrative details, the kind of experiences 
which are my concern. Are there stories in which are 
developed the hero's sense of despair, anxiety, depression, 
etc., and which state is terminated suddenly in a highly 
significant and revelatory way? In fact, there are a 
number of such stories which fit the mould well, in addition 
to the recurrence of this theme in the Psalter. Perhaps 
the clearest example is that of Elijah. I have chosen, 
however, to consider two stories where the parallels are 
not quite so well-drawn. One is the story of Jacob, from 
the collectively-created saga-opus of the Book of Genesis. 
The second is the literary creation of the Book of Job.
Jacob
During the past century, Pentateuchal criticism has been 
dominated by the scholarship of source analysis. It is now 
widely accepted that the Pentateuch comprises at least four 
major literary traditions which have been combined and 
edited into one more-or-less smooth and coherent whole.
The criteria for disentangling the various strands of
here.
In the past couple of decades or so, a reaction has 
set in against the more extreme forms of source analysis. 
Some scholars, while accepting as proven the broad outlines 
of source criticism's conclusions, are concerning them­
selves with the fact that from seemingly-disparate sources 
a narrative of sophisticated integrity and skill has 
resulted. It is as though, after many years of concern 
with the parts there is a reawakened interest in the whole. 
Such scholars include Nahum Sarna and JP Fokkelman, and I 
find myself broadly in sympathy with their approach and 
many of their conclusions. The more I consider the Jacob 
saga, the more I am impressed by its integrity as an 
account of a person's life and also by its curiously 
contemporary quality. With certain circumstantial details 
brought up-to-date, it could read very much like a case 
history presented as a court report by a modern social 
worker or psychiatrist. True, the references to God would 
have to be deleted from a court report, as He plays very 
little part in the world-view of the modern caring 
professional. But - as has been pointed out by more than 
one commentator - God is very much in the background in 
the Jacob story, anyway.
This curious, contemporary quality is evidence of the 
true stature of the saga. It has a timeless and universal 
quality, being able to transcend its historical milieu.
I shall therefore treat the story of the life of 
Jacob as an integrated account of the life of an historical 
or pseudo-historical character, an account which has 
heuristic and exemplary qualities for the reader in both 
his individual and communal perspectives. I shall begin by 
considering the observations of Sarna and Fokkelman.
Sarna (1) lays emphasis on the moral dimension in 
Jacob's life. This is a well-chosen theme. Later in this 
work I shall consider the role of conscience and awareness 
of the self as sinning as being powerful movers in the
1 Sarna, Nahum M "Understanding Genesis" Schocken Books
1970
commentators other than Sarna have called attention to it - 
that throughout the Jacob story there runs a thread of 
behaviour which is, to say the least, ethically dubious 
It is certainly dubious from a twentieth-century 
perspective; though much of Jacob's activity has to do 
with "business" - property, wealth, status, etc. - and 
there is much in contemporary business practice which is 
equally dubious, evidence of the narrative's uncannily 
contemporary quality. Sarna maintains that even by the 
standards of some ^,000 years ago it was dubious. He finds 
in this a crucial feature of Jacob's pre-Jabbok character, 
anticipated even by the rivalry in the womb between Jacob 
and Esau and finding its first expression in the coerced 
sale of the birthright.
Sarna maintains that the moral aspect "is of vital 
importance to understand the unfolding narrative." * He 
shows that running alongside Jacob's dubious behaviour is 
the paradoxical perception that this unscrupulous character 
is simultaneously the chosen of God, and that his election 
should be disengaged from his improper conduct. For my 
part I am not too sure about the disengagement. There is 
a sense in which Jacob's weakness and lack of insight is 
revealed.by his striving to achieve what, in some senses, 
he already is. The wickedness of his behaviour throws 
into relief his tuer nature, and adds a somewhat pathetic 
aspect to an otherwise unsympathetic character.
Be that as it may, Sarna rightly points out the 
contradictory nature of Jacob as unscrupulous and yet 
divinely ordained. He believes that this is established 
even before birth (as is also Jacob's contending, striving 
personality) by the oracle which reveals that "the older 
shall serve the younger." (Gen. 25*23) Thus the narrative 
rather calmly observes Jacob's trickery but, though the 
oracle and other hints, makes clear that Jacob's claims and 
achievements depend not on Jacob's efforts but God's 
decision. There is thus both a nice irony and a profound 
psychological insight - we strive to attain what we already 
are, to gain what we already have.
or Esau Out of his birthright and blessing is revealed 
through comparison with the Nuzi texts. These indicate a 
strong likelihood that such endowments were not, as has 
usually been though, sacrosanct to the older son. They 
possibly were transferrable at the will of the father. It 
is possible that Jacob resorted to trickery not in order 
to outmanoeuvre the conventions but to outwit Isaac's 
pronounced favouritism.
Sarna develops the motif of moral interplay by 
drawing out certain parallels between Jacob's actions vis- 
a-vis Esau and what later befalls him. Just as he plays a 
trick on his father by reason of the latter*s blindness and 
so obtains the blessing, so Laban plays a trick on Jacob, 
taking advantage of his effective blindness at night, by 
substituting Leah. And the hand of God is indicated in 
this, as it is Leah who bears Levi and David, the forebears 
of the Mosaic/priestly and the Davidic/Messianic lines 
respectively.
A similar parallel to Jacob's relationship with 
Esau is suggested by the later dissensions which arose 
between Jacob and Laban's family. Sarna suggests that 
initially Laban had only daughters, and that as his son-in- 
law Jacob would stand to inherit. The sons mentioned in 
31*1 were born later and caused the tension between Laban 
and Jacob over the matter of inheritance, a tension pre­
figured in Jacob's earlier rivalry with Esau for the 
inheritance from Isaac. If Sarna's observations are correct 
they would indicate a high level of narrative sophistication 
far removed from the "just growed" theories of the origin 
of the saga.
For Sarna, the human character of Jacob is resolved 
by the eventual integration within his personality of the 
elements of human will and divine destiny, elements which 
for much of his early life were separate and in contention. 
Eventually his own moral direction is reconciled to the 
moral imperatives of God. Sarna believes that this final 
integration of personality, the merging of what Jacob wants 
of himself and what God demands of him, is achieved in the
A new era was about to open in the career of Jacob ....
.. Two incidents, each mysterious, mark the transition.(2)
The first such incident is the very truncated one of 
32i1-2, when Jacob meets the angels. Sarna tentatively 
suggests that this second reference to angels - the first 
being the ladder dream - may mark the closing of a frame­
work opened by the dream. In other words, an indication 
within the narrative structure that the whole Laban episode 
occurs within the context of divine control, as symbolised 
by the presenc2 of the angels which begin and end it.
As for the Jabbok incident, Sarna considers it 
"thoroughly bewildering" and "unparalleled in Biblical 
literature". He regards it as comprising two elements; 
a tale of a river crossing and a tale of an encounter with 
a supernatural agency or demon. He reckons that a tale 
perhaps current in folk-lore has been applied to Jacob, 
and that the change of name - as was the case with Abraham 
and Sarah - betokens a change of intent, a break with the 
past and a fresh destiny. In Jacob's case it is perhaps 
more accurate to see it as betokening not so much a fresh 
destiny, but a new understanding and self-realisation of a 
destiny which has been hinted at from the womb. At the 
Jabbok, Jacob became reconciled to himself and to God.
The struggle with the angel may therefore imply the final 
purging of those unsavoury qualities of character that 
marked his past career. (3)
I find Sarna* s analysis helpful as it highlights the 
moral factors in the story of Jacob, and brings out - without 
attempt’.ing to explain - that element in the character of 
Jacob which led him initially to strive with God/destiny 
and to attain of himself that which was his already as the 
elect of God. His willfulness leads to a split, a
2 Sarna; op cit p.202
3 Sarna; op cit p.20^ 1
necessary for him and what, unbeknown, he already is.
This struggle within his nature "peaks" at the incident by 1 
Jabbok, when his striving nature is accepted, overcome and 
yet, somewhat paradoxically, blessed. Sarna recognises 
the great potency of this episode, even though bewildered 
by it.
Fokkelman also is one of the comparatively few 
commentators who pay particular attention to the Jabbok 
incident and regard it as having a high significance.
He considers it
is indeed an interlude, but one in which a new protagonist 
brings a decisive depth to the narrative ...... ftt)is by no
means a breathing space, by no means an uncommitted 
dissociation from the current situation, but .... very opposite.w
The Jacob narrative seems to abound in parallels and 
internal echoings. I have already mentioned two to which 
Sarna draws attention. Fokkelman draws parallels between 
the Jabbok incident and the events which led up to Jacob's 
obtaining the birthright in Gen. 25*29-3^. Each is "a 
perfectly rounded kernel" and they share an underlying 
structure* preliminaries, conflict, conversation, Jacob's 
evaluation and departure. The striking difference, though, 
is that the second resolves the split between Jacob and his 
destiny which has been inaugurated by the first. Fokkelman 
interprets the Jabbok incident in terms of Jacob's 
increasing displacement in his world and the perceived 
failure of his plans.
Fokkelman argues that not until
...we can give, an “objective” outline of the "exterior' ot-e 
we justified in and capable of gauging the"interior". (5)
By this he means that a sensitive understanding of the 
narrative action of an episode will offer us clues to the 
inner state of the actors involved. Accordingly, he spends
^ Fokkelman, J.P. "Narrative Art in Genesis" Van Gorcum, 
Assen 1975 P* 208 
5 Fokkelman, J. P. "Narrative Art in Genesis" Van Gorcum, 
Assen 1975 P« 209
He draws attention to Jacob's inability to sleep, and to 
his increasingly feverish attempts to defuse the potentially 
explosive encounter with Esau by means of presents and 
envoys, attempts which seem to bring no peace of mind and 
which, on the next day, he recognises as being futile. He 
also makes the observation that God only reveals himself 
to Jacob when the latter is alone, and at night. But in 
such encounters prior to the Jabbok incident
i
(Jacob)* does not see himself yet, does not recognise his 
new identity which can save him, the renewed integrity 
which is born in the recognition and confession of one's 
guilt. (6)
At the Jabbok we find according to Fokkelman a re­
presentation and encapsulation of the major theme of Jacob's 
career to that point. His life had been a striving after 
blessing and birthright, first with Esau, then with Isaac, 
then with Laban. At the Jabbok we again have the strife, 
followed by the wresting of the blessing from his opponent. 
Fokkelman observes that it is typical of what we have by 
this time come to expect of the man that he is too self- 
willed and proud to let the blessing simply be given to 
him? he has to feel that he has obtained it by his own 
efforts. It is this same life-long, grim, proud determina­
tion to define his own destiny (and which therefore requires 
resistance to God's destiny for him) which culminates at 
the Jabbok. There it is paradoxically both countenanced 
and destroyed.
An interesting word in this context, countenanced'. 
Fokkelman questions the extent to which other commentators 
have read into this incident the sense of taboo at seeing 
the face of God which is explicit in the Mosaic narratives 
in Exodus. He observes, I believe correctly, that the 
narrative in Genesis contains no sense of there being 
anything dangerous or forbidden in seeing God's face.
Perhaps the interpretation of 32i30b expressed not by
6 Fokkelman op cit p. 213
life is preserved" but "X have seen the face of God and 
therefore my life (threatened by Esau) is preserved". In 
other words, this is the moment when he realises that his 
prayer in 32ill has been answered, he has been delivered.
Even from such a cursory review as I have offered
here, it is apparent that there are major differences between
the approach of scholars such as Martin Noth (7) and those
such as Sarna and Fokkelman. Such differences arise at
least in part from their differing concerns with what they 
♦
believe the text is about. For Noth, it represents these 
communal and cultic concerns from which it grew and which 
it authenticates. Such scholarship seems to miss what is 
immediately apparent, namely that the Jacob saga is unself­
consciously a human narrative of outstanding depth and 
accuracy of perception into some of the ways in which people 
can relate t) God, and vice versa. It is the meaning of the 
story as it unfolds the development of Jacob's spiritual 
nature which is the concern of such as Sarna and Fokkelman.
And it is in this way that the story is of concern to me.
However, it is necessary to be cautious. Jacob is 
hot some preliterary equivalent of mediaeval, Christian 
Everyman. Yet even while acknowledging this, I believe 
one can discern beneath the details and circumstances 
which derive from his 'sitz in leben' a number of the 
powerful and mysterious themes which are perennial and 
universal. Dissociation and re-integration; alienation and 
reconcil .iation; guilt, repentance and redemption; wilful 
pride and humble acceptance. Just as there are parallels 
within the narrative between the seemingly-different episodes, 
pointing to an underlying unity which has been developed 
with skill, so these different thematic lie as parallel 
strands within the ongoing flow of the story.
It is my contention that when the narrative is 
approached in this way - as a highly perceptive and 
illuminating document on some fundamental aspects of what
7 vide Noth's comments on the Jacob narratives in his
"A History of Pentateuchal Traditions" Prentice-Hall 19^8
an awkward embarrassment, bewildering in its seeming lack , 
of sense or meaning. Instead it is seen as an account of 
one of the mysterious, ineffable crux occasions when there 
is a prodigious upheaval and re-arrangement within the total 
personality of a man. It is the point where the disparate 
and ultimately self-defeating impulses in Jacob's character, 
impelled by guilt, conscience and futility, reach a 
cathartic climax and resolution. Let me consider one or 
two of these major motifs in more detail.
Fundamental to the Jacob saga is the matter of what 
today would be called "sibling rivalry"; that is, a 
relationship between siblings based on jealousy, envy, a 
need to assert oneself above the other, etc. Such sibling 
rivalry is a very important theme in Israelite history, 
particularly the early history. It runs from Cain and Abel, 
through Jacob and Joseph, to the tribal rivalries alluded 
to in Judges and the eventual division of the Kingdom into 
Israel and Judah. In the case of Jacob andEsau such 
rivalry has an immediate and practical justification; 
inheritance and property depend on the brothers' places in 
the family. But a wealth of modern research on the 
relationship between siblings in our society, in which 
property is not so immediately tied to one's place in a 
family, shows that rivalry is widespread and powerful. 
Brothers and sisters compete for parental love, for 
affection, for status, for approval and so on. If 
favouritism is shown by either or both parents, this gives 
added intensity to the feelings siblings have toward each 
other.
If such rivalry within the family is markedly strong, 
it has a lasting effect on the children. As we grow we 
interpret, understand and approach the world as we have 
learned to within our family. We respond to the significant 
other people in our lives as we learned to relate to members 
of our family as children. If what we have learned as 
children is a sense of rivalry, contention, mistrust, we 
shall become to a greater or lesser extent adults who are 
contentious, mistrusting, etc. Consititution probably plays 
some part in this; a person may be naturally contentious
be emphasised by the conditioning it both produces and 
receives during upbringing.
Although modern casework and research may serve to 
give some objective, scientific status to observations 
on the rivalry between siblings, such rivalry is nothing 
new, nor is knowledge about it new. Its recurrence as a 
theme in the oldest parts of the Old Testament is sufficient 
to confirm this. And the rivalry between Jacob and his 
brother Esau is crucial both to the narrative and to the 
development of an understanding of the character of Jacob.
So deep-seated is the rivalry that we are told it 
begins even in the womb. And although Jacob is born second, 
there is divine authority for the reversal of the usual 
order of sibling precedence; in this case it is divinely 
decreed that "the elder shall serve the younger". The 
etiological implications of this are spelled out in 
25?23; the interpersonal implications of it form the 
underlying substance of the whole Jacob Narrative.
The tensions within the family are even further 
heightened by the fact that the parents openly take sides, 
thus doubling the intensity of the rivalry between the 
brothers. One wonders whether parents are using the twins 
in order to enact elements of their own relationship.
Indeed, one wonders about all manner of features to do with 
the family interrelationships and the psychological 
implications thereof which are hinted at by the text, but 
such speculation is probably neither justifiable nor, in 
the long run, fruitful. Sufficient to accept the fact 
that Jacob's early years and development are integral to 
the character of the man; that the tensions within his 
family confirm a basic disposition toward contention and 
striving.
It is within the context of family tensions and 
rivalries that the matter of the birthright and blessing 
becomes symptomatic. They are the signs, the symbols of 
approval, status, and superiority. Although the text with
iAixoa.vuuj.y xxica.aenx sex up oy Kebekah and willingly connived 
by Jacob. The result is an open breach between the brothers 
a situation which Jacob resolves by flight. (Here again 
the text is not straightforward; the journey of Jacob to 
Laban seems to have been authorised by Isaac. One can 
suggest that Isaac, despite his favouritism for Esau,
WQuld draw the line at fratricide among his sons.)
Thus the story of Jacob's career begins within a
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context/intense rivalry. Contention is basic to his 
disposition, and is augmented by parental attitudes.
During his sojourn East of the Jordan the rivalry fades 
into the background, but is reinvoked by the rivalry which 
develops between Jacob and Laban's sons, and as the direct 
consequence of the rivalry his original relationship with 
his brother is resurrected as he is forced to return home 
for the confrontation. It is his overriding consideration 
as he approaches the Jabbok after quitting Laban's 
territory.
The split between Jacob and his brother is reflected 
in a more intimate disociation within Jacob himself. His 
aim to supplant, that is, to establish himself as a 
successful man over and above all others and in particular 
his brother, seems to be achieved. He is what today 
would be called a "high achiever".
Jacob's contrivances to rob Esau are described in almost 
paradigmatic form as a shrewdly successful program for 
getting on and getting ahead. Swindling and cleverness 
of this sort was admired by our moral ancestors. The name 
of the game was - get ahead if you can but avoid theft. 
Match thy wits against thy fellow-creatures and gain as 
much advantage over them as thou canst...... (8)
By cunning, guile and hard work Jacob acheives and obtains 
what he wants. He obtains the birthright; he obtains the 
blessing; he becomes a man of wealth and property; he
8 Menninger, Karl "Whatever became of Sin?" 
Hawthorne Books Inc. N.Y. 1973 p.1^6
each success is obtained only at the cost of family and 
social implications of destructive force, and also at the 
cost of his own conscience.
Although there seems to be no immediate consequence 
in terms of wrath or retribution to the coerced sale of 
the birthright, may its effect on Esau have been cumulative? 
So that, when also tricked out of the blessing, he responds 
murderously to this younger brother who is always outwitting 
him. The cost to Jacob of obtaining these two symbolic 
family benefits is paid in family dissociations - a total 
breach with his brother and exile from his home. In this, 
Jacob is responding in the accepted way of the Old Testament. 
In tha..01d Testament, one of the most frequently-mentioned 
ways of coping with danger or pain is to run away®. There 
are few hero stories which depict their characters delib­
erately confronting danger; examples would be Samson or 
the boy David. But there are many examples of heroes who 
have their times as refugees, eg. Moses, David, Elijah, 
Jotham, Jonah, and of course, Jacob.
In the Old Testament, flight from suffering or danger is 
not in principle injurious to honour; it is a normal, 
recognised reaction to danger. (9)
Jacob's amorous affairs do not progress^smoothly.
In part this is because he is himself outwitted by Laban 
in the matter of the marriage to Leah. In part this is 
because his wives cannot agree together. And also in part 
because his masculinity seems to be put under threat.(30*1)
In material terms, he is a success. "And the man 
increased exceedingly, and had much cattle, and maidservants, 
and menservants, and camels and asses." (30*^3) But he is 
not allowed to enjoy his material success in tranquillity.
The reasons for the growing tension between Jacob and 
Laban's family are complex and not altogether clear. I 
have already mentioned the possibility that the growing
9 Gerstenberger & Schrage "Suffering" Abingdon (Nashville)
1980 p .117
because of the latters® anxieties about the inheritance. 
There may also have been queries about the means whereby 
Jacob obtained such largeflocks. The Biblical reader is 
made aware that the affair with the peeled rods was 
divinely decreed, but without that decree it would look 
very much like sorcery, and doubtless could seem so to 
Laban's dispossessed family. In the background but 
equally plausible is the possibility that Jacob fell victim 
to the universal resentment felt by indigenous folk against 
the stranger who proves himself more successful than they 
are. For these and perhaps other reasons, there comes 
about a change in Laban's attitude toward Jacob, a change 
which the latter notices and he deems it prudent to depart. 
The parting is on fairly amicable terms, but its very 
amicability stems from its irrevocability.
It is possible that if Jacob had been allowed to 
enjoy his material success in a settled and peaceful manner 
he might have lived out his life in equanimity toward his 
severed relationship with his family, with a smothered 
conscience and the ability to endure the friction within 
his marriages; that is, his material success would have 
compensated for his disadvantages. However, in the wake 
of the rift with Laban, Jacob becomes once again a refugee, 
albeit a wealthy one. He thus approaches the Jabbok as a 
man of great substance, but dispossessed.
Running through the descriptions of family rivalries 
and breaches and the setbacks consequent upon his material 
success is the thread of the moral dimension to Jacob's 
career. This is the feature rightly emphasised by Nahum 
Sarna. In a sense, we are completely at a loss to know 
what effect his somewhat dubious activity had upon Jacob's 
conscience. But there are reliable clues. Esau's 
justifiable anger, and Jacob's flight from that anger, 
indicate the serious breach of honour involved in the 
trickery over the blessing. The lengthy self-justification 
of yi ity-13 amounts to a self-defence based partly on divine 
ordination of the events leading to the gaining of the 
flocks by use of the peeled rods, and partly on a tit-for- 
tat argument because Laban owed him wages anyway.
we can see that all these elements - the rivalry with 
Esau, the trickery which has resulted in his wealth, the 
moral tension - serve both to provide the background 
information illuminating the character of Jacob and also 
to heighten the dramatic tension to a level at which 
something has to break. This crux point is, I believe, 
the mysterious incident at the Jabbok. As Jacob approaches 
the Jabbok he is in what contemporary jargon would describe 
as a "double-bind". Whatever he does is fraught with danger 
Consider the options. He cannot return to Laban1s territory 
that option is closed. He could have travelled into 
completely alien country; this would have meant almost 
certain permenant dispossession, homelessness and acute 
danger from marauders drawn by his wealth. His final 
option, the road back to his homeland, is dominated by the 
threatening and vengeance-bent figure of his aggrieved 
brother.
It is possible that Jacob himself hesitated between 
the last two options, but the situation is forced by the 
news that Esau is not waiting upon his arrival but has come 
out with a small army, looking for him and obviously bent 
on revenge. In other words, the choice is taken out of 
Jacob's hands; a particular confrontation is being set up, 
the last option is being forced upon him. It is just this 
dangerous, conscience-invoking course which is gradually 
being revealed as the will of God for Jacob. God is 
leading him into the situation, a situation which he 
cannot escape and which he cannot worm his way out of nor 
manipulate to his advantage. Not surprisingly, Jacob is 
filled with dread. 32*7
His response to the situation into which hefeels 
himself being inexorably driven is to take a series of 
precautions which he hopes will allay or avert the possible 
disaster. The first is the division of his property, on 
the assumption that at least half his possessions may thus 
escape. However, this strategy does not seem to have 
satisfied him, perhaps partly because he felt it would not 
work and because the resultant loss would be too great, 
anyway. His next ruse is to send a number of his servants,
brother and thereby currying his favour. But, again, this 
seems to have been insufficient to allay his fears, and 
we are told that finally he sends on ahead the remainder 
of his possessions, together with his close family - his 
two wives, his concubines and their sons. What his strategy 
was on this occasion we are not told; probably it represents 
an intensification of the previous one, having larger gifts 
and more worthy emissaries.
The text is vague on the time-scale of all this 
activity. There is a suggestion that it all happened in 
one night, but this would seem impossible. Perhaps it 
makes more sense to assume that the nights mentioned in 
32*13 and 22 were consecutive nights. This would mean that 
the division of the property occurred on day 1; the sending 
of the servants and the gifts occurred on day 2; the sending 
of the family early on the second night. The close 
association of the preparation of the gifts with the first 
night would seem to bear out Fokkelman's point that this 
was a time of sleeplessness for Jacob.
In the light of the foregoing I believe we can make 
some justifiable conjectures about Jacob's state of mind.
He was exhausted both in the sense of being physically utterly 
weary, and also emptied of ideas. He was also in a state 
of profound and unsettling anxiety. Perhaps for the very 
first time in his life, Jacob is ina situation which is 
threatening - him and which he cannot handle from his own 
personal abilities. When he compares his predicament with 
the scale of his success but a short while before, the 
current crisis is thrown into deeper relief. There are 
five elements in Jacob's behaviour which are evidence for 
this conjecture.
Firstly, the nature of his activity and the decisions 
which it reflects. Anxiety arises when we are in a position 
of needing to take decisive and effective action, but the 
appropriate action is unknown to us or else we believe 
that there is none. The resultant pattern of behaviour 
in the acutely anxious person is symptomatic. It usually 
consists of a series of decisions; no sooner has one been
and it is modified or substituted by another course of
action. The result is that decision follows decision,
action follows action until, eventually, there is a complete
disintegration of decision-making activity and an inert
helplessness sets in. This is often associated with
reveries - the wish to turn the clock back, to undo what
was done, the growth of guilt/remorse and the onset of
despair. I believe that the sequence of actions adopted
by Jacob in Chapter 32 adequately fit this pattern. He is
being portrayed as a highly anxious person, casting around
for a non-existent solution.
Secondly, a major component of anxiety is fear. We
know enough of Jacob's circumstances to surmise him to be
frightened, but are specifically told this is so in 32*7 •
Thirdly, an important symptom associated with high
levels of anxiety is an inability to sleep. In 32*13
there is a strong suggestion that Jacob was so afflicted,
plus the quite definite description of the night without
sleep by the Jabbok, and it is my suggestion that these
were two separate nights.
Fourthly, Jacob's approach to Esau is one of
appeasement for the wrong he has done him. 32*20. This is
the clearest indication we have of Jacob having a guilty
conscience; he is aware that the initial fault is his,
and that he has no case to plead before his brother. All
he can seek to do is to atone. Guilt feelings are often
aroused by anxiety-inducing circumstances as introspection
is forced upon the anxious person in examination of his
predicament. That anxiety states can often shade into
states of despair and depression may also be attributable
to the rising of guilt feelings, as it is widely acknowledged
in psychodynamic theories that guilt is a most important
underlying feature of depressive states. (10)
Fifths, but by no means lastly, it is in association
with the Jabbok incident that Jacob for the first time
turns to God in prayer* Man under stress is a praying animal. 
    (11)
10 see, for example, the paper of the same title in Melanie 
Klein's "Love, Guilt and Reparation; and other works." 
Hogarth Press 1975
11 Allport, Gordon W "The Individual and His Religion" 
Constable 1951 P» 56
portrayals of suffering generally .... are to be found in
the context of worship in the Old Testament. Loss and pain, 
threat and uncertainty, demand to be considered in prayer. (12)
Until this period in his career, Jacob has not been a 
praying animal'. And until this period the narrator has 
subdued the divine element in the story into the background. 
Although we are left in no doubt that Jacob is living within 
a great and divinely-ordained destiny, the divine presence 
is kept very much in reserve. It is clear that until the 
crisis Jacob has considered himself to be getting on very 
nicely without God's help. But in Chapter 32 he turns to 
the God he has ignored - and there is a hint (although I 
appreciate that it may be no more than the conventional 
self-abasement before God) that he is aware of how little 
he deserves God's favour.
Yet the self-assertiveness of Jacob's nature has to 
be set alongside the prayer. His frantic contingency plans 
indicate that he still cannot trust God, and believes that 
any relief will be up to him to arrange, ie. he does not 
trust God nor God's power nor even, perhaps, God's wish to 
save him. There still survives in Jacob a strong streak 
of "God helps those who help themselves", for Jacob until 
this point had helped himself in both meanings of the 
expression.
(There is a problem with the text as it stands in 
regard to this matter of prayer, as the prayer seems to be 
associated with a Jordan, notJabbok, context. 32*10 
contains specific mention of "this Jordan". However, the 
wider setting is the build-up to the Jabbok encounter, 
and we may perhaps surmise a textual error. Though this 
may not actually be necessary, as the Jabbok was a 
tributary of the Jordan. Alternatively, the word Jordan 
can be used generically to mean "river", as the word Avon 
was once so used in this country.)
Thus we have a picture of Jacob on the banks of the 
Jabbok on that fateful nightj exhausted both physically
12 Gerstenberger and Schrage op cit p.28
anxious, vacillating, guilty, apprehensive, fearful, unable 
to be rescued or solaced by the very things of his life 
upon which he has expended so much of himself. Is this a 
possible surmise for his mental and emotional state?
Might we also conjecture an element of self-doubt, self­
doubt of a gnawing and self-destroying nature?
Before I come to an examination of the Jabbok 
incident in detail, it is as well to look ahead to its 
consequences. The outcome which had been imagined by 
Jacob, which filled him with anxiety and dread, and which 
he believed inexorable, did not in fact happen. And not 
only did those events over which he had no control not 
develop as he had expected; his own behaviour was not as 
he could have predicted. Whereas on the previous day he 
had arranged all that he possessed and held dear into a 
series of buffers between himself and Esau, on the following 
day he leads the way. Moreover, he leads the way in deep 
humility, relying not upon his ability to impress or buy 
off his brother, but only on Esau's willingness and 
ability to forgive. Somehow, from somewhere, Jacob had 
discovered the power and the reality of forgiveness, not 
as a theoretical religious exercise involving the 
appropriate forms of penance but as a living experience 
of being forgiven. This gives added weight to Fokkelman*s 
suggestion that his exclamation "I have seen the face of 
God, and my life is preserved" is evidence of an awareness 
that at the Jabbok Jacob knew the outcome of the future 
on the basis of what had just happened to him. Whatever 
we may conjecture, there is a complete change of strategy 
on Jacob's part; if strategy is the right word for 
behaviour which was unplanned. Indeed, not only was Jacob's 
action unplanned, it seems totally at variance with the 
Jacob we have come to know in his development before the 
Jabbok incident. Being humble and submitting himself 
to the mercy of another man was not his style at all!
He emerged from it a changed man. It is merely a matter 
of conjecture, hut I wonder whether we can consider Esau's 
response to his brother when eventually they meet as being 
determined by an immediate perception of the altered 
character of his brother. Although it had been many years 
since their last meeting, he would recall him as a scheming, 
devious, manipulative person. Perhaps, with that ability 
or faculty for immediate character assessment which most 
of us have and which defies description, Esau saw at once 
that the Jacob he was meeting was a very different kind 
of man from the hated brother whom he had last seen. Esau's 
changed attitude to Jacob - at variance both with what he 
had intended and what Jacob had expected - can thus be 
considered a reflection of the magnitude of the change 
which had occurred in the latter.
I therefore consider that the events by the Jabbok, 
far from being a meaningless and irrelevant interpolation 
as would be maintained by some, constitute the turning 
point in both Jacob's career and his character. "The 
moment marks a great spiritual turning point for Jacob."
(GR Driver) If this is accepted, and if we compare the 
Jabbok incident with other accounts of such critical 
turning points, it will come as no surprise to us that this 
ancient text is difficult, puzzling and obscure. Even 
contemporary accounts, with much more refined vocabularies 
and categories of thought to draw on, find us a t a loss 
adequately to describe what is going on. Because of such 
difficulties and obscurity there are those today who query 
whether such things actually occur, despite the evidence 
for them.
The myth of cure infects our thinking ..... and as one 
consequence we have an altogether superficial and unsympath­
etic view of personal change; we overlook the difficulty 
of change and the pain it demands, as well as the imposs­
ibility of eradicating experience .... It is ironic that
some research investigators of psychotherapy feel that 
improvements in patients due to "significant life events" 
outside the therapeutic situation should be carefully
xnerapeutic technique. (13)
While we must take seriously the suggestion of 
several commentators that the Jabbok incident is based 
around some folk-tale of an encounter with a river spirit,
I cannot accept that this is all it is. (1^) The notion 
of river crossings being guarded by protective, jealous 
and dangerous spirits who take their toll of those who 
would cross is widespread from Scandanavia through to 
Africa. But to acknowledge this is to point to the mystery 
rather than explain it. It raises inteijfsting questions.
Why are tales of the crossing of water threatened by 
malignant forces so widespread? What is the symbolic power 
such a format exercises? Why are changes of role or 
character so often associated with rites of passage requiring 
the crossing of water, or rituals involving myths of such 
crossings? Why is death frequently symbolised as a crossing 
of water? From the tale of the Billy Goats Gruff and the 
story of St. Christopher through to the rites of baptism 
and the prospect of "the grim, ferryman, Death", we seem 
here to be involved in a whole galaxy of myth, folk-lore, 
symbol and rites of passage. And almost invariably the 
crossing involves some loss, some pain or grief, some effort, 
and results in a deep change in the character who crosses.
If the Jabbok incident was originally a floating, 
anonymous story, we are justified in asking why it came to 
be attached to Jacob? What happened to Jacob, at the 
Jabbok or elsewhere, which rendered him apt for having such 
a disturbing story associated with him? If, that is, the 
events described at the Jabbok were not originally peculiar 
to him. I would suggest that Jacob and the events of his 
career fit him into the category of myth and legend, symbol 
and ritual alluded to above. The crossing of the water 
indicated a radical change in Jacob, a change not achieved 
without a tremendous, night-long struggle. Thus, no matter
13 Smail, David "Illusion and Reality; the Meaning of 
Anxiety" Dent 198^ p. 91-2 
1^ See, for example, Skinner in the International Critical 
Commentary on Genesis; McKenzie, John "Jacob at Peniel" 
in Catholic Bib Quart. 1963
to Jacob is no accident. Rather, it is highly indicaxive. 
And we must bear in mind that the story.may have;had its 
origin in the the story of Jacob; it may be original to him.
I think that the fact that the story is to be located 
within the wider context of stories of river crossings with 
wider, symbolic overtones is emphasised by the deep and 
complex layer of symbolic associations, associations which 
can be confirmed from many other sources. Indeed, the 
words used have metaphorical overtones. Night is a time 
of ignorance and fear, when super-human forces are let 
loose. Whether these forces have their origin in a super­
natural realm of reality (ie. have objective existence as 
ghosts and demons) or arise from the depths of the human 
subconscious, and imagination is a point which can be 
debated, depending on one's willingness to accept the 
existence of a supernatural realm or, indeed, the . 
existence of the human subconscious. I would opt for the 
latter - the nighttime being the time when our repression 
of the undesired parts of ourselves is weakened, and that 
which we would rather not face can break through with 
terrifying power.
To this day we speak of "wrestling with conscience"; 
that is, a struggle with some more righteous and judgemental 
aspect of self that cannot be denied and eventually lays 
its claim upon us.
The "voices" and hallucinations of psychotics frequently 
make sense when they are understood in terms of the guilt 
conflicts which they represent. (15)
Crippling as an hysterical displacement symptom is 
well-known in the annals of psychology and psychotherapy 
of all kinds. The precise nature of such displacements is 
a matter for discussion in the medical world, but there 
is ample evidence that on occasions mental or emotional 
disabilities which are too painful to be confronted and 
lived with become displaced into physical symptoms; mental 
blocks become physical blocks. It might be in some such
15 Stein, Edward V "Guilt* Theory and Therapy" 
Allen and Unwin 1969 p.11^
mentally and emotionally freed from its effects, but its 
inhibiting nature results in the displacement into a 
physical disability - he is left crippled.
The last of the symbolic overtones to be mentioned 
here is the change of name. This, of course, reflects 
a precedent set with Abraham and Sarah. But it also 
reflects a change in the character and nature, as also the 
destiny, of Jacob. In >the times of the patriarchal sagas, 
as among many primitives today, the name of a man is far 
more than a mere label. The name both determines and 
reflects the being of the person. A change of name was a 
highly significant symbolic act, only undertaken in rare 
and decisive occasions.
In the graphic and dramatic form of an encounter 
with a strange "man" who has superhuman strength, Jacob's 
inner struggle and the eventual resolution of his spiritual 
turmoil are depicted. It is important to remember, when 
we approach the story as narrative, that symbols do not 
need to be understood in the sense of being fully explicable 
in abstract terms in order that they can be effective as 
means of communication. Indeed I suspect that the less 
they are understood, the more effective they are as 
communicators; the less abstract theorising clusters around 
them, the more effectively they make their point. (16) 
Although we today seek to unravel the spiritual, mental 
and emotional processes signified in such symbolic ways, 
let us not assume that we therefore "understand" the story 
better than those who first heard it. I suggest that those 
who originally told and heard the story would be sensitive 
both to its dramatic impact as narrative and also to its 
deeper implications. The story speaks powerfully to us, 
even today, not merely because it is a striking narrative 
but because it evokes powerful resonances in people's own 
experience.
16 For a fuller treatment of the matter of thepower of 
symbols to be effective see Bruno Bettleheim's "The 
Uses of Enchantment" Penguin Books 1978
wrestling with a foe whose might is greater than his own,
yet who cannot escape from Jacob even though Jacob cannot
shake himself free of his assailant. Somehow they seem
bound together, at least until the light dawns. Jacob is
confronting something which is a part of himself(and
therefore cannot be shaken off) and yet is not subject to
his wil ful control (and therefore seems alien, not
atr
himself, and formidable). It is^the Jabbok that this 
unacknowledged aspect of himself confronts Jacob in its 
fullest power. His conscience has been evoked by the 
precarious situation in which he finds himself, a situation 
he would not have been in had he attended to his conscience 
earlier. Thus his conscience challenges and condemns him, 
and he has no escape from its overwhelming power.
Clearly God had used retraint until now, letting Jacob exert 
himself to the utmost, so that when he was defeated he would 
know that all his shrewdness, his trickery, his underhand­
edness and his strength were not enough. (17)
Fretheim suggests that in the wrestling match we find 
encapsulated the whole nature and previous career of Jacob. 
Just as his abilities were unable ultimately to save him, 
and had led him to the impasse between Laban and Esau, so 
now at' the Jabbok his conscience presents him with the 
impasse between bad conscience and accepting the will of 
God. Jacob is in both a circumstantial and a moral double­
bind .
If he yields, this implies the diminishment of all 
his prior achievements. And yet his achievements are already 
in question, and are part of the total situation which is 
forcing him to yield. He cannot use his achievements to 
bolster his crumbling self-esteem, for his self-esteem 
is based on those very achievements which are themselves 
turning to dust.
The seeming-ambiguity of the contest, in which Jacob 
seems paradoxically both vanquished and victor, both
17 Fretheim, Terence E. "The Jacob Traditions" 
Interpretations 1972
is resolved if it is accepted that the story, whilst seeming 
to speak of two protagonists, is speaking about opposing 
forces within Jacob. There is thus both polarity and 
unity depending upon whether one is considering Jacob divided 
against himself or that unity which encloses, the disparate 
elements of his personality. Even the very rare, multiple 
personality forms of schizophreia arise from what is 
mdoubtedly one person*.
The protagonists are, on the one hand the conscience 
as the expression of thewill of God, on the other the man 
Jacob has created as the expression of the will of Jacob 
at the expense of the former. This latter is an ego- 
construct need some sense of victory otherwise the outcome 
could be disastrous for Jacob. Hence the story depicts 
both Jacob (ego-construct) and the "man" (conscience/God) 
as prevailing. But we are left in no doubt that the latter 
is in fact the stronger, and it is the former's desparation 
which leads to the blessing Df the ego-construct by the 
conscience.
It is the new, wholesome Jacob who renames himself, 
recognising that his character is such as has led him to 
strive both with God and men. The change of name reflects 
the change of character which arises from his acknowledge­
ment of his nature and the negative aspects of it which 
have led him to his parlous situation.
C G Jund uses this story of the Jabbok incident on 
several occasions to illustrate the encounter with what 
he calls the "shadow" - that is, the repressed, unacknow­
ledged, dark and hidden part of the total self which must 
be recognised, accepted and incorporated before we can 
become whole. Hence the ambiguity and confusion in the 
story as to who this mysterious assailant is. Jacob 
cannot know his name, although he knows Jacob. And yet, 
in the fact that the strength of this self-which-is-not- 
self is greater than his own, he is forcibly brought to 
acknowledge that a part of him is responsible to a power 
which immeasurably transcends what he thought was himselfj
is in the hand of God. He realises, suddenly and with 
intuitive insight, that his mysterious opponent is none 
other than God. And the light dawns - literally and 
figuratively.
In summary, then, the Jabbok incident is a dramatic 
account in symbolic form of a man being brought face to 
face withhidden, repressed, ignored or denied parts of 
himself. The agentof this confrontation is his conscience, 
activated by circumstances of extreme stress and desparation, 
with whom he has a tremendous battle before yielding to 
its truth. But in yielding he recognises thathis opponent 
is essentially benevolent, a part of himself hitherto 
unacknowledged. Hence the confusion of names, the ambiguity 
of identities and theultimate change in designation. By 
the end of the struggle Jacob is found to be reconciled 
to the newly-discovered or revealed part of himselfj he 
recognises it as being God-centred, divine. The tdal 
experience has been one of God, although it did not seem so 
until the very end. There is the implication that all that 
has gone before, enfolded within God's destiny for him, has 
led to this painful yet exhilarating moment of revelation.
A new day dawns for the striver with God and men.
The Jabbok incident is one man's version of the odd, 
perplexing and highly important incidents in human lives 
which carry significant religious meaning and the power 
to affect andchange us. It arose in time of crisis and 
appeared in the course of deep inner turmoil. It resolved 
his turmoil by rearranging his personal values and motives. 
The pattern of development seems to have been* life of 
striving for success - setbacks - crisis- anxiety and turmoil 
disintegration/reintegration of self-resumption in modified 
form.
Although I realise that it is difficult to make 
comparisons across the centuries and across so vast a 
culture gap, some of the features highlighted in Chapter 1 
as being salient features of contemporary religious 
experience may be detected in the Jabbok story. In Ch. 1
authority/authenticity, benevolence, association with crisis 
and distress. In the Jabbok narative we are told that Jacob 
was left alone. The obscurity and ambiguity of the narrative
is perhaps a consequence of the ineffability of the experience.
It left Jacob with the conviction that he had encountered 
God, and it had long-term effects both for him as an 
individual and for the nation he founded. Its effect on 
Jacob was for the good. In its wake he was spared by Esau, 
and although remaining a shrewd man he no longer is depicted 
as being deceitful. Lastly, the incident arose during a 
time of profound personal crias which I have interpreted 
in terms of anxiety and guilt.
Thus the story in Gen. 32i22-32 tells the reader that 
it was out of the -impasse of his circumstances and the inner 
crisis that this engendered that Jacob came to recognise 
and accept God's will for him. Our times of failure,
therefore, while they may seem to be created by us, are
set within God's destiny for us; and from the pain of inner 
turmoil and despair can come enlightenment and new beginnings, 
even to the reshaping of our personalities so that we 
become new men. The story acts as a paradigm enabling the 
reader to approach his own despair with at least the hope 
of a positive and creative outcome. It enables the reader 
to recognise and accept that theophanic occurrences canbe 
extremely odd and disturbing. It tells us that we may 
strive with God, and even not recognise him when we are 
in face-to-face encounter with him. That this is the way 
it was with no less a hero than Jacob, and we should not 
hope for more. And that after the dark night of strife, 
the new day dawns and we are blessed.
Some Biblical Considerationsi Part 2 - Job
I am aware that the foregoing study of Jacob, centring on 
the incident at the Jabbok, contains a very large measure 
of conjecture. But conjecture is unavoidable in any 
attempt to understand such narratives ; it is virtually 
forced upon us by the character of the narrative and 
this, as I shall shortly argue, is one of the greatest 
features of such texts. The patriarchal sagas are whata 
modern publisher's blurb might describe as "action-packed 
adventure". We hurry from one event to the next, and the 
reflective content is virtually nil. Ocassionally we are 
granted a one-word summary of the main character's feelings 
or motives - Jacob, we are tersely told, was "afraid",
Esau "hated" - and from the actions described we can under­
stand why he feels this way. But for the most part of the 
inner states of the various characters are left undescribed. 
If we are interested in such things (as I am) we must resort 
to conjecture.
I believe that the attempt to fill the emotional and 
mental vacuum left by a narrative such as that of Jacob is 
both justified and necessary. The meaning of a religious 
drama cannot reside solely in the descriptionof events; 
the attempt to understand the events and elicit their 
meaning must involve an attempt to understand how it felt 
to be involved in those events. If this is not achieved 
the narratives remain locked into their own contemporary 
situation. The reader cannot recreate the events; as 
events they cannot transfer into his own time.
 .an historical event can only take place once. From
the historical point of view the battle of Waterloo is a 
single, unique event which can never be repeated. But the 
essential truth of the myth lies in the fact that it embodies 
a situation of profound emotional significance, a situation, 
moreover, which is in its nature recurrent. (1)
1 Hooke S.H. "The Labarynth" Introduction
historical and mythological criteria. Thqr have the "this 
really happened and needs to be taken seriously" aspect 
of history, plus the recurrent and transferable features 
of myth. Although the reader cannot transfer the events 
to his own time, th e motives, emotions and significances 
lying behind the events can be so transferred. Because he 
makes the effort to get beneath the events, to understand 
how it was to be Jacob, and why Jacob felt and acted as he 
did, a dimension of being human and a part of the relation­
ship between human and divine is opened tohim. Through 
understanding what it meant to be Jacob he is able the more 
fully to understand what it means to be himself. He is 
enabled to appreciate and interpret similar events in his 
own life, and see how the involvement of God in the affairs 
of Jacob may or may not mirror the involvement of God in 
his own life and times. Thus the "action-packed adventures" 
of the patriarchs transcend their historical situation.
It is their very lack of reflective material which lifts 
them out of their historical context, enabling succeeding 
genoations to flesh out the bones of the events with 
appropriate interpretations.
The patriarchal narratives, therefore, demand 
conjecture, demand the attempt to penetrate behind the 
superficial (in a non-perjorative sense) account of events. 
This is what it means to "understand" them. If (and I 
recognise the weight of this "if") human feelings and 
motives remain similar despite the change of circumstances 
from one generation to the next, if.hate, envy, despair, 
ambition, love, lust, etc. are the common lot of succeeding 
generations, then the hypothesis of a common bond linking 
times past with times present at the spiritual and emotional 
level is valid. Those inner motives, feelings and moral 
imperatives which we project from our own time (whenever 
that time may be) into the past can be assumed to carry a 
measure of authenticity. We .can sympathise with Jacob.
(It should be born in mind that this projection of 
understanding, the attempt on the basis of my experience
open, to question, whether we make the attempt over three 
millenia or with contemporaries. We can never really he 
confident that we understand just how another person is 
feeling, what he is experiencing.
 most people cannot accept the fact that others
experience the world in a way radically different from 
themselves. On the wholes people know very little about 
other experiential worlds. Many expeiences are difficult 
to put into words, and some people are not as articulate 
as others, so most people do not guess how very different 
the experiences of others may be. (2)
I suggest that this very real difficulty is not appropriate 
in the present context. A gulf between our understanding 
of Jacob and his own self-understanding and experience is 
irrelevant. The aim is not to achieve an understanding 
of Jacob but rather, through reflection on him, to under­
stand ourselves. Thus any conjecture about and understanding 
of Jacob will in this sense be accurate. One of the features 
of the timelessness of such sagas is that by virtue of their 
skeletal, event-formed nature, they are open to receive any 
number of conjectural projections. The religious strength 
of such a narrative is that it contains so little explicit 
religious form'.
If we bear in mind the origins of the patriarchal 
sagas in oral tradition, we should not be surprised that 
they are largely "action-packed adventure". Such is the 
story-teller's material; ruminations on the state of the 
hero's soul or conscience have no place in the context 
within which such stories originated and became established 
in form. But in other parts of the Old Testament, much 
later in their origins than the sagas, there are explicit 
attempts to convey to the reader the inner and intimate 
realities which coincide with the processes of outward 
events and circumstances. Such attempts almost certainly 
required the development of writing skills of a fairly
2 Essayi Laing's Models of Madness by M. Siegler, H. Osmond 
& H. Mann, in "R.D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry" Ed Boyes 
& Orrill Octagon Books NY 197^
as in the literature of other cultures and languages - the 
material can be initially designateddepending on whether it 
is expressed in prose or poetry.
On the whole, in Old Testament literature prose is 
used for narrative, be it historical, mythological or 
whatever, and also for liturgical, legal and didactic 
writing. Poetry is used to describe how feels to be caught 
up in the tide of events depicted by the prose. Prose is 
used to say what happens when a person or nation is being 
religious; poetry is used to describe how it is to be that 
person or nation. A very clear example of this dichotomy 
is to be found in the Book of Jonah when, in the midst of 
an adventure described in prose, the hero cries to God in 
anguish using (largely plagiarised) verse. What happens to 
Jonah is described in prose. How it felt to be Jonah is 
described in verse. Thus the division between prose and 
poetry reflects the division between the objective and 
subjective data of religion.
Chief among the Old Testament literature which deals 
with the subjective side of religion are some of the 
prophetic books, the Book of Psalms, and some of the Wisdom 
literature. Of these, perhaps the greatest is the Book of 
Job. Here again, as in the Book of Jonah but on a much 
grander scale, a man's anguish is poetically expressed 
within a prose structure depicting the circumstances which 
create that anguish.
The unknown author of the Book of Job has a greatness 
which transcends Biblical confines. The measure and 
expression of human anguish depicted in Job are equalled in, 
say, Second Isaiah or the Book of Jeremiah. Where the author 
of Job excels is in the power and quality and accuracy of 
his writing. His poetic genius sets him in that select 
company of genius which transcends religious, cultural and 
national boundaries. He speaks for the universal human 
spirit in its anguished relationship with God. He is to be 
measured alongside the likes of Homer, Shakespeare, Dante 
and Goethe. Significantly, this last uses the prologue to
Part 1. These two works, widely regarded as being supreme, 
deal with the same theme. The author of Job therefore 
belongs to a company of multi-faceted genius, who combine 
religious wisdom, human compassion and insight, philosophical 
acumen and literary skill.
Although the author is anonymous, we can speculate 
with some measure of assurance on what kind of man he was.
He was probably widely travelled, and therefore probably 
wealthy. His concern with the Biblical category of Wisdom 
reinforces thepossibility of his being wealthy, as Wisdom 
tended to be the domain of the wealthy and successful. He 
'was sophisticated, well-read, educated and highly intelligent. 
Robert Gordis suggests that he may have been, or been very 
interested in the skills of a physician. (3)
This is to say who the author may have been in social 
terms. In more intimate terms, he was a man of the greatest 
insight into the way that human beings are. The way in 
which Job is depicted as being very much the same after his 
ordeal as he was before it, particularly in material terms, 
and yet not exactly the same, and the indefinable nature 
of the difference, tell of a most sensitive ability on the 
part of the author to observe the nuances of human life, 
behaviour and change. I have a strong suspicion that he 
himself had endured personally the kind of anguish which he 
describes so well through the mouth of Job, for in the 
relationship between Job and the Comforters he shows a 
painfully accurate awareness of the gulf which exists 
between those who suffer and those who talk about sufferir©
As Albert Cook expresses iti
This question (Why do I suffer?) does not come about in such 
a way that a man thinking about his suffering makes it into 
an object ... it is not a discussion but a contending 
conversation. (*f)
3 Gordis, Robert "The Book of God and Man" U of Chicago 
1965 p. 57
^ Cook, Albert "The Root of the Thing" Indiana University 
Press 1968 p.25
speculation on theodicy as a portrayal and a polemic.
Last by by no means least of the author's charac­
teristics is his poetic genius. He undoubtedly deserves 
his place among exalted company mentioned earlier. His 
poetry is very rich. It is structurally highly sophisticated, 
abounding in assonance and dissonance, filled with parallels 
and tensions. He expands it with hints of hymns, myths, 
riddles, aphorisms, legends of the age and wide-ranging 
metaphors. From his pen, language becomes almost equal to 
the impossibility of the task he set himself'.
He stacks up parallels within parallels, creating 
poetry in the Hebrew idiom of immense and subtle complexity. 
Consider,
He leadeth counsellors away spoiled,
And judges maketh he fools.
He loseth the bond of kings,
And bindeth their loins with a girdle.
He leadeth priests away spoiled,
And overthroweth the mighty.
He removeth the speech of the trusty,
And taketh away the understanding of the elders.
He poureth contempt upon princes,
And loseth the belt of the strong. 12*17-21
Note that there are not only the immediate parallels we 
would expect between the halves of each couplet. The 
counsellors, who are trusted to offer advice, are picked 
up again six lines later; the binding up of the loins is 
both reflected and refracted in the loosening of the belt, 
again six lines later. If one maintains this six-lines 
repetition, then there is a link between fools and elders 
in the poetic structure of this short extract which reflects 
the link between the elder status of the Comforters and the 
increasing depiction in the work as a whole of their counselirk-
as sheer foolishness. The word "genius" is not /appropriate'.
The Book of Job is unique within the Old Testament in 
a variety of ways, one of which is the breadth of vo-cabulary 
the author has available for his use. This is of the highest 
importance when we seek to understand the comparative success 
he achieved in his difficult task. The attempt to express 
our deepest levels of feeling and understanding is extremely
gories of abstraction, people are concerned that words 
fail adequately to express how they feel. In the time of 
the composition of Job, even the crude abstractions were 
rare.
However, it has been observed frequently that the 
words we use to describe mental and emotional states are 
linked to our physical perceptions. The very word 
"feelings" to describe areas of experience which we do not, 
in fact, feel in the usual sense of that word is an 
indication of this. Moreover, there has always been a 
strong link between inner states of mind and emotion and 
our bodily functions. Conditions of stress or anguish, 
for instance, are accompanied by such physical symptoms as 
sleeplessness, loss of appetite, irregular bowel functioning, 
loss of muscle tone, etc. There is a link between how we 
feel emotionally and how we feel physically. And where 
the categories of emotional expression are inadequate, 
physical description can substitute. The finest example I 
know of the physical being used to express ;the emotional 
and mental is the author's terse depiction of extreme 
apprehension "My bowels boil, and rest not". 31*27
The author combines the words which he does have at 
his disposal to describe inner states and categorical 
abstractions with words of powerful physical imagery 
repeated time and time again, creating a wholly convincing 
and communicating picture of what it is to be Job. For 
instance, the use time and time again of the words for 
belly and womb emphasise the viscerality of despair. The 
longing for death is eloquent of the value Job places upon 
his life. A modern existentialist scholar expands upon 
Job's desire for death at the beginning of his troubles -
The desire for death, normally the first reaction of one 
who has awakened to reality, is a confession of failure 
to find meaning in life. (5)
Quite so'. The author circumvents the shortage of such 
abstract categories by assembling physically descriptive
5 Cox, Dermot "The Triumph of Impotence; Job and the
Tradition of the Absurd" Gregorian University 1978 P«50
Book of Job, we have a very good idea of what Job felt like.
Thus the picture we obtain of the author' is of a 
sophisticated, leisured, highly educated and intelligent, 
and experienced poet of genius and insight. Although 
there have been suggestions that he was not Hebrew but, 
Chaldeean or Egyptian, I think it sensible to consider 
him a widely-travelled Hebrew. Certainly, the book is 
thoroughly Hebrew in style, content and thematic issues, 
despite some Aramaisms.
The book is not easy to date. It is tied to no 
historical event and its style and vocabulary are in some 
ways unique, making semantic comparisons difficult. Basing 
an estimate largely on knowledge of the development of 
religious ideas within Hebrew culture and the ways in which 
such ideas find expression in the book, the suggestion of 
a date somewhere between 500 and 300 BC seems most widely 
accepted. However, as our knowledge of the development of 
Hebrew religious thinking depends to a considerable extent 
on data from the Book of Job, using such a development 
then to date the book seems a rather circular process'.
I do not think that the dating of the book is a 
matter of vital importance. The limits mentioned above 
will suffice. No view of history depends on putting Job 
into historical context; in some ways, the book transcends 
time.
However, an understanding of the contemporary 
religious ideology is most useful in efforts to under­
stand the book. Job suffers anguish at two levels. First 
is the circumstance of his suffering - the loss of his 
property and family, his loss of status within the community, 
his own miserable affliction. But arising from this is the 
second and deeper level of anguish - his conviction that 
the suffering is undeserved and his anguished attempts 
to understand, to make sense of his circumstances, to 
justify himself. I would suggest that the mental suffering 
which is occasioned by the seemingly unjust, inexplicable 
nature of physical suffering^ be the more torturing and 
acute, and have the more profound effects in the long run.
The very basics of a person's life are being shaken .
man to grow proud of himselfi andif it were to he laid 
down that the self-approval of a good conscience is never, 
even in the best men, untainted by worthless pride, I do 
not suppose the assertion could be seriously refuted,.
If we are ever to be in a right - that is, a wholly filial -
relationship to God, this self-satisfaction must be torn
out by the roots. We must come with empty hands. (6)
It is this"tearing out by the roots" - a process as painful
as the metaphor implies - which is the major substance of
the Book of Job. Job's inability to understand and accept 
his situation is crucial; his bewilderment arises from his 
assumption that he did understand and, more over,, did not 
need simply to accept because he was in control of his 
destiny. We therefore need to consider the kind of 
understanding and supposed-control which his suffering so 
brutally abrogates.
It is the conventional understandings offered, by 
Hebrew Wisdom which are under assault in the Book of Job. 
Initially, Job himself was the apotheosis of such under­
standing; the Comforters remain so, with perhaps one slight 
modification.
For the bulk of Hebrew Wisdom literature such 
adjectives as practical, common sense, down-to-earth come 
to mind. It is a corpus devoted to the immediate tasks 
of everyday life. Robert Gordis goes so far as to describe 
it as "everyday advice on how to be a success in life". (?) 
For the Wisdom writers, being a success in life entailed 
being being a successful devotee of Jahweh, for religion 
was a central part of life. Yet while being a successful 
devotee was a part of the overall pattern of success, it 
was simultaneously much more. For the success one 
acheived in other parts of life - as a member of the 
community, family man and householder, man of property, 
man of health and wealth, etc. - depended very much on 
receiving the blessing of God which ensued from successful 
devotion. Wisdom offered advice on how to secure that
blessing* "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom.."
(Prov. 1*7)
6 Mackintosh, H R "The Christian Experience of Forgiveness" 
Fontana Books 1961 p.199
7 Gordis, R op. cit. p. 2k
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of things, meant a proper respect for and relationship 
with God, both in terms of following ritual precepts and 
obeying moral commandments. The man of Wisdom, then, is 
first and foremost a man who is virtuous and righteous, an 
observer of cultic and ethical requirements, upright and 
honourable. All this is summed up in the Hebrew word "tarn" 
is precisely what the Job of the prologue is.
The drawback to all the sound advice of the wisdom 
schools, and to the theoretical constructs based on 
following such advice, was that practical experience showed 
it didn't always work'. It worked sufficiently often tobe 
accepted as a general rule; that this should be so is more 
easily understood when it is recalled that Wisdom was 
chiefly the preoccupation of the wealthier classes, who 
therefore had a head start in the matter of smooth, 
prosperous lives. But even for them, it didn't always work. 
And it was the analysis of the breakdown which led to a 
higher form of Wisdom literature, a Wisdom-literature which 
reflected critically upon the conventional Wisdom and the 
processes which it took for granted. This higher form is 
sometimes referred to as "meta-Wisdom".
Meta-Wisdom is a rational, exploratory, analytical 
commentary on the conventional meanings and values of its 
time. Its chief representatives are the Book of the 
Preacher and the Book of Job. Of the two, the Book of 
Job is the more exalted. Whereas the Book of the Preacher 
says that Wisdom comes to naught^and it matters very much 
indeed. (Though perhaps Job eventually comes to the same 
conclusion as the Preacher, only from the position of 
humility rather than cynicism.) It is because it matters 
to him that Job enters so deeply into his tragedy and 
suffers so intensely. It is through his analysis of what 
it is to suffer and to agonise about that experience of 
suffering - as distinct from merely talking about suffering 
with a concentration of attention on how to avert it, 
which is the substance of conventional Wisdom - that
that eluded him. (8)
The Book of Job, then, makes a response to the 
observed failings in practical terms of the answers and 
theories of conventional religious Wisdom. These failings 
must be seen in their context of the wider shifts in 
Hebrew religion. If the dating of 6-ty centuries BC is 
accepted, then the book was written at a time when the 
traditional Hebrew notions of retributive justice were 
in a state of flux. The nation as a whole had had the 
experience of the Exile to cope with, live through and 
come to terms with; this received its fullest response in 
Deutero-Isiah. Simultaneously, the question of retributive 
justice for the individual within the national collective 
was brought into question. The book of Job addresses itself 
to this latter question, in a particularly penetrating way. 
Indeed, so devastatingly penetrating was its analysis that 
David Bakan maintains that the doubts which have always 
been raised against the book in terms of its historical 
authenticity and place in the canon have served as a form 
of defence against the accuracy of its insight, the 
devestating effect of its penetration upon conventional 
views. (9)
In the Pentateuchal view, the suffering of the 
individual - the undeserved suffering, that is - was 
subsumed within the logic of normal retribution applied 
collectively. The individual may suffer unjustly, but 
the tribe or nation prospers. But the time when the Book 
of Job was written was the time when these collective 
notions were beginning to be calledseriously into question. 
(10) At this time the notion of an afterlife had not been 
fully developed, let alone accepted. Such notion of the 
after-life as there was consisted of a uniform, shadowy 
existence to which all, good and evil alike, were consigned. 
It had not developed that degree of colour in which the 
good and evil of this pesent. life could be reflected in the 
hereafter, and problems of retributive justice- thereby
8 Kahn, Jack "Job's Illness; Loss, Grief and Integration" 
Pergamon Press 1975 p.100
9 Bakan, David "Disease, Pain & Sacrifice" U of Chicago
1968 p .101
10 Tsevat, Matitiahu "The meaning of the Book of Job and other 
Biblical Studies" Ins. for Jewish Studies Dallas NY iQftn
the future, thus obviating the need for resolution here 
and now.
Job, it is true, does toy with the idea of afterlife 
which might carry the consequences of present moral 
decisions, but he rejects it. In this he rejects what - 
so Dermot Cox maintains - would have been a subtle form 
of suicide. He rejects actual suicide in his brusque 
response to his wife. Cox considers that for Job the 
acceptance of a retributive afterlife would have constituted 
moral and intellectual suicide. I think this is to over­
state the case, but certainly the idea is not appealing 
for the author. (11)
The Interior dilemma of the Book of Job, then, 
which poises its hero between his conventional assumptions 
about what should be the case and his inescapable experience 
of what is the case, reflects the ethical dilemma within 
which the whole Jewish faith was poised at that time. It 
was a crucial point in the history of religious development. 
For Job individually and the nation collectively, the 
older meaning-structures of existence were being called 
into question and found seriously wanting. The experience 
of the destruction of that which we cherish causes grief 
and pain; the effect of this in destroying assumptions 
about meaning causes anguish and despair; and the struggle 
toward a new understanding is the heroic dimension 
exemplified in both Job and nation.
The Book of Job presents two well-known textual
puzzles on the larger scale, which I feel I must refer to.
The first is the matter of the relationship of the poetry 
to the prose prologue and epilogue of the work. Matitiahu
Tsevat presents the issue succinctly*
i. The author used and perhaps adapted a prose story 
as the framework for his poetry, 
ii. The author invented and wrote the prose, 
iii. An editor later provided the prose introduction 
and conclusion to round off the original poetic 
' account. (12)
11 Cox, Dermot op. cit. P-32
12 Tsevat, M. op. cit. Extensive footnote on page 1.
tend to favour either the first or the second, on two 
grounds. Firstly, the quality of the prose writing,is 
commensurately high vnfch the poetry, indicating a common 
source. Secondly, although it is remotely possible that 
the poetic section could exist on its own account, most 
would agree that it needs both an introduction and a 
conclusion; otherwise its start and finish would be too 
abrupt. It is highly unlikely that a stylist of the 
stature of the author would have been satisfied with such 
abruptness. We can therefore assume that the poem needs 
a framework, and has done so from its composition. The 
third of the above possibilities would require that the 
original framework had been lost, and the present one 
provided by an editor. This seems tobe a case of 
"multiplying causes" and is to be discouraged on that 
account. Tsevat himself rejects the last possibility, and 
says of the first two*
A choice between them is of little consequence for the 
issue at hand ... in either case the resulting book is 
his creation, and our object of concern is this book. (13)
I agree with Tsevat*s conclusion. Furthermore, I 
cannot share that sense of incongruity or dislocation which 
some critics detect between the prose and poetic sections. 
The two different.styles merely reflect the criteria which 
I mentioned earlier; the prose sections describe the 
circumstances and events which led up to, caused and ensued 
from Job's anguish, whereas the poetic section tells us of 
Job's inner state. This seems entirely in accordance with 
wider Biblical usage. Moreover, the prose sections are 
more than just a framework; they contain some highly- 
significant details which are a considerable help in 
interpreting the more perplexing poetical part of the book.
The second major textual issue (an issue which is 
more pertinent to my theme) is provided by the status of 
the Elihu speeches. Here again, scholarly opinion is 
divided, and although I haven't actually done a head-count
13 Tsevat, M. Op. Cit. Extensive foot note on page 1.
.that«the majority reject these speeches as not oemg 
authentic to the original text. However, I feel a word 
more has to be said about this rejection, and the grounds 
on which it is made.
There is a tendency among scholars to make rather 
free with the text of the Book of Job, shifting verses 
and even whole sections from here to there, or eliminating 
them entirely. This is partly occasioned, no doubt, by 
the complexity of the poetry and the large and difficult 
vocabulary employed, and some of the emendations can be 
justified on semantic or textual grounds. But the more 
drastic revisions are based on more than this. The best 
example is the wholesale elimination of the Elihu speeches; 
perhaps thenext best is the urge to unite (they would say 
re-unite) Job's two answers to Jahweh into one concluding 
speech. (1*0 These alterations are made because the 
commentator feels that the text makes more sense in the 
form to which he has altered it; he can understand it 
better. But consider, this means that the commentator 
is saying that the work means such-and-such, and the fact 
that it does not is of small account because if we re­
arrange the text we shall find that it does. In other 
words, the data are abandoned for the sake of the 
interpretive hypothesis.
But is this not to fail to meet -fte challenge of the 
book? The purpose of the Book of Job is not to provide 
us with a textual puzzle - the Book - but with a human 
puzzle - Job's and hence our predicament in the face of 
unjustified suffering. The extent to which we respond to 
this challenge to our self-understanding by emasculating 
the challenge is the extent of our failure to respond.
This, I contend, is the case with the rejection of 
the Elihu speeches. They are rejected, it is asserted, 
because they say nothing new and Job makes no response to 
them. I donot regard either of these as sufficient reason
1** For a good example of this (and a rather crass piece 
of exegesis) see ”0n Job's Response to Jahweh" by 
John Briggs Curtis in the Journal of Biblical Literature 
981 1*97-511 1979
would maintain, moreover, that not only are they insufficient 
reasons, they are not accurate. The first observation is 
quite straightforwardly wrong. As I shall show later, the 
Elihu speeches do introduce a new element. Moreover, it 
is both appropriate and important that Job receives them 
in silence. Far from these considerations indicating the 
incongruity of the Elihu speeches within the work, they 
indicate that they are in fact authentic to the original, 
an integral part of the development of the whole work.
My interpretation of the Book of Job is therefore 
made on the basis of the extent text, while acknowledging 
that one or two minor modifications are probably justifiable. 
To requote Tsevat, "... our object of concern is this book." 
All of it.
The totality of the Book consists not just in the 
ideas which it explores in a philosophical way, but also 
in the way in which it presents an accurate and moving 
description of what it is like to be in deep anguish and 
despair. Albert Cook's main argument is that the Book 
is a complicated literary exposition of what it is to be 
Job, the poetry corresponding to his mental and emotional 
turmoil. (15) The very physical nature of many of the 
descriptive passages tell of the deep, interior reality 
of suffering, and imply the recognition that without 
knowledge of this reality one is not qualified to discuss 
the matter. The constant going over the same ground reveals 
and reflects that exhausting wheel of anxiety known to 
those who are in despair as they go over their circumcstances 
time and time again, desperately trying to make sense of 
what is happening to them and confronting failure, time 
after time after time, until eventually the whole process 
grinds down into a painful, exhausted silence. It is no 
coincidence, still less a sign of textual interference, 
that Job is silent during the speeches of Elihu, he has 
nothing more to say, he has reached the end limit of his 
attempts to understand and failed. At last he is ready to 
stop talking and start listening, especially if it is to 
something new and pertinent to his predicament.
15 Cook, Albert op. cit.
assumption about the relationship between God and man - 
namely, that the circumstances of life with which we are 
blessed or cursed depend on our relationship with God.
It is assumed that if that relationship is right in the 
sense of being pleasing to God, then we shall be blessed 
by God in worldly circumstances. On the other hand, if 
we ignore the demands of God, live wickedly and irresponsibly, 
then God will send punishment in the form of suffering or 
ill-fortune. In other words, there is a straight forward, 
almost casual, correlation between virtuous and righteous 
living and material and emotional benefit. It is this 
assumed correlation which is so flatly denied by JobT, s 
circumstances, and which is examined in the various 
reflections of the characters of the Book.
Possible means of resolving the dilemma of the 
sufferings of the righteous are variously examined and 
rejected. As already briefly mentioned, the notion of an 
afterlife is found, an unacceptable solution. Sheol is 
the final resting place of all, and itis not a state to 
be desired, (vide 10:21,22 and 17il3-l6) Job found it 
desirable in his initial extremis, when it is conjured 
as a place of oblivion which would relieve him of his 
physical suffering and pain, .(vide: 3:17-22) However, it
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cannot offer any resolution of^why he, the righteous man, 
should have to suffer. In the context of his time, Job 
cannot find solace in the view that even if virtue goes 
unrewarded in this life it will be rewarded in the next.
Another, and much older, means of resolving the 
discrepancies in the observed fate of so many of the 
righteous is the ancient view that the sins of the fathers 
are visited upon the children. There is a distinct 
tension in the text with regard to this belief. Nowhere 
is it offered as a possible explanation of Job's own 
suffering; nowhere is it suggested that he is suffering 
for the iniquities of his ancestors, Hebrew theology had 
moved on by the time of Job's author, incorporating the 
insistence of the canonical prophets that a man suffers 
for his own sins. Yet in the prologue we are told that
Job seeks to expiate the sins or supposed sins of his own children by 
performing the required ritual sacrifices. This would seem to imply that 
we can in some ways bear responsibility for the sins of others; only, in 
this case, it is the sins of the children which are to be expiated by 
the father. This is not straightforward. There is no suggestion that his 
children's sins would be "visited upon” Job; he would not suffer because 
of them. Presumably his children would suffer for their own sins.
However, Job can bear the responsibility of relieving them of their 
suffering, and we are told that he does so. Or attempts to do so 
because, of course, they are among the first to suffer. It is an 
interesting question, but it is not developed at all in the text as 
having any bearing upon Job's own predicament. My own belief is that the 
description of Job making the necessary cultic observances on behalf of 
his children is more to do with creating the "psychological portrait” of 
the man than with any theloogical implications.
The role of the Comforters is to uphold and defend the received
dogma.
The pedagogy of Wisdom literature tells that .... personal suffering is 
as a rule a consequence of deviation from the right way, which is 
indicated by morality and belief. <16)
It is this pedagogy that the Comforters embody. They Insist that because 
Job is suffering, he must have sinned, He may be hiding the fact from 
them, he may be hiding the fact from himself, it may be a sin of his 
youth which he has completely forgotten, but somewhere, sometime he has 
sinned. If Job cannot or will not accept any of these then he must at 
least acknowledge that the sufferings of the righteous are not as 
grievous as the sufferings of the wicked! All these arguments and 
protestations Job receives with contempt.
As the Book develops, the gulf between Job and the Comforters 
widens and, in these characters, the gulf between the theory and the 
practice of suffering is made clear.
16 Gerstenberger & Schrage "Suffering" Abingdon <I!ashville>
1980 p.121
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body are two quite different things. The best theories 
about misfortune can fail in the crucial moment and 
leave the believing thinker as a moaning heap of misery. 
Conversely, it has often happened that in the midst of 
the most exteme distress, ideas have proved valid that 
the sufferer only a little while earlier would have 
rejected. (17)
We are left in no doubt that Job originally was very much 
akin to his Comforters; he was one of their kind and, if 
roles had been reversed, he would have spoken as one of 
them. It is the fact of his suffering which changes him, 
but does not change them.
Most commentators aeem to assume that the Comforters 
gradually entrench themselves more and more firmly into 
their positions, reiterating their supposed arguments with 
the confidence that repetition will produce persuasion 
if not truth. Tsevat (18) points out that the repetition 
of the arguments of the Comforters also serves as a 
poetic device to indicate their emptiness. The conceptual 
grasp of the Comforters is exhausted by their confrontation 
with Job.
While I would agree that for the most part the 
speeches of the Comforters consist of the same ineffective 
arguments repeated, I believe that in the final short speech 
of BMad in Ch. 25 we find the hint of something new - 
a more profound understanding of the human condition. It 
is almost a move toward a recognition of original sin, 
that is, of man's nature being irredeemably flawed by 
virtue of who he is, not what he does. No matter how a
man may exert himself to be righteous, he cannot alter the
fundamentally flawed, alienated nature of himself vis-a- 
vis God.
Ho then can a man be just before God?
Or how can he be clean that is born of woman?
Behold, even the moon hath no brightness,
And the stars are not pure in His sight.
How much less man, that is a worm'.
And the son of man, which is a worm'. 25i^-6
By his inclusion of the moon and stars in the comparison, 
the author seems to be suggesting that there is an essential
17 Gerstenberger & Schrage op. cit._p.ll6
18 Tsevat,*M. op. cit. p.2
entirely different order of being from God. It is not so 
much a matter of the distance between the natures of the 
two in terms of scale or grandeur, as that the difference 
is one of essential being. If I am correct in reading 
this into Chapter 25t then we have here a most important 
and profound shift in our self-understanding; certainly, 
it is novel in the Book of Job. It entails a shift in 
the concept of sin, and therefore of righteousness. Our 
sinfulness is not a consequence of what we do, bot of who 
we are. Thus the righteousness of our actions, our deeds, 
our endeavours, cannot effect this fundamental alienation 
from the Creator, an alienation inherent in our creatureliness.
Job sidesteps this speech by Bildad. He is unable 
to accept it; perhaps unable even to hear it properly.
His integrity is based on the righteousness of his deeds, 
and he fervently believes - indeed, he has staked his 
whole existence on the assumption that - such righteousness 
will transcend the gulf between himself and God. The 
constant comparison which Job makes in his self-justification 
is between what he has done for God, and what God has done 
for him. Job's only response to the new element introduced 
by Bildad is to repeat his modus vivendi and to entrench 
himself firmly and finally in his own sense of integrity.
It is not only the Comforters who do not advance much in 
their arguments. Job ends the cycles of discussion by 
offering a long self-justification, bewailing the unfairness 
of his lot and thus the unfairness of God, and collapsing 
into silence. There is nothing more for him to say.
That Job has nothing more to say does not mean that 
there is nothing more to be said. It is said by Elihu, 
who brings a number of new features to the debate. The 
first novel element he provides is simply himself - and 
thereby a different perspective, after Job and the Comforters 
have trodden and retrodden the ground. The advent of a 
new point of view from a new character should not be under­
estimated. Its benefit in aiding those who suffer any 
form of mental anguish is widely known. Patterns of 
thought tend to go round and round, but make no progress,
a new perspective. Jack Kahn, who writes from the view­
point of a practioner of group psychotherapy, lays great 
emphasis on the arrival of Elihu - anew member of the 
group who has listened and observed, but until now not 
participated in the discussion. (19)
There is further significance in the fact that 
Elihu is not only a new character, but a young character.
He sets himself up - apologetically but confidently - 
against the received wisdom of his elders, the Comforters, 
which has been so inadequate to help Job. In the cultural 
context of the time, for a young man to put himself forward 
under such circumstances would have been considered most 
shocking, for the young were expected to remain silent 
before the wisdom of their elders. This is the author's 
way of emphasising that what Elihu is about to say is both 
new and shocking. In short, the advent of Elihu represents 
a shift in the logic of the poem.
Elihu does not adopt the role of Comforter with 
something new to provide; rather, he comse as a 'discomforter'.' 
As Margaret Susman points out in a very insightful 
contribution, Elihu plunges Job further into his suffering; 
he intensifies Job's anguish and incomprehension. He is 
"uncharitable", having realised that Job must go to the . 
bitter end of his path of suffering in order to understand. 
(20) Jack Kahn makes the same kind of point, using medical 
models. In mental and emotional illness, one cannot begin 
to be helped until one realises that one is ill. In the 
speeches of Elihu, Job's attention is turned away from 
all that is wrong with God, and made to consider just what 
kind of man he is. (21)
I think that Elihu brings two very important and 
and novel insights to the debate, each of which is 
revolutionary within the context of conventional Wisdom.
The first is to set Job free from his assumption of a
19 Kahn, Jack op. cit. p.112 ff
20 Susman, Margaret "God the Creator" in "The Dimensions
of Job" ed. Glatzer, Nahum N. Schocker Books, NYI969 P*97
21 Kahn, Jack op. cit. p.91
itself both painful and demeaning.
Conventional Wisdom posits almost a man-to-man 
relationship with God. Transactions can be made with God, 
almost as though between equals. This, observes Elihu, 
is absurd. Sarcastically, he says:
Look unto the heavens and see;
And behold the skies, which are higher than thou.
If thou hast sinned, what doest thou against Him?
And if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest
thou unto Him?
If thou be righteous, what givest thou Him?
Or what receiveth He of thine hand? 35*5“7
In other words, Job is being asked to consider seriously 
his importance to God, and therewith the nature of the 
transaction between himself and God. Hitherto he has 
assumed that there is some kind of bargain between himself 
and God, and that his calamities and suffering indicate 
that God has not kept His side of the bargain. Such an 
attitude is, of course, the consequence of a deep-seated 
pride of the kind which is called "hubris"; it assumes 
some measure of parity between man and God. It is essentially 
more self-affirming to hold onto the principle of such a 
transaction, even though God is found to fail in his side 
of the bargain when the righteous suffer, than to abandon 
the principle entirely. This latter would be to confirm 
the gulf between self and God.
Therefore Job has laboured under the delusion tha t 
his righteousness matters within the divine economy. This, 
Elihu suggests, is totally unrealistic. He returns to 
the theme again in 37*14-2^, and it is also a substantial 
feature of the Jahweh speeches. What Job has to learn - 
at enormous and painful cost to his sense of self - is 
that he has got the nature of the relationship between 
himself and God fundamentally wrong, ie. that God is 
mighty and therefore can, if He so chooses, ignore Job's 
offering of his virtue. If this were the case, Job's 
complaint would be valid. As it is, however, Job has 
utterly misunderstood the very nature of the relationship
Job's pride and sense of self while all is going well and 
the assumed relationship seems to hold good; so, when all 
collapses around him, it is not just the theological 
principles and assumptions which are under threat of 
destruction, but also Job's pride and sense of self which 
rested upon them. This is why the theological strain 
results in such intense and real personal agony.
In the Elihu speeches we are introduced to the 
innovative idea that virtuous action is, of itsef, secondary. 
It may indicate a right relationship with God and a correct 
estimate of self, but it may also indicate that they are 
wrong. Indeed, strenuous virtue may well indicate a 
deeper and more permanent sense that all is not well with 
self. Paul Weiss (21a) points out that theologically 
there is a difference between sin (violating a pre-rational 
principle) and evil (violating a known ethical principle) 
and observes acutely that a man may be ethically virtuous 
and good not despite but because of his sinfulness. While 
I do not agree that sin is only a violation of principle, 
rational or pre-rational, (for sin is essential, not 
active), I would concur with the main drift of his 
observations. Under no circumstances must it be enter­
tained that virtuous action puts any constraint upon God. 
Margaret Susman's observation that Elihu plunges Job deeper 
into his misery is borne out in this; he is telling Job 
that all he is so proud of, all which he believes justifies 
himself before God, all on which he has based his life and 
his being, is in fact irrelevant. Job does not believein 
God - Job believes only in Job'.
It is not surprising that Job remains silent before 
Elihu. His observations are new, profound, accurate and 
painful. Job is being made alert to the fact that
Divine and human justice are not congruent: they are,
in truth, not mutually intelligible. (22)
It is no easy or pleasant experience to be told that
21a Weiss, Paul "God, Job and Evil" in Glatzner op cit p. 185 
22 Susman, Margaret op cit p .89
nothing. Job has sought to manipulate God by his right­
eousness, and it is the mistaken pride lying behind this 
which Elihu is dissecting out. Normally, Job would have 
easily resisted such insights into himself, but having 
been reduced by his suffering to helplessness, he is at 
last open to the profounder self-understanding that lies 
with the pain of their acceptance.
This dissociation in essence between God and man 
which is emphasised by Elihu reflects that hinted at between 
Creator and creature in Bildad*s speech in Ch. 25. It Is 
later picked up and defined at length in the Jahweh speeches. 
Indeed, in these last Job is distinguished not only from 
God but, because of his mistaken pride, from the remainder 
of the creation, too.
The second major feature which Elihu brings to the 
debate is a new insight into the nature of suffering. 
Hitherto, suffering has been thought of as consequential. 
Elihu suggests that it is functional, purposive.
He keepeth back his soul from the pit,
And his life from perishing by the sword.
He is chastened also with pain upon his bed,
And with continual strife within his bonesi 
So that his life abhorreth bread,
And his soul dainty meat.
His flesh is consumed away, that it cannot be seen;
And his bones that were not seen stick out.
Yea, his soul draweth near the pit,
And his life to the destroyers. 33*18-22
This is an accurate picture of some of the characteristics 
of extreme despair, and is an accurate summary of the state 
to which Job has been reduced. Yet Elihu goes on to observe 
that this state is not visited upon a man as a punishment, 
but as a means to an end. It is not punitive but purposive. 
It is suffering, and only suffering, received and perceived 
aright, which can change a man to the fundamentals of 
his nature, elevating him into both a new and more exalted 
understanding both of God and himselfi
Twice, yea thrice, with a man,
To bring his soul back from the pit,
That he may be enlightened with the light of. the living.
33*29,30
Elihu seems to be saying that a man will be led into 
suffering by God as often as is necessary for him to be 
enlightened. And there are none as unenlightened, and in 
more need of enlightenment, than those who believe themselves 
without sin. It is in this lack of awareness of sin that 
Job is without a proper "fear" of God.
Fear (in which is Wisdom) ..... succeeds at centering
itself in the speaker's integrity. Thereby he combines 
perception and piety, religious vision and the religious 
actof accepting the limits of vision. Elihu points out 
that in his approach Job lacks not perception so much as a 
fully rounded emotional bearing, a "fear" .... (23)
The suffering of those who lack such "fear" must be 
all the greater in that they have the greater change to 
experience before they can understand. The depth and 
intensity of Job's suffering are both consequent upon his 
assumed perfection.
Above all, Job knows himself innocent ..... Still, not 
for a moment does he doubt that his suffering is a 
punishment ordained by God's justice .... Finally, when 
the ceaseless search brings to light the hidden guilt of 
his own existence, it turns out that he cannot be blamed 
for this guilt which is not his own, but the guilt implicit 
in being a man, which finds expression- in Job's question, 
"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" 14*4 (24)
Yet, deep though his suffering is, he is "brought back
from the pit" (ie. physical death) in order that he may
come to and then live with a new understanding. Thus, 
God uses suffering in order that men may learn; the 
abrogation of Wisdom which leads to wisdom is a painful 
process. Elihu brings two complementary understandings 
to Job; firstly, that righteousness is not necessarily 
all it seems to be and, secondly, that suffering is not
what he assumes it to be.
23 Cook, Albert op cit p. 67-68
24 Susman, Margaret op cit p. 88
despair to the brink of a new understanding,'a new 
understanding which dawns not as the consequence of 
theological and philosophical speculation, but in the 
light of revelation. This dawning of revelation is 
presented by the author in what I believe to be the most 
subtle of the skills he brings to the Book of Job; it is 
presented in the very structure and logic (some might say 
"lack of logic") of the work as a whole.
The Book of Job is, in effect, a problem within a 
problem. The inner problem is the ostensible subject of 
the book - the matter of the suffering of the innocent.
Why do the innocent suffer and the wicked prosper?
Although widely referred to as the Problem of Evil its 
technical title - Theodicy - is more accurate and 
appropriate. The problem lies in the righteousness and 
justice (or lack thereof) of God. The subject is a proper 
question to ask, and has been asked perennially. From 
the Book of Job onwards I suppose that it has been recognised 
that there is no satisfactory solution. Certainly, the 
Book of Job itself provides no answer inthe terms within 
which the problem is posed. It comes to no satisfactory 
conclusion. Concerning the inner problem, then, the 
Book asserts that there is no answer to the question.
The outer problem, though, is that despite the lack 
of answer to the inner problem, the Book concludes as 
though an answer has been found®. There is a stark dis­
junction between the implications of the main burden of 
the argument, and the implications of the conclusion.
Although we are not told why the righteous are led into 
suffering, the Book implies that eventually Job understands 
and is brought thereby into a new and more intimate 
relationship with God. It is most odd'.
If the Book were to state outright that there is 
no answer; or that the very construction of the problem 
is in-valid, built upon false premises; then a least 
we would have an honest and straightforward non-conclusion. 
And there are those who, by means of strained exegesis, 
textual manipulation, or a combination of the two, maintain
both should be and is., (25) Such, however, is a shallow 
reading, and says more about the critic's presuppositions 
than about the Book itself.
The disconcerting fact is that eventually we are 
told that Job avers that he has at last seen God face 
to face 42i5* The Comforters, we are told, have not 
spoken rightly "as my servant Job hath" 42*7• And Job 
is finally restored and blessed. But we are not told 
directly what ultimate reality Job has seen in God's 
face, nor are we told directly in what way Job has spoken 
rightly v/hereas the Comforters have not. Nor is it made 
clear why Job's long villification of God should lead 
ultimately to his restoration.
It might be argued (and sometimes is) that this 
seemingly-inappropriate conclusion is no more than the 
remnant of the folk-tale which the author used as his 
framework. It is conjectured that the folk-tale is onein 
which Job is tempted to curse God, does not do so and 
is rewarded by God for his restraint and patience. But 
such a reconstruction is to visit upon the author a sudden 
obtuseness if not stupidity, which is totally belied by 
other indications about him. If he had the wit to write 
3* 1-42*7, he would have had the wit to adapt the folk­
tale to a far more pessimistic, God-denying, form if thqit 
was what he had intended to say. I believe that we must 
conclude that he was alert to the incongruity and that 
the incongruity was important to his purpose. If this is 
accepted, then we must set ourselves to the task of 
pursuing that hidden link between the man body of the 
text and the seemingly-incongruous conclusion.
It does seem to me that the prologue and epilogue 
are both in accord with the main thrust of the larger 
part of the work. As well as defining the outward 
circumstances which have occasioned the subjective 
description of the poetic section, the prologue gives some 
telling hints.as to the kind of person Job originally was,
25 See for examples, JB Curtisi op cit, or CG Jungs 
"Answer to Job" for examples.
outwardly much the same, yet in other ways subtly 
altered. In other words, the Jobs of prologue and epilogue 
are not quite the same character. While reluctant to 
read into the differences . the full-blown clinical 
diagnosis offered by Jack Kahn (26), I think they are 
highly suggestive. A change has been worked in Job 
through his agnony and suffering; the epilogue does not 
describe merely the return to the original status quo.
The Job of the prologue is perfect, more, he is a 
perfectionist. The telling feature is his concern for his 
children, the offering of sacrifice on their behalf just 
in case they might have sinned. His concern is possessive, 
apprehensive, pessimistic, and obsessive, ^t is met and 
alleviated by ritual enactments. His later recitations 
of his virtue are made in terms of his obedience to the 
precepts of the Law. He has little or no confidence in 
his worth before God by virtue of who he is; he seems 
unable to place any trust in God's love or concern for him. 
Indeed, this last possibility never seems to enter his 
head. Instead, he has to create what he feels to be an 
appropriate worth which will commend him to God's mercy 
and blessing by the strenuous practice of virtue, as 
conventionally defined. *
A character such as that of Job is by no means 
unfamiliar in either the literature or the experience and 
practice of pastoral concern. It is an obsession with 
scrupulosity in religious matters, a need to be perfect 
and to be absolutely sure one is perfect, resulting in 
a form of obsessive/compulsive neurosis.
One sees the apotheosized in religious refinements of the 
law, the "commentaries on the commentaries". It is also 
seen in the traditional law-grace controversy, where the 
whole question raised is whether man can live in a 
provisionality accepted by God, or must guarantee a perfect 
performance to survive. (27)
26 Kahn, Jack op cit
27 Stein, Edward V "Guiltj Theory and Therapy" 
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the angry God. It is what Pfister refers to as a synthetic
(as opposed to analytic) solution of guilt. It is
irrationally ritualistic, and it reveals the thinly-veiled 
conviction that God's love is not a reliable given in life 
but something extorted or manipulated - that His true 
nature is wrath and that he needs to be cajoled if we are
to escape his cruelly. (28)
Although such personalities are usually interpreted in 
terms of an over-riding fear of the anger of God, there 
is also an element of pride present. Although the 
relationship being created is with none less thah God, 
the control of the relationship remains within the hands 
of the man.
It is because of his misplaced confidence in the 
solidity of the relationship which he has created with 
God by virtue of his righteousness, and his faith that 
he is the creator of that relationship and is pulling all 
the strings, that there is no sign of fear of God in Job, 
Bewilderment, despair and anger are the emotions which 
are dominant in his response to his calamity. But fear 
of God appears only in his final response to Jahweh as 
he becomes aware of the enormity of what he has presumed 
to do - namely, control the relationship between himself 
and his Creator. The quality which above all marks the 
beginnings of Wisdom is the one quality singularly lacking 
in Job.
It is possible to look at fear or ita apparent lack 
in a person with a deeper insight. The need to take and 
maintain control of a relationship may of itself be a 
symptom of a pathological fear of the object of that 
relationship. It may be that Job does not fear God in an 
appropriate and theologically realistic way, but is so 
utterly terrified of Him that he sets up his life and 
invests utterly in a way of understanding himself which 
will not only serve to lessen tie risks he runs from God9 s 
power, but will serve also to enable him to avoid 
acknowledging and living with his terror. Yet that deeper
28 Stein, Edward V "Guilt; Theory and Therapy" 
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immediate response to calamity, a person will expose 
insights about himself which normally are kept hidden, and 
as soon as the calamitous situation is under some measure 
of control (even if that only means becoming accustomed 
to it) the insights are re-buried. This may be the process 
which lies behind Job's exclamation towards the start 
of the poetic section*
For the thing which I fear is come upon me,
And that which I am afraid of cometh unto me. 3*25
The long process of suffering is necessary for that 
hidden dread, with all its implications, to be faced.
On the other had, the same passage may be interpreted 
as revealing the very untheological nature of Job's fear. 
Seton Pollock (29) argues that the thing which Job fears 
is not God but loss and disgrace. It is this human fear 
which is realised and shattered, casting Job out onto an 
unchartered spiritual ocean. I believe that the two 
kinds of fear are far from being self-contradictory. They 
may be mutually complementary, even.
To some extent the pre-catastrophe character of Job 
is something of a happy hunting ground for those inclined 
toward speculation of a psychological character-assessment 
variety. There is, however, a fair measure of consensus 
among such speculators, once one allows for their individual 
bias toward the various schools of psychological 
speculation. Here, for instance, is a Jungian viewpoint*
It may happen that sincere but misguided efforts to utilise 
the resources of religion to deal with unconscious compexes 
will, by strengthening the ego-defences, increase rather 
than mitigate the disorder. The Biblical story of Job 
presents us with such a case. The immensely devout but 
anxiety-ridden Job intensifies his religious piety, offers . 
sacrifice continually and reiterates his protestations of 
trust in God, but until healed by the final vision, he 
succeeds only in aggravating its unconscious opposite - 
the blaspheming "shadow" which he had projected onto 
his children - and suffers a complete breakdown. The 
pattern is distressingly familiar to those who have been
20 Pollock, Seton "God and a Heretic" Glatzer op cit
p. 270
disturbances, and especially the anxiety-neuroses, which 
sometimes are to be found among the devout. (30)
The overall conclusion seems to be that Job's devotion 
is a complex matter arising not from simple adoration, 
love and worship. It has its springs in Job's anxious 
fear of God and dread-filled concern for the consequences 
of his own and even his children's deeds and misdeeds.
In the epilogue, Job is not concerned about, nor is 
he required to be concerned about, the fate of his 
children. Instead, he is charged to pray for his friends. 
There is a considerable shift here. In the prologue,
Job's concern is enacted in ritual deeds; in the epilogue, 
it is the Comforters, presumably still trapped in their 
mistaken ideas derived from the superficialities of 
conventional Wisdom, who ae called upon to redeem them­
selves through their ritual deeds and sacrifices. But 
their redemption will be effective not by virtue of those 
deeds, but by virtue of Job's prayers offered on their 
behalf. In the prologue, Job failed to save his childen 
by his deeds. In the epilogue, the Comforters will fail 
by like methods. But they will be saved - as perhaps 
the children might have been saved - by Job's prayers 
because he now is in an authentic and truly redemptive 
relationship with God. The pleading of the humble, God- 
trusting soul will avail where the arrogant manipulation 
of the proud will fail. Job can intercede with God on the 
behalf of others because of who he is in the eyes of God, 
not because of what he does.
Job's ordeal changes him. The change is subtle 
and interior. In the epilogue we are told that his 
worldly circumstances are restored, he again becomes a 
man of wealth and property. Outwardly, nothing has 
altered. Within, he is transformed.
Once one has confirmed the absurd one reaches a measure 
of what can be called renunciation, when a man realises 
that he is intellectually incapable of finding a 
meaningful pattern in the world he renounces the effort 
of imposing one, and explores the possibility of trans­
formation. (31)
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with all its pain and self-abasement - is of itself a trans- 
fromation.
That the Jobs of the start and end of the Book are 
very largely the same is one more indication of the depth 
of insight which the author possesses, and leads me to 
surmise that he himself knew from personal experience 
what happens to those who are dragged through the pit of 
despar having - so it seems for a time - lost all. The 
change wrought by grace is one of attitude, of warmth, 
of trust, of openness, of ease where before there had been 
only dis-ease.
But this means that while as far as personal identity 
goes the man is still continuous with his old being, in a 
yet profounder sense what he was has ceased to be. (32)
But the outer problem of the Book remains. How
this change works, how it is brought into effect, we are
not told. That it can and does happen, of this there is
no doubt. Those who see the "happy ending" as a sign
of tampering with the text indicate their own unfamiliarity
with a major feature of the basic phenomenology of religion.
Changes such as that described in the Book of Job, brought
about by calamity and despair, are not unique to that
Book. That it happens, how it feels to be totally at
the mercy of thehappening, are described faultlessly.
But what the process of such change, what its "mechanism"
may be - of this we are given hardly the slightest hint.
It may be that the author did not have available to him
the categories of theological and psychological
abstraction which would have enabled him so to do. (As
I hope to show, even with our vastly more sophisticated
categories of abstraction concerning human behaviour, the
task is still beyond us today.) It may also have been
because he knew personally the ineffable mystery which
lies at the heart of such change, and with the instinct
of* poe.t-ic geAius ke. \<ac >^ cLu u>m  kw belter e
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ultimately inadequate attempts io describe the process 
of such change. Thus the outer problem - why does Job 
have the characteristics of a man whose doubtsand questions 
have been met despite the fact that they have not? - 
is not really a problem but a theological definition.
Indeed, the two problems of the Book - the inner 
problem of the suffering of the righteous and the outer 
problem of the resolution without explicit explanation - 
become as one when we realise that in fact neither is the 
real and substantial problem. The problem of the Book is 
essentially the problem of Job himself. What does it 
mean to be Job? And, in as much as I may identify aspects 
of myself with Job, what does it mean to be me? How can 
a deep-rooted, false understanding of the relationship 
between man and God be rectified? Especially if the 
rectification entails ego-loss; Is suffering the only 
way? If so, then is it necessary that the righteous 
(or the righteous in terms of some forms of righteousness) 
shall suffer?
False understanding depends on the status quo which 
both derives from and maintains that false understanding. 
Alter that status quo and the understanding will be put 
under strain. Destroy the status quo - as happened in 
Job's case .- and the false understanding will disintegrate. 
Thus spiritual suffering is occasioned by material 
suffering, in order that all shall be well.
The Book of Job, then, is about the change brought 
about in a man by suffering, and how suffering is simul­
taneously cause and symptom of that change. The suffering 
which has power to change us must be construed at least 
initially as undeserved suffering. If I feel that I 
deserve my suffering, to that extent I understand it. If 
I can detect reasons and causes for my suffering within 
the worldview which I already hold, the suffering will 
occasion no shift at all in my understanding. If I can 
explain my suffering it remains my suffering and I am in 
control. Only when suffering challenges me am I forced 
to alter in order somehow to accommodate.
the right method to tell him to stop doubting. It is 
rather the right method to tell him to go on doubting .... 
until at last, by some strange enlightenment, he may begin 
to doubt himself. (33)
Nothing initiates or intensifies doubt as fiercely as 
undeserved suffering. Deserved suffering presents the 
suffering of the body only, and raises the question "0 God, 
why cannot I die?" in order to escape the suffering.
This was Job's initial response. But the meaninglessness 
of suffering which is perceived as undeserved, incompre­
hensible, transfers it from the realm of bodily to the 
realm of mental and spiritual anguish and raises the 
deeper and more ultimate question "0 God, why am I alive?" 
•^ his happened later with Job.
To attempt to find the nature of pain, to seek to find 
its meaning, is already to respond to an imperative of 
pain itself. No experience demands and insists upon 
interpretation in the same way. Pain forces the question 
of its meaning and especially of its cause, insofar as 
cause is an important part of its meaning. In those instances 
in which pain is intense and intractable and in which its 
causes are obscure, its demand for interpretation is most 
naked, manifested in the sufferer asking "Why?" (3*0
I think that the above observation is particularly true 
when the causes which are obscure are the theological and 
philosophical constructs which we bring to our understanding 
of pain.
I beleve that the Book of Job depicts with accuracy 
what is involved in a shift from a less to a more authentic 
understanding of the relationship between man and God, 
with all that this implies for the man's self-understanding. 
We see how, because of and through his pain and suffering, 
bodily, mental, emotional and ultimately spiritual, Job 
comes to a more accurate awareness of his own nature and 
the reality of God. He becomes aware of the unbridgeable 
gulf between us and Him; that he is part of the created order
33 Chesterton, GK "Man is most comforted by paradoxes" 
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God can bridge the gulf from his side by his love. Thus 
man's true response to God is humbly to adore. Job is 
divested of his sense of a "special relationship" with God, 
which was the root of his brittle pride. He is overwhelmed 
by an appreciation of what is, rather than what he thinks 
ought *to be when viewed from his own minute perspective.
Job moves himself from the centre of affairs. The 
catalyst of the move is his suffering and despair, for it 
is because he confronts the reality of his suffering, with 
its imperative demands, that his previous assumptions are 
painfully demolished and he accepts the humiliating fact 
that the whole creation is not ordered for his benefit, 
nor can he make it so, nor can he any longer maintain the 
reassuring pretence that it is so.
 it(suffering) forces man into the only possible
authentic position, the recognition of reality. It is 
better to see that there is no answer than to build one's 
life on a false answer. (35)
Better still to realise that life is not a question'.
In an oblique way, the problems of the Book are 
brought to a resolution together. The innocent can and 
do suffer, and God enables it to be so. Because suffering 
is not punitive; it is purposive. Job suffered in order 
that he might become perfect as a man, not perfect as a 
God-substitute.
All I know myself is that I suffer. And if I suffer it is 
because at the origin of myself there is a mutilation, a 
separation. I am separated. What I am separated from,
I cannot name it. Formerly is was called God. Today it 
no longer has any name. (36)
35 Cox, Dermot op cit p. 153
36 Adamou, A. "L'Aveu" Paris, 196^
Despair to Enlightenmenti Part 1 - A Psychodynamic Approach
In the previous three chapters I have sought to present a 
case for considering the enlightenement which arises out 
of despair as a serious object for study and concern. My 
concern has been threefoldi to discover whether or not 
the process happens to any significant extent, to try to 
gauge the measure of importance it carries in the lives 
of those to whom ithappens, and to see what degree of 
religious content it is understood to have. I have there- 
fre examined the process as an objective phenomenon.
In Chapter 1 I reviewed some of the contemporary 
study of religious experience being conducted in this 
country. It would seem that an unexpectedly high propor­
tion of the population have experiences which they under­
stand as having leligious significance. Although a great 
variety of events and experiences are gathered under the 
head of "religious experience", it seems possible to 
abstract certain features which, while not necessarily 
common to all, are to be detected within large sub-groups * 
in the classification of such experiences. I mentioned 
such features as the fact that the majority of experiences 
occur when the experiencer is alone; that the experience 
carries a high level of self-authentication. Two features 
which I wish to emphasise at the start of this chapter are 
the "oddity" or "incongruity" of many such experiences, 
especially when associated with the second feature, the 
factor of the distress/despair/depression of the person 
who has the experience.
By "incongruity" I mean that hiatus or gap in cause 
or logic which is detected between the content of the 
experience and the preceeding or ambient circumstances 
of the experiencer. Part of the striking, attention- 
demanding nature of religious experiences is found in the 
way the experiences seem to stand out more or less starkly 
against the background of their circumstances. They seem
as to their origin and source, unry on reiicuuuu u.« 
discerned that the fact that they seem to come from nowhere 
means only that they do not come from the immediately- 
observable somewhere. In time, a source or origin is 
located. But the incongruity which is felt at the time, 
the disjunction between experience and circumstance, serves 
to enhance the "givenness" of the experience. Usually, 
straightforward causal links cannot be drawn between the 
immediately-preceding events and the experience itself. 
Indeed, sometimes the contents of the experience are so 
utterly odd that it is not possible to say what kind of 
events may have produced it; but more usually, we could 
surmise what events would produce the experience, but they 
did not obtain at the time. Indeed, often their very 
opposite obtained.
For example, out of a long depressive phase, marked 
by the usual inner feelings of utter lack of worth, 
hopelessness, lovelessness, there may suddenly, unexpect­
edly co^e its complete opposite - the kind of bliss, 
associated with being deeply in love, sometimes a bliss 
even beyond that. The incongruity is striking. There 
has been no change of circumstance, just a complete change 
of feeling. We are struck by the fact that the experiencer 
has feelings which should, ordinarily, be occasioned by 
the very opposite of his circumstances. He is left, quite 
understandably, wondering what has happened, where it has 
come from.
Another example might be found in the case of a 
person whose perception is suddenly and consistently 
altered for a while, so that he sees and appreciates all 
around him as having a different "tone" - usually an 
enhanced awareness of benevolence and harmony and all 
being well. Such feelings can be induced by certain 
psychotropic drugs; only, in his case there has been no 
use of such drugs. One can hypothesise a sudden and 
causative change in brain chemistry, but hypothesis is 
all it is. And one leads to the further and difficult 
area of the relationship between feeling states and per­
ceptions and the brain's chemistry. This "chicken and 
egg" problem is one which I do not wish to pursue.
experiences such as those in which the experiencer feels 
his sensible, perceiving self to be dissociated from his 
body, floating away and looking back at himself. In such 
cases it is not that the circumstances which produce such 
occurrences are totally lacking; rather, such experiences 
are outside our conventional understandings of human processes • 
there are no appropriate circumstances. This is a "total 
incongruity". To dismiss such an experience as "hallucination" 
will not do. There are differences between "normal" 
hallucinations and an experience such as that mentioned on 
page 2*1. In any case, hallucinations seems more like 
sticking a large label onto the question mark, rather than 
answering the question.
The second feature from Chapter 1 which I would re­
emphasise here is that distress of one kind or another 
seems to play a significant part in the background to such 
experience. In the experiencers' own accounts it is often 
associated in a non-causal way; they happened to be 
depressed when the experience happened. In some, such as 
that quoted at length on pages 20-1, 'the distress is 
specifically mentioned as having a contributive, perhaps 
causal, function within the experience as a whole. But in 
all such cases, an experience interpreted as being religious 
in content and having features of integration, understanding, 
bliss, the feeling of being in contact with a higher order 
of benevolent existence, arises against a background which 
is marked by the very opposite of these feelings and intuitions.
Thus despair, however it is described, seems to have 
an associative significance in contemporary religious 
experience, and the nature of the experience which arises 
from it emphasises the incongruity of the experience.
It seemed to me that if the experience of a sudden 
shift from distress to peace or bliss is a significant 
part of contemporary religious experience, then either 
present circumstances are totally without precedent 
(which I consider highly unlikely) or that we should find 
some reference to the process in accounts of religious
Moreover, that if the process is a significant one in 
terms of the frequency with which it occurs within the 
total spectrum of religious experience, we should find 
reference to and descriptions of it in the corpus of 
material which is regardes as religiously authoratative.
With this last in mind, I chose to consider the Old Testament.
I am aware that this choice can be criticised because 
of the gulf in terms of time, culture and conceptuality 
between our era and Old Testament times. It might be 
accused that we cannot interpret Old Testament events 
in terms of contemporary understandings; that we can only 
endeavour to "think ourselves back" into their context.
I do not think this criticism is valid, and I am not alone 
in rejecting it.
We shall note significant differences between our reality 
and that of the Old Testament, but we shall not over­
emphasize these differences. The person who is subjected 
to suffering and is tested by suffering remains the same 
in the various cultural systems and historical epochs. (1)
To begin with , if the Old Testament is totally 
alien to modern people, its value as a religious ;text 
vanishes. It becomes the source for archaic sholarship, 
and no more. The fact that it is widely used in Judaeo- 
Christian culture as a religious source indicated that 
this is not the case.
But this is a negative argument. Identity of meaning, 
purpose and understanding can be found between Old 
Testament times and our own.
 I, as a psychologist, have found myself looking with
renewed interest and respect at some of the great cultural 
and historical documents of the past; and I have found 
nothing more illuminating than that remarkable collection 
of writings known as the Old Testament. (2)
As justification for my assertion, consider briefly the 
two examples I chose to examine at length in Chapters 2 
and 3 - Jacob and Job. The immediate problem presented
1 Gerstenberger & Schrage "Suffering" FP Leiden 1977P-1*!'
2 Mowrer, 0 Hobart "The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion" 
D Van Nostrand Colne 1961 p.28
lack, is a concern among folk in Great Britain today which 
is alive and well and close to the surface. As a minister,
I am struck by the number of people I meet in personal work 
who, facing a personal calamity or criss, will express 
first of all the question "What have I done to deserve this?" 
Sometimes they will offer confession of some long-concealed 
misdemeanour as a sufficient explanation of their current 
misfortune. The problem with which the Book of Job initially 
wrestles is based on a view widely held two-and-a-half 
millenia later - namely, that somehow we earn or deserve 
the good or ill fortune we receive. Similarly, there is 
identity between Job's sense of grievance and the feelings 
of being ill-used,ill-requited among people today who 
cannot find due cause (according to their understanding 
of things) for their suffering. In other words, there is 
an immediate community of concern between our day and that 
of the author of the Book of Job.
Similarly the major thematic issues of the Jacob 
saga - parental preferences, sibling rivalry, manipulation 
of people and circumstances, the striving after material 
gain, the survival power of the conscience - ^re matters 
which immediately confront us today in our concern for 
others and ourselves.
In short, once one gets beneath the outward 
circumstances and cultural sets of such characters as Jacob 
and Job, one's response is not so much how archaic they 
are, but how modern'. Thus, the attempt to find parallels 
for contemporary human experience in a corpus of tradition 
which, while archaic, is still regarded as carrying 
religious insight and authority is, I believe, entirely 
justified.
Furthermore, just as there is a link between these 
two characters and modern men and women, so there are 
links between the career of Jacob and that of Job; this 
despite their coming from very different temporal and 
cultural backgrounds and being written about with great 
differences of style and emphasis. Each character is
with a reversal in that self-defined success. Each enters 
a period of bewilderment and despair. Each is brought, 
in the middle of that distress, into a struggle which 
results in their seeing the very face of God. Each returns 
from this experience to a resumption of his previous 
character and a restoration of the wealth andposition he 
thought he had lost, but there are slight, subtle yet 
significant changes in "deportment". In each case the 
turning of the despair is narrated in a way which indicates 
that this event is odd and mysterious. In Jacob's case, 
the process of transformation is marked as ineffable by not 
even being described; instead, we see the outcome in 
term's of Job's transformation from rebellious, ignorant 
pride to humble enlightenment without any account of the 
actual transformation.
Although Jacob and Job serve as paradigms for this 
strange process whereby from despair comes enlightenment, 
an enlightenment which is regarded as God-given, they are 
not the only examples to be found in the Old Testament.
The career of Elijah, for example, shows the same 
progression of success, setback, bewilderment (literally, 
for he is mentally, emotionally and physically "in the 
wilderness"), suicidal despair, transformation which comes 
through a still, small voice though what it says is not 
recorded, return to the world. Psalm 22 and others 
encapsulate in poetic form the same process.
Moreover, the Old Testament examples show parallels 
with some of the features frequently found among the 
contemporary reports of religious experience. There is 
the background of despair or distress. Jacob and Elijah 
were alone at the time of the experience; although Job 
was not alone physically, he was alienated from those about 
him, locked within his own misery. The turning-point is 
acknowledged as being most odd by the very way in which 
it is or is not described. Each finds it highly authorative 
it is an experience of the reality of God. Each is both 
restored and transformed by the experience. Compare this
I hope that by now I have done enough to justify my 
contention that people in despair are sometimes suddenly 
lifted out of that despair in ways explicable and not of 
their own doing, and that this experience is a significant 
part of the wider canvas of mankinds religious consciousness. 
I would maintain that we have evidence that this kind of 
experience has provided men and women with a most important 
datum of religion from the earliest records of religion 
to the present day.
However, while asserting a community of identity 
underlying the phenomena of long-ago and today, I have to 
acknowledge that there must be a considerable difference 
of approach and response to the circumstances that initiate 
it. If the two characters from the Old Testament were 
alive today, Jacob possibly and Job almost certainly would 
have been referred to a doctor. Occurrences which disturb 
the homeostasis of the individual are nowadays all to be 
regarded as illness, and these include the disturbances 
which while having physical symptoms are largely mental 
and emotional inorigin. Thus states of bewilderment, 
anxiety, despair, grief, depression, etc. which interfere 
with the normal functioning of a person are regarded as 
illnesses in need of cure.
The development of this atitude toward abnormal 
mental and emotional states need not concern us here, 
except to mention two features of it. The first - which 
I shall develop more fully later - has been to alter our 
perception of guilt. Illness is something for which the 
ill person cannot be held totally responsible; sometimes 
he is not responsible at all. The definition of mental 
and emotional abnormalities from personality problems 
through to acute schizophrenia as "illnesses" serves to 
lessen the feelings of shame and guilt associated with them. 
However, it is widely found that guilt plays a significant 
part in many such abnormalities, either close to the surface 
or more deeply repressed. Those who adopt the medical 
model of such states as illness, have therefore to
in a condition over which the person involved ought not, 
in theory, to have guilt. The adoption of the medical 
model therefore involves some sleight-of-hand with the 
phenomenon of guilt, regarding it as at once real yet 
inappropriate. The suffering individual is regarded as 
feeling guilty for things which he should not feel guilty 
about; and much therapy requires that the attempt be made 
to enable him to see his pseudo-guilt realistically, and 
thus be released from it when he discovers its insubstan- 
tially. This point will becpme more important as I develop 
my theme.
The second point to be made here is that the under­
standing of mental/emotional abnormality as "illness" is 
by no means universally accepted. Its medical classification 
can be shown to be an historical accident to some extent, 
reflecting the professional backgrounds and circumstances 
of pioneers in the field. Failings in the coherent 
application of the model have been raised by critics centring 
round the names of R D Laing in Cleat Britain and Thomas 
Szasz in the USA. Much present-day psychiatric practice 
pays homage to the notion of mental illness more out of 
expediency and economics than as a sound reflection of 
practice. Modern psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice 
constitutes an extremely wide and varied professional field, 
and many of its practitioners are in fact very undogmatic 
and eclectic in their choice and use of methods. I feel 
it necessary to make this point in order to emphasise that 
there is nothing untoward, let alone revolutionary, in 
examining and seeking to go beyond the assumptions of the 
"illness models" of mental/emotional abnormalities.
However, if we accept for the intenmthe use of the 
notion of illness, then Job, for instance, might be 
diagnosed as having acute grief and severe reactive depres­
sion. Today his"illness" would bring a response of 
"treatment" fromsuitably-qualified persons, which would 
eventually lead to a satisfactory "cure". The exact nature 
of the treatment would depend largely on the persons 
administering it; it could be exclusively chemo-therapy,
to discover and administer the appropriate drugs. On the 
other hand, it may be exclusively "talk-therapy" from one 
of the various schools of practice. Most probably, it 
would be a mixture of both, with maybe group therapy added 
for good measure. As before mentioned, most psychiatric 
practitioners are eclectic using (if truth be acknowledged) 
what seems to work best in the particular case.
The course of a typical case of reactive depression 
may go like this*
1. Initially there is a state of normal or satisfactory 
living, which undergoes some crisis or setback. This leads 
to
2. A state of anxiety arising from the effort to restore 
the above state of satisfactory living, but which is 
frustrated and fails. This leads to
3. A.-state of anxious searching for an understanding of 
the above calamity and the failure to restore normality, 
the search being conducted in terms of the meaning-systems 
appropriate to 1. This fails, and leads to
k, The disintegration of assumed meanings and values; 
bewilderment; hostility towards self and environs, including 
the rest of the whole Universe and God; the collapse of 
the sense of self; feelings of failure; etc. At the same 
time, there will have been a gradual deterioration of the 
physical self. This is
5 The state of chronic depression, with its attendant 
physical, emotional and mental symptoms. This is regarded 
as the "illness". It is treated by
6^  The combination of some form of therapy with constitutional
vitality, and the support which attention and concern give. 
This leads to
7 A modified attitude toward self and environs, a distancing 
of self from the disasters in 1-3 and the ability to blank 
off their implications which caused such pain, a focussing 
of attention on other, positive areas of life. If 
sufficiently supported, this leads to
8. On the positive side, a redirection of self toward
new areas of success; on the negative side a reconciliation
with the failure implicit in 1-3, often summed up as a 
"learning from experience". In time, this may bring
9. The restoration of personality and lifestyle much akin 
to the state in 1.
This process may take months or even years. A person may 
be able to stave off the deepest effects of a catastrophe
when set in, may take a similar number of weeks. Intensive 
therapy of whatever kind may take further weeks, and the 
ensuing supportive work to establish the effects of the 
therapy may take months or even years. Some depressives 
are never cured. Many return to a more-or-less normal 
and satisfactory life, but always have the feeling of being 
somewhat diminished by the experience. Others feel that 
in the long run they have gained in understanding, wisdom 
and patience with the failings of both themselVes and others.
By now it will be clear that the "career" of an 
illness such as reactive depression is very different from 
the careers of physical illnesses. It is far more open 
to variation and carries more imponderables.
Of particular interest to me is that variation which 
is so immense that it seems to abrogate the attempt to 
include it into the above pattern at all. The process is 
shared with normal sorts of reactive depression until we 
arrive at the fifth stage, when the symptoms of the illness 
are established and identifiable. What happens next, 
however, cannot be said to follow on through the usual 
understandings of causality, nor through the application 
of successful therapy. If we take up the career at point 
5» it may be summarised thusi
5. The state of chronic depression, with its attendant 
physical, emotional and mental symptoms. This may be 
regarded as an illness. It is suddenly transformed into
6. A state of bliss, or peace, or harmony with attendant 
perceptual, noetic and affective attributes, which may
last a variable length of time from individual to individual. 
It leads to
7 . An awareness that the illnessis over. A completely 
new response and assessment of both the crisis and the 
state of satisfactory living of phase 1. This is tested, 
and leads to
8 .^ A state of normal and satisfactory living, usually 
being a modified form of phase. 1, but with a different and 
markedly improved appreciation of that life.
This obviously is very different from the first pattern.
The former seems more like a process of re-assembly, 
painstakingly conducted; the latter seems like an explosion 
in which the pieces all fall back into not just the right
an indeterminable number of cases, the process is regarded 
as having profound religious significance.
The question of what we make of such a process is, to 
some extent predetermined by where we decide to look in 
order to do so. It is a mixed phenomenon. It begins with 
what today is widely regarded as a form of mental and 
.emotional illness and is resolved in a manner which is 
understood in religious terms. If we try to interpret 
the whole experience in the categories of either psychology 
or theology, this will entail the reduction of one or other 
part of the total experience. Either we say that the first 
part presents itself to us as an illness but is, in fact, 
a spiritual crisis; or we say that the second part seems 
to the experiencer to be religious in content butis, in 
fact, an extension of the psychological processes. And 
if we do, what criteria can we apply to adjudge between 
the alternatives?
This matter of interpretation is made all .the more 
difficult by the fact that the two broad categories of 
interpretation which are available to us are both so all- 
encompassing. The psychologist may argue that all that 
happens to a person - including religious experiences and 
religious sentiments - are part of the psychological processes 
of that person and therefore amenable to interpretation 
according to psychological categories. On the other hand, 
the theologian may argue that all that happens to a person - 
including all the processes which are the data of the 
psychological disciplines - are subsumed within the indi­
viduals relationship with God. The argument then shifts 
into the realm of metaphysics where, I suspect, it will 
remain essentially inconclusive.
We might however, be mistaken in applying an either/ 
or approach to the matter. By analogy, we may apply the
.•nC
Complejntarity Principle of modern physics to the dilemma, 
and argue that it is possible to hold more than one 
understanding of a single entity, each understanding of 
necessity seeming to exclude all others. The exclusion 
is accepted as the necessary price for the insight offered 
by that particular interpretation, but such exclusion is
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as light may he understood as at times behaving as a
particle, at other times as a wave, but essentially being 
both; so a phenomenon in human experience can be understood
at times as being psychological, at other times as
theological, but in fact being both. The problem thus lies 
not in the fact of the experience but in the nature of the 
mind seeking to interpret it. (3)
It may also be the case that we assume a far sharper 
division between the fields of psychology and religion than 
in fact is so. Although it seems widely assumed that modern 
psychology has reduced the bulk of religious experience 
to psychological data, in the process psychology incorporates 
into its interpretive structure many hidden assumptions 
borrowed from the world of religion. A therapist .....
......applies himself in a way which suggests a set of
convictions, a powerful mood, a moral stance, a faith.
To call this exercise an outcome of faith is, I believe, 
well warranted for it has many of the characteristics 
of human experience and behaviour with which we associate 
the notion of faith. (*0
Paul Halmos develops at length the extent to which psycholo­
gists of various schools, in their theoretical writings 
and in their case notes, incorporate such elements of faith 
as the triumph of love over hatred, the inadequacy of 
psychology as an applied science, the creative presence of 
the therapist himself, the power of compassion, etc. He 
maintains that the dichotomy between religious and 
psychological interpretations is more apparent than real.
However, the fact remains that in today's climate of 
opinion the process I am interested in moves between two 
areas of experience and interpretations of experience which 
are regarded as, at best, uneasy bedfellows, at worst 
totally incongruous- namely, the medical and the religious. 
Of the two modes of interpreting the depression-to-sudden- 
enlightenment syndrome, it is the illness mode which will
3 See Barber, Ian Gi "Issues in Science and Religion" 
SCM 1966 pp 290-^
^ Halmos, Paul "The Faith of the Counsellors" 
Constable 19^5 P*7
and available. A person experiencing it is more likely 
to consult a doctor than a priest. Many clergy feel - 
perhaps justifiably - that the medical professions have 
stolen their clothes.
I therefore feel that it is necessary to attempt some 
consideration of the phenomenon from the viewpoint of some 
modern attitudes towards mental illness. To begin with we 
must notice that in many quarters of the world of psycholo­
gical theory there seems to be a background assumption that 
suffering andpain can lead to or resolve into ways which 
enhance human life. They impart understanding, depth, 
insight, etc. Such assumptions mirror those from the wider 
world which I mentioned in the '.'Introduction (page ^).
For instance*
The confronting of genuine tragedy is a highly cathartic 
experience physically, as Aristotle and others through, 
history have reminded us. Tragedy is inseparably connected 
with man's dignity and grandeur and is the accompaniment, 
as illustrated in such dramas as Oedipus and Orestes, of 
the human being's moments of great insight. (5)
This background assumption of the worth and value of suffering, 
indeed its necessity for the enhancement of existence and 
the introduction of a heroic dimension into human life, is 
widespread. However, I fear that often it is asserted as 
a kind of romantic principle, without any substantial effort 
to understand why suffering can produce such enhancement.
It is reassuring to note that a number of psychological 
theorists emphasise that suffering and tragedy can be . 
appallingly destructive. At times it is possible to suffer 
.with no reprieve and with no beneficial outcome. In discussing 
what he calls "frustrational crisis" Anton Boisen observes 
that such crises can spell either blessing or disaster. (6) 
Although some folk come through them with enhanced spiritual 
insight and greater feelings of individual personal security, 
many come through eventually being marginally diminished.
And many come through being seriously damaged. Some take
5 May, Rollo "Existential Psychology" Random House NY
1969 p. 82
6 Boisen, Anton "Crises in Personality Development" in 
"personality and Religion" Ed. William A. Sadler SCM
1970 p. 192ff
literally go mad, or enter serious physical decline. Some 
adopt subconscious avoidance techniques in the forms, for 
example, of conversion hysteria in which physical symptoms 
appear and are used to "explain" the person's involvement 
in the crisis and also to attract the sympathy and attention 
he seeks.
This corrective to the romantic view is healthy. Yet 
it is without doubt widely observed that despite the dangers 
and despite the seeming contradictions which are involved, 
some people do emerge from their suffering enhanced and 
enlightened. Abraham Maslow commentsi
I (and others) have been increasingly impressed by the fact 
that tragedy can sometimes be therapeutic, and that therapy 
often seems to work best when people are driven to it by 
pain. It is when shallow life doesn't work that it is 
questioned and there occurs a call to fundamentals. (7)
Or Boisen again*
 certain forms of mental illness are themselves
manifestations of healing power .... when fate hangs in 
the balance and destiny is in measure determined. (8)
The sense that "fate hangs in the balance and destiny 
is in measure determined" when we meet and respond to crisis 
implies that matters of profound religious concern are 
evident and perhaps sometimes even paramount in times of 
certain forms of merfe.1 illness, and this despite a previous 
lack of religious concern in many patients* histories. A 
sense that the crisis has something to do with God's will 
for the person, or that suffering is the consequence of 
sin, is quite common. In our culture the crisis is some­
times interpreted by an immediate identification with the 
suffering of Christ.
I once spent three years in a close pastoral relation­
ship with a woman in a long depressive phase. On two 
occasions, in paroxysms of tension, she clenched and 
unclenched her fists time and time again, driving her long, 
scarlet-painted fingernails into the palms of her hands..
7 Maslow, Abraham "Toward a Psychology of Being" D van 
Nostrand Co. Inc. NY 1962 p.13
8 Boisen, Anton op cit p.192
arms, opened her hands to show me the bloody marks of the 
nails, and told me she was being crucified. She herself 
did not link the nail-marks and her feelings of being 
crucified; but to the observer each reinforced the other.
She was not a conventionally religious woman.
Boisen suggests that the identification of the 
sufferer with the agnnies of Christ* s Passion also serves 
to identify the sufferer with the hope implicit in the 
Passion. There will be a resurrection. He concludes that 
disturbances of this kind are not necessarily to be seen 
as evils to be avoided but
......as problem-solving experiences of a desparate and
dramatic variety. (9)
However, it must be recognised that the crisis carries 
both great pain and great risk. If the circumstances which 
precipitate the crisis can be more or less resolved, the 
patient will return to his former, normal condition, some­
times slightly changed for the better, sometimes slightly 
damaged in self-esteem. Sometimes there is no reconstruction, 
only the gradual fragmentation of the person into withdrawal 
and madness. But sometimes the personality is rebuilt on 
ideas and insights which seem to arise from within the 
experience, data which other people often find difficult to 
identify and accept. This is the course of tragedy and 
suffering identified in the romantic notions referred to 
earlier.
That the initiating crisis has such a potential for 
both suffering and destruction is implicit in the fact 
that it puts in jeopardy certain features of the person's 
selfhood which are of great importance to him, may indeed 
be considered actually to be essential parts of himself.
He runs the risk of psychological amputation. It is to 
defend himself against this destruction that he begins the 
increasingly desperate search - symptomised by high-intensity 
anxiety - somehow to defend or restore the areas of self 
under assault. If the defence or restoration cannot be 
made effective, there may occur a second line of defence
9 Boisen, A op cit p.200
that whole area of his selfhood which has been threatened-•
The torpor, indifference, withdrawal and emotional numbness 
which are so characteristic ofdeveloped depressive phases 
are symptomatic of this.
Some theorists maintain that the destructive implic­
ations about the self which are carried by the initiating 
criasare usually if not invariably positive in the long run, 
and of benefit to the patient when they are ultimately 
accepted. The crisis theatens a self-image and self-under­
standing which are most precious, but not entirely accurate.
It is the fact that they are precious which causes the pain 
when they are under threat; it is thefact that they are not 
accurate which is responsible for the eventual self­
enhancement when they are abandoned in order that new insights 
offered by the crisis can be taken up. The kind of "faith" 
mentioned by Paul Halmos is seen clearly here. "Truth" 
about self, however unflattering, is to be preferred to 
fantasy, however comforting. This is seen clearly in 
Abraham Maslow's assertion*
By the very fact that a person defends himself against the 
insight, it is therefore by definition painful to accept.
Its breaking through into consciousness is sometimes crushing 
to the person. And yet, in spite of this, it is universally 
reported to be worthwhile, desirable and wanted in the long
run. Seeing is better than being blind, even when seeing hurts.
(10)
I am not sure that his confident "it is universally reported" 
actually is the case®. Boisen suggests that the ancient 
Hebrew question, Can a man see the face of God and live? may 
well indicate that men have long recognised the danger 
inherent in the processes which bring us deep insight.
We must not lose sight of the fact that most theory
of the function of mental and emotional suffering in people's 
lives comes from the casework of practising therapists, and 
thus is concerned with the more usual progress of depressive 
states. That a person who has undergone a damaging crisis, 
reacted to it defensively and with anxiety, and then with 
patient help from a therapist been led to a new self-
10 Maslow, A op cit p.7^-5
and their implications, and is thus advanced and enhanced 
in self-understanding, I can readily accept. But both the 
process and the outcome differ from the phenomenon which 
is my chief interest.
The very sudden and dramatic reversal of conditions 
of despair is a phenomenon not unknown to psychologists.
The majority seems to regard it as a very welcome and yet 
incomprehensible blessing in the course of more conventional 
treatment; a sudden and radically complete cure which they 
do not understand in either it's suddenness or its origins 
but which they gratefully accept. One or two, however, 
have been sufficiently puzzled by the phenomenon to consider 
it a seperate phenomenon, worthy of being distinguished 
from the usual process of recovery from depression.
The most distinguished figure to afford this 
recognition is Carl Jung, who in the rather obscurantist 
way which is typical of him - gives it a name derived 
from Heraclitoan philosophy. He calls any sudden and total 
reversal of feeling states "enantiodromia".
Enantiodromia means a 'running counter to'. In the philosophy 
of Heraclitus it is used to designatethe play of opposites 
in the course of events - the view that everything that
exists turns into its opposite....... (Heraclitus) himself
says i
It is the opposite which is good for us.
Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. 
It is an attunement of opposite tensions, like that 
of the bow and the lyre.
The bow is called life, but its work is death.
Mortals are immortals, andirnmortals are mortals, the one 
living the other's death and dying the other's life.
For souls it is death to become water, for water death 
to become earth. But from earth comes water, and 
from water, soul.
All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all 
things, like goods for gold and gold for goods.
The way up and the way down are the same.
(Heraclitus* Fragments k6,k$9661
67,68,22,69)
I use the term enantiodromia for the emergence of the 
unconscious opposite in the course of time. This charac­
teristic phenomenon practically always occurs when an 
extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in 
time an equally powerful counterposition is built up, ^
uently breaks through the conscious control. Good 
examples of enantiodromia aret the conversion of St. Paul 
and of Raymond Lully, the self-identification of the sick 
Nietzsche with Christ and his deification and subsequent 
hatred of Wagner, the transformation of Swedenborg from 
an erudite scholar to a seer, and so on. (11)
Jung is suggesting that the dramatic reversal of 
states of feeling and understanding demonstrate a fundamental 
psychological process which he even refers to as a "law" 
of the psyche. He suggests that there should be an 
equilibrium in psychic forces and energies which, if too 
grossly disturbed, initiates a self-regulating process so 
tiat the balance is restored.
Heraclitus was indeed a very great sage, discovering the 
most marvellous of all psychological laws; theregulative 
function of the opposite. He called it enantiodromia, a 
running contrariwise, by which he means that sooner or* 
later everything runs into its opposite .... I said just 
now that there seems to be something, a kind of superior 
power, in the human psyche, and that if this is not the 
idea of God, then it is the "belly". I want to .express 
the fact that one or other basic instinct, or complex of 
ideasj will invariably concentrate upon itself the greatest 
sum ofjsychic energy and thus force the ego into its service. 
As a rule the ego is drawn into this focus of energy so 
powerfully that it identifies with it and thinks that it 
deserves and needs nothing further. In this way a craze 
develops, a monomania or possession, an acute onesidedness 
which seriously emperils the psychic equilibrium. (12)
We see here a model of psychic governance which is based 
on a fairly simple illustration derived from the world 
of physics. It is as though too much material is piled 
onto the scale pan of one side of the balance, and this 
is rectified and balance restored by some unspecified 
source pouring a sudden rush of material onto the opposite 
pan. Jung is noticeably vague about the actual origin 
of the sudden energy acquired by the alternate side of the 
psyche's equilibrium. (It is possible that his is the 
source of interpretation offered by the person quoted on
11 Jung, CG Collected Works Volume VI RKP 1971 
paragraphs 708-9 "Psychological Types" p. ^25-6
12 Jung, CG Collected Works Volume 7 RKP 1953
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model for understanding the sudden reversal which his 
feelings underwent.)
Jung's appropriation of the term enantiodromia from 
the thought of Heraclitus seems justified by our understanding 
of what Heraclitus was about. Heraclitus was not a 
physicist; his choice of fire as the abiding principle of 
the cosmos was not an attempt to offer a more appropriate 
theory of the workings of the physical Universe. His aim 
was not to improve the newly-fledged Milesian natural 
science but to reinterpret its total meaning by offering 
a radical shift in perspective.
I believe....the central insight of Heraclitus (is) in this 
identity of structure between the inner, personal world of 
the psyche and the larger, natural order of the Universe. 
The doctrines of fire, cosmic order and elemental trans­
formation serve as more than illustrations; but they are 
significant only insofar as they reveal a general truth 
about the unity of opposites, a truth whose primary applic­
ation for human beings lies in a deeper understanding of 
their own experience. (13)
^he characteristics of.'.and relationships between the elements 
reflect the physical flux of human experience. By meditating 
upon them, and particularly upon fire, one can perceive
the hidden harmony that unifies opposing principles not 
only within the cosmic order but also:.in the destiny ofthe 
human psyche. (Heraclitus1) real subject is not the 
physical world but the human condition, the condition of 
mortality. By its participation in the eternal life­
cycle of natire and also by its capacity to master this 
pattern in cogitation, the structure of the psyche is 
unlimited .... The opposites are one; and this deathless 
structure of life and death is deity itself. (14)
The use of fire as symbol of deity is, of course, ancient 
and universal. That human beings experience their own 
condition in terms of fire is less usual, but not unknown.
13 Kahn, Charles H "The Art and Thought of Heraclitus" 
Cambridge UP 1979 p.21
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Love is the unfamiliar name 
Behind the hands which wove 
The intolerable shirt of flame 
Which human power cannot remove.
We only live, only suspire,
Consumed by either fire, or fire. (15)
Thus in both Heraclitan philosophy and Jungian 
psychological theory, enantiodromia represents a sudden 
change in the direction of a flux of consciousness, a change 
occurring at the bidding of some higher, perhaps divine, 
regulative principle whose goal is an equilibrium aimed at 
but never achieved. No process is carried to such an 
excess as to swamp consciousness and permanently exclude 
other significant features of the total gamut of consciousness. 
These other features will make their presence felt, and 
the more they are repressed, the greater the vigour with 
which they will eventually reappear. Jung felt that this 
adequately accounted for sudden reversals and changes in 
mood and character. I am far from sure that it does. Such 
sudden reversals are far more the exception than the rule, 
and to elevate their occurrence into a "psychological law" 
is absurd; laws apply to events which almost invariably 
occur. In addition, it does not seem to me that Jung is 
saying anything more than observing that such things do 
occasionally happen. He offers no real explanation of the 
relationships and processes within the psyche which will 
effect the transformation. Of his assumption of some kind 
of self-regulative function within the psyche I shall have 
more to say later.
The second theorist whose work I wish to mention is 
Henry Ellenberger. He has observed that at times the 
strain and preoccupation required in the attempt to solve 
a difficult problem may lead to symptoms which can be 
classified as a form of mental illness, and that the 
resolution of the problem relieves the symptoms and produces 
many of the aftereffects which may be associated with
15 Eliot, T.S. "Little Gidding" Four Quartets Faber &
Faber
religious experience. He writes*
This compels us to define creative illness and give it. its 
main features. It occurs in various settings and is tobe 
found among Shamans, among the mystics of various religions, 
in certain philosophers and creative writers. A creative 
illness succeeds a period ol intense pre-occupation with 
an idea and search for a certain truth. It is a poly­
morphous condition that can take the shape of depression, 
neurosis, psychosomatic ailments or even psychosis. What­
ever the symptoms, they are felt as painful, if not agonising, 
by the subject, with alternating periods of alleviation 
or worsening. Throughout the illness the subject never 
loses the thread of his dominating preoccupation. It is 
often compatible with normal professional activity and 
family life. But even if he keeps to his social activities, 
he is almost entirely absorbed with himself. He suffers 
from feelings of utter isolation, even when he has a mentor 
who guides him through the ordeal. The termination is often 
rapid and marked by a phase of exhilaration. The subject 
emerges from his ordeal with a permanent transformation in 
his personality and the conviction that he has discovered 
a great truth or a new spiritual world. (16)
Ellenberger's name for this condition - "creative 
illness" - is a good one. The adjective "creative" makes 
us modify our attitude toward the notion of this particular 
illness and its cure. We realise that the teleology (in 
the philosophical as distinct from the technical medical 
sense of that word) of the illness is upset. In most 
ilnesses, the cure and its application are determined by 
the nature of the illness; in this case the illness is 
determined by the "cure". In order that what seems to be 
the cure shall be achieved, the illness must be undergone.
But under such circumstances, of course, the cure is hot a 
cure as conventionally understood; it is the goal of the 
whole experience. Ellenberger suggests that the illness is 
a necessary part of the total process of coming to a radically 
new, creative understanding.
This rare condition begins after a long period of intell­
ectual work and preoccupation. The main symptoms are 
depression, exhaustion, irritability, sleeplessness and 
headaches. In short, it presents the picture of a severe 
neurosis, sometimes of psychosis. There can be oscillations
16 Ellenberger, Henri F "The Discovery of the Unconscious" 
Allen Lane The Penguin Press 1970 p.*j47/8
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remains obsessed by a prevailing idea or the pursuit of 
some difficult aim. He lives in utter spiritual isolation 
and feels that nobody can help him, hence his attempts at 
self-healing. But usually he will feel that these attempts 
intensify his sufferings. The illness may last three or 
more years. The recovery occurs spontaneously and rapidly, 
is marked by feelings of euphoria, andis followed by a 
transformation of the personality. The subject is convinced 
that he has gained access to a new spiritual world, or that 
he has attained a new spiritual truth .(17)
I believe that there are strong parallels between the 
subject of Ellenberger*s concern and the phenomena I have 
been considering.
A difference (which may be more apparent than real) 
is Ellenberger* s consideration of the illness as arising 
from intellectual preoccupation. The object of his study 
is the development of dynamic psychology during the past 
century, and he maintains that the authority and importance 
of the systems of Freud and Jung in this field are 
attributable to the fact that each of these men went through 
the kind of illness described. Each spoke with the authority 
the process endows on those who undergo it. Janelj Adler 
and others lack this authority because their theories are 
based on clinical observations rather than personal 
experience. Ellenberger is alert to the philosophical 
problems raised by the authority of deep but private 
personal experience. He sees it as being contained within 
the wider field of the whole difficult area of the truth 
content of all inner, psycho-dynamic processes. It is 
perhaps worthy of notice that for both Freud and Jung, 
religion came to have a crucial role within their developed 
theories, although there were great differences in their 
understandings. For Freud, religion is a widespread and 
necessary neurosis; for Jung it is the deepest and most 
significant level of man* s spiritual and psychological 
organisation and direction.
17 Ellenberger, Henri F op cit p .889
Whether, in fact, Ellenberger is correct in inter­
preting Freud and Jung1s creative illness as the result 
of no more than intellectual preoccupation is, I think, 
a moot point. Each faced himself, his whole and emotional 
and mental organisation and meaning. Whether one can ever 
confront one* s own self simply as a "problem" for intel­
lectual assessment is, I suggest, most unlikely. (18)
The whole of ones being is most deeply and powerfully 
involved; the task has implications for one's emotional, 
religious, social and intellectual reality. That the 
experience eventually resulted in a body of theory which 
is intellectual in presentation does not mean that the 
experience itself is restricted to the intellectual plane.
There are obvious and striking similarities between 
the phenomenon which Ellenberger calls the Creative Illness 
and the despair-to-enlightenment experience which is my
concern. The similarities are to be found in
/
The nature of the symptoms, eg. sleeplessness, 
irritability, withdrawal, headaches, loss of appetite.
The mental effort involved in seeking to resolve the 
problem of the crisis.
The fluctuating levels of pain, exhaustion; alternating 
periods when it is felt that some progress is being 
made, some hope is afforded, and then the onset of 
further despair.
The sudden and very rapid resolution, for reasons 
which are not clearly discernable.
The ensuing elation.
The feeling of having attained a new and important 
spiritual understanding; and a long-term or perhaps 
permanent alteration in character and deportment as 
a consequence.
The first three similarities mentioned are held in common 
with most forms of depression, no matter what their 
resolution may be.
Ihere are two differences between Ellenberger* s 
presentation of the process and my understanding of it.
The first is that he seems to want to ascribe a semi-
18 See the relevant sections of CG Jung's autobiography 
"Memories, Dreams, Reflections" RKP 19^3
volitional motive to the whole affair. This may be because, 
as already mentioned, he places great emphasis on the 
intellectual aspects of the experience. The illness arises, 
he believes, because the person in question is obsessed 
with a problem with which he is wrestling intellectually.
To this, I would make two observations, Firstly, I would 
repeat that he may not have fully understood the total 
involvement of the person with the problem; there is an 
emotional aspect, in that the problem being faced grows 
out of one's own experience and is therefore a problem 
within and to do with self. It is "important", and , its 
resolution carries profound implications not only in the 
world of ideas but in the understanding of self. A further 
observation, perhaps arising out of the above, is that 
Ellenberger fails to explain the power which the obsessive 
idea has. Why is the person so totally immersed in it?
Here again, I would suggest that this is because the 
problem does not exist purely on the plane of intellectual 
fascination, but has a significance which stretches 
through the person's whole existence. If the problem is 
not resolved, then not only will the world of ideas be 
the poorer; the person’s whole life will be damaged. Again, 
I would draw evidence from Jung's own accounts of his 
Creative Illness; his"problem" is his whole self.
The second difference between Ellenberger's present­
ation and my own is subsidiary to the above. He seems to 
imply (he is not wholly clear on the issue) that the 
suddenness of the resolution, and its completeness, are 
to do with the fact that the outcome is in terms of 
intellectual resolution. Suddenly, as it were, "the 
light dawns" and a solution appears as though out of 
nowhere. The source of obsession and illness vanish in 
understanding. The understanding is accompanied by an 
emotional content which is largely one of relief and 
relaxation. Although an important part of religious 
experience is to do with new levels of understanding, it 
would seem to me that the emotional content of experiences 
such as those mentioned in Chapter 1 are far more positive
and overwhelming than the feelings of relief at the solution 
of a long-term obsession.
However, it is possible that we are mistaken in 
seeking to draw lines too clearly between the different 
elements of the total experience, or between different 
levels of intensity in the experience. I make this point 
on the basis of two interviews, I had while collecting 
material for Chapter 1. The interviews were with an 
American whose training and profession were in economics.
At the age of about forty he became obsessed with what he 
believed was an anomaly in current economic theory, and 
spent three years undergoing a Creative Illness similar in 
most ways to that defined by Ellenberger. Eventually,
"the light dawned". But in his accounts of the resolution 
of the problem, my informant was at pains to emphasise that 
the dawning of the light was no mere metaphor;
 It came in light. My head was filled with light.
A piercing, blue light. I buried my face in my hands, 
but it wouldn't go away. I couldn't bear to look at it, 
but - oddly - it wasn't painful ..... (19)
Although he had found the answer to the problem in economics 
which had obsessed him, and although he subsequently wrote 
a book around this answer which made him enough money to 
retire comfortably, the experience of the answer he 
interpreted as being religious. He argues the intellectual 
obsession can lead to an understanding which is far wider 
than the immediate concern of the obsession.
As I have previously hinted, if Ellenbergei's 
observations concerning the Creative Illness are correct, 
then he is using the word "illness" in a unique way. The 
"illness" is the necessary process to be gone through in 
order that its outcome - the "cure" - may be attained.
In other words, the "illness" is the price to be paid, the 
effort to be expended, in order that the benefits of 
understanding which are its outcome can be arrived at.
19 Private Interview. Oxford, February, 198^
concept of enantiodromia seems to work. In order that the 
self-regulating functions of the organism may come into 
effect, the person has to he plunged more deeply into 
whatever extreme of feeling is possessing him. We seem 
here to he skirting close to that understanding of suffering 
which I have called "romantic", namely, that suffering has 
to be gone through in order that a person can in some way 
be improved, enlightened, matured. There is thus a subtle 
alteration in the etiology of illness; a subtle shift in 
our understanding of the processes involved in illness 
and cure.
Theorists of both physical and psychological forms
of medicine assume within a patient a basic impetus or
disposition which moves the patient toward health and
wholeness. It has long been recognised in the realm of
physical medicine, almost on a rule of thumb basis, that
the doctor must co-operate with the patient's "will to get
well", and that without this impetus to be well the most 
careful doctoring may fail. On the other hand, a patient
determined to live may recover whenall medical prognosis
seems without hope. That this "will to get well" entails
a link between the patient's physical and psychological
states is increasingly widely recognised and accepted.
There is accumulating evidence that the duration of an 
illness is associated with psychological indicants, 
that the more favourable the indicants with regard to the 
mental health of the individual, the shorter the duration 
of the illness. There is evidence also that the psycho­
logical condition of patients is a good prognosticator 
of the effectiveness of medical treatment. (20)
Such assumptions depict illness of whatever kind as 
an interruption of a state of well-being (or simply being 
well) - usually referred to as homeostasis. This last 
term suggests a stable state of the orgnaism. Once the 
stable state is disturbed by the illness, the organism's 
own self-regulative activity will begin self-healing, a
20 Bakan, David "Disease, Pain and Sacrifice" U of 
Chicago 1968 p.5
process which can be, aided by the doctor, now staD±e tnib 
homeostasis really is in the physical organism is open to 
question. But the notion that a stable state can be said 
to apply to the psychological condition of the individual 
is not seriously tenable.
A great number of theorists have depicted the psychic 
life of the individual morein terms of "process" than 
"state". In Jungian theory the process is called 
"individuation". Jung defines it*
(Individuation is) the process of forming and specialising 
the individual nature .... as a differentiated being from 
the general collective psychology. (21)
This process is unique to each individual. When seeking 
to assist a patient cope with mental as distinct from 
physical illness, a therapist must be very sensitive to 
the direction and force of the individuation.
 in psychotherapy it seems to be positively advisable
for the doctor not to have too fixed an aim. He can hardly 
know better than the nature and will to live of the patient 
....Each of us carries his own life form within him - an 
irrational form which no other can outbid. We must follow 
nature as a guide, and what the doctor then does is less 
a question of treatment than of developing the creative 
possibilities latent in the patient himself. (22)
Like Jung, Stephen Spinks sees mental health more in 
terms of a process than a static state. He lays emphasis 
on what he calls the "completion" of the individual, 
suggesting that in all forms of illness, but particularly 
in mental illness, we see in the individual an urge to 
move or develop toward "completeness". (23) Drawing on 
ideas first presented by JA Hadfield, who argued that "the 
urge to completeness is the most compelling motive of life", 
he finds parallels between this and Jung's notions of 
individuation. He observes that all human activity,
21 Jung, CG "Psychological Types" 193& edition p.261
22 Jung, CG Collected Works Vol 16 p. tyo
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some urge to reach a goal. Thus the whole of human 
existence is teleological within its own terms, and he 
accepts with approval Jung's definition of religion as 
"the fruit and culmination of the completeness of life."
Abraham Maslow (2*0 emphasises the distinction between 
static and progressive assumptions of the human condition. 
While acknowledging the necessary vagueness of such terms 
as libido or elan vital, he nevertheless feels compelled 
from clinical observation to postulate a motivational 
force in the individual alongside and in addition to those 
static concepts of healthy equilibrium which we define as 
"being well". The organism does have self-regulative and 
self-restoring abilities which enable it to repair any 
damage which befalls it; yet it would appear that even in 
the midst of these seemingly-static conditions there is an 
urge to express and achieve a growth toward self-perfection. 
Maslow maintains that this is the assumed motivational force 
behind all therapy, and that without it health in whatever 
form could never be either achieved or restored.
It must be acknowledged that there is a vagueness 
about the above notions of individuation, completeness 
and life force. Psychologists themselves agree that they 
are seeking to define some motive principle which exists 
beneath and supports not only their clinical data but their 
actual task of healing and therapy. It is in this area 
that psychology's attempts at being an empirical science 
falter; the theory "runs out" and meets an indefinable 
factor in the total psychological dynamic which is too 
elusive to grasp and yet without which neither theory 
nor therapy could function.
It is an area which may psychologists endeavour to 
avoid, because it entails a bold ('some would say "fool­
hardy1".) step from the empirical and verifiable into the 
ideological. It posits some goal of individual selfhood 
which the individual in some way seeks to attain, which 
when thwarted or disturbed creates pathology of some kind,
2k Maslow, Abraham op cit p.21 ff
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introduce into the discussion such notions as purpose, 
value, good, right, etc., the material of personal meaning 
and personal morality.
A useful insight which unites psychotherapy is that 
we cannot offer or foist onto another person - even a 
suffering person - our own understanding or ideal of how 
that person should live, what his self-perfection should 
he like. It is a goal, to he striven for and perhaps 
achieved in terms of the individual's own self-definition, 
self-understanding with which the person is most fully 
to he identified, the reaching of which both in process 
and achievement endows his life with its most real 
perspective. One callsto mind the saying about having not 
only life, but having the life which is "abundant". (25)
Any attempt to identify this goal, this abundance, or to 
objectify it immediately diminishes it, perhaps to the 
point of being useless. Its extreme idiosyncracy means 
that it can never be clinically defined in terms of actions, 
achievements or overt moral qualities; it has to be defined 
in terms of self-fulfilment.
The individual is thus understood to be striving to 
realise and express his completeness outwardly, and 
receiving support for that expression from outside sources, 
but his completeness and his motive toward completeness 
are essentially inward in both authority and generation.
It is this force, however it may be organised within the 
internal, dynamic economy of the inidividual, which is 
posited as the motive for.healing during any phase of illness.
However, I should like to offer for consideration 
the suggestion that there may be an exception to the 
overall validity of this model of illness and healing.
I would suggest that it may be possible, under certain 
circumstances which are comparatively rare when set along­
side the full gamut of illness, for this elan vital or 
motive toward completeness to createt rather than cure,
25 John Ch. 10 v 10
completeness initiates in the person a resistance to its 
force, and that the resistance has many of the symptoms 
of certain other forms of mental or emotional illness and 
thus is usually straightforwardly identified with them.
In fact, however, it is very different; different in its 
origin, its substance and in its cure.
It is almost diametrically opposite to the normal 
course of the development of an illness. Whereas most 
illness can be considered to be a change (for the worse) 
in a static state of well-being, in this comparatively 
rare case the illness^the maintenance of a state of supposed 
well-being in resistance to a process of change assumed 
to be for the worse. The dynamic power of the movement 
toward completeness is vigorously resisted. The individual 
seeks to deny and impede his own development. For whatever 
reasons, he seeks to cling on to the status quo, rather 
than face the implications of change. It is the exertion 
of the blocking procedures which produce the symptoms of 
illness.
We may perhaps assume that in the normal course of 
the life of a person, the motive toward completeness (I 
shall use Spinks" term) shows in the maturity which can 
come with the passing of years and the accumulation of 
life-experience. We change, learn, grow, develop in 
understanding and acceptance. Although the process can 
bring times of stress, as we readjust to a wider perspective, 
an altering understanding, the stress is coped with 
undramatically and the change takes place. However, in 
certain kinds of individuals under certain circumstances 
there may come occasions when change is forced upon us 
in very threatening painful or self-destructive ways.
A crids of almost any kind may do just this, be it a crisis 
of circumstance or a crisis of understanding and ideas.
What matters is that the crisis should have profound 
implications for our sense of self, our understanding of 
who we are, our estimate of our value. If a crisis occurs 
"outside" us, we may produce strenuous efforts to rectify
rectification may well include the acceptance of change.
Only if the crisis either arises from or profoundly affects 
our inner selfhood, perhaps indicating that in truth we 
are not who we think we are and who we want others to think 
we are, will it prove difficult to accept the change. Then 
we shall resist the implications, and at times even the 
fact, of the crisis.
It must he understood that the crisis and the move 
toward completeness are essentially working to the same 
end. The move to completeness entails the recognition and 
acceptance of the self as it really is. In as much as a 
crisis presents us with information which tells us more 
accurately what kind of person we may he, it can thus he 
interpreted as a stimulus toward completeness. If, for 
whatever reason, that more accurate assessment is unaccept­
able, both crisis and change ensuing will be resisted.
Hence the usual course of events in response to a 
crisis of this kind. The initial recognition of the 
threat to self which it presents results in panic. Often 
there is an initial period (usually very short) of total 
recognition of the implications of the crisis; this is 
usually then blocked out. The person becomes emotionally 
and mentally "numb", in much the same way that a thumb, 
accidentally hit with a hammer, will cause a moment or two 
of great pain, followed by the whole thumb going numb.
Pain is not felt; but this responsive anaesthesia is at 
the cost of all feeling, ^he hurt thumb can no longer feel 
anything at all. Siidlarly, we have theability to go 
mentally or emotionally numb, totally incapable of feeling 
anything at all. Those who spend much time with the 
bereaved will be very familiar with this phenomenon. It 
can last for a long time. In some aberrant forms of grief 
it can last for the rest of the bereaved person's life.
Once the system can cope with the pain, the numbness begins 
to wear off, the full weight of the catastrophe bears in, 
and increasingly high levels of anxiety and activity ensue 
in order to restore the status quo or else compensate the
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to nullify the crisis, to make it "unreal" and therefore 
to dissipate its implications. Sometimes this can he 
done, though always with a powerful element of fragile 
precariousness. A person who, at the breaking of a long­
term and profoundly important love affair, enters 
immediately into another affair which is much shallower 
but which he invests with great significance, is nullifying 
the original crisis and thus eliminating its implications 
of lovelessness, worthlessness, rejection, etc. A useful 
indicant that such second, "rebound" relationships are 
fragile is found inthe statistics for the breakup of 
second marriages.
If the efforts to nullify either the crisis or its 
implications fail, gradually the truth is accepted.
Usually this is regarded as the truth concerning an 
inferior kind of self; we accept that we are what the crisis 
tells us that we are. It is the combination of subconscious 
realisation with subconsciously-motivated resistance to 
that realisation which causes the symptoms of despair. 
Typically, the despairing person loses character; he 
becomes a non-person. Unable to be with conviction the 
person he formally was, he yet refuses to accept the (as 
he sees it) grossly diminished person the crisis tells 
him he is. He withdraws; becomes solitary; obsessive; 
"dull"; unresponsive; loses care and concern for physical 
matters; cannot concentrate, etc. In other words, he 
presents a case of acute depression and despair.
The "illness" therefore, is symptomatice of an epic, 
inward struggle to resist and nullify the impetus toward 
a more accurate and complete sense of self implied by the 
circumstances and details cf the initiating crisis. In 
this case, the constitution of the illness is the 
complete opposite of the individual's usual, constitutional 
response to illness. Usually, the motive to completeness 
resists and fights against the source of illness on behalf 
of the well-being of the person. But in this case, it is 
the illness which resists and fights against the motive
the person.
Yet if the motive to completeness is as fundamental 
as is hypothesised, then it has priority; the resistance 
can never ultimately overcome it, and the maintenance of 
resistance is an ongoing and exhausting struggle. In as 
much as the individual is able to maintain the resistance, 
he is also maintaining his own illness. In other words, 
we arrive at the observation which distinguishes this 
particular "illness" from all others; in order to be "cured" 
of the "illness" the individual must lose the struggle.
Only when the resistance breaks down, when the person yields 
to the full and dreaded implications about himself contained 
in the crisis, can the motive to completeness come into 
unhindered effect and he move toward a more realistic 
selfhood. Although that more authentic selfhood may seem 
diminished in comparison with his previous notions of self 
(ego-construct), this is obviated by the benefits of a 
realistic self-assessment and self-acceptance.
I would suggest that this is precisely what we see 
in the ancient and paradoxical account of Jacob's struggle 
at the Jabbok. Many commentators are struck and perplexed 
by the nature and outcome of the fight. Who is the winner? 
Jacob simultaneously both isn't and yet is'. Jacob is in 
battle with a power which is mysterious, to be resisted, 
and seems more powerful than himself. Despite all his 
efforts, he cannot prevail. Suddenly, seemingly easily, 
his opponent becomes his supreme benefactor. The outcome 
of losing the contest is that Jacob is blessed; the light 
dawns, and he is a new man, with a new name and new 
destiny. His old self is crippled, diminished, and yet 
he has seen the face of God and his life is preserved.
It seems to me that this ancient source recognises 
that there are certain circumstances when great benefit - 
indeed, blessing - arise from being vanquished in a 
struggle to maintain what one believes to be oneself.
reversed kind of illness are not as rare as I have suggested. 
There can he no doubt that the treatment of depression 
within the medical professions on the lines of a normal 
illness is a treatment which meets with little real success. 
By encouraging the patient's sense of self, trying to re­
store that which is under threat, the usual course of 
treatment encourages the very resistance which is the 
illness. David Bakan characterises
.....emotional defense responses with disease as manifest­
ations of a person's being in a situation where he is 
protecting himself from "being done in". (26)
He suggests that in such cases where the defence is the 
disease, the patient must be encouraged to bring to bear 
the "mechanisms of surrender", that he may possibly turn 
the tide of the disease by encouraging the body not to 
defend itself. This is interesting advice from the realm 
of physical medicine, recognising that on occasions the 
defence mechanisms are more harmful than that which they 
are defending the body against.
However, the usual course of cure for depression is 
to encourage and support the patient in his resistance to 
the destructive implications of the crisis, because it js 
assumed that they are nothing more than destructive. Thus 
the usual course of treatment for depression may on occasions 
ramify the illness, and the patient achieves a measure of 
restoration almost despite rather than because of the 
therapy. He is encouraged to endeavour to reconstruct his 
shattered ego-construct or else to create a new and modified 
one from the wreckage of the old. In either case, he is 
enabled to continue to resist the implications of the 
initiating crisis and thus thwart his own motive toward 
completeness.
Why the motive toward completeness should be seen
to be so threatening and potentially destructive, and
therefore resisted to the point of illness, is the concern
of my final chapter. Let me try to summarise the main 
features of this chapter.
26 Bakan, David op cit p .30
practice and theory, confirms that at times states of 
acute despair suddenly resolve into their opposite. The 
theorists largely refrain from trying to explain this; 
those one or two who make the attempt fail to do so 
convincingly. This may he because their illness is not 
a condition which that word normally represents. This 
condition may indicate a particular relationship of 
resistance to a subrational or supernational force within 
the individual which, while widely acknowledged as existing, 
of necessity remains ill-defined. The sudden reversal 
occurs when the posture of resistance is, for whatever 
reason, abandoned.
Despair to Enlightenmenti Part 2 - A Theological Approach
As mentioned in previous chapters, the boundaries which 
contain the disciplines of psychology and theology are 
not precisely drawn. In many places they are blurred, and 
in many places they overlap, sometimes to lesser but occasion­
ally to a greater extent. The same phenomenon of human 
experience can be considered sometimes from the viewpoint 
of one discipline, sometimes from the other. And although 
it is very difficult if not indeed impossible to consider 
the phenomenon from both simultaneously, it may at times 
happen that the insights of the one can aid and clarify 
the other. Therefore, although I have used two chapters 
to consider the phenomenon of my concern from the two 
respective points of view, it is my intention to import 
some psychological categories into this chapter, in order 
to make clearer some of the psychological processes which 
a person undergoes while involved in an experience which 
is being consdiered ultimately from a religious point of 
view. Yet, simultaneously, I hope that theological 
categories of understanding of the human condition will 
be introduced in order to fill out and make more consistent 
and coherent some of the shortcomings which were revealed 
when the experience is considered only from the point of 
view of psychological illness.
This mingling of the two disciplines is, I believe, 
forced upon us if we are to respect the experiencer's own 
accounts of the experience. What starts out in the realm 
widely accepted today as that of mental illness becomes 
eventually an experience which finishes in the realm of 
the religious. Depressive illness transforms into mystical 
experience. How? It is my suggestion that the iritial phase 
of despair, reaction to crisis, onset of depression, do 
have in them already the seeds of experience which belong 
not only to the world of psychological illness but also 
to the world of religious understandings. In other words,
mystical experience, but that thephenomenon which is usually 
regarded as nothingmore than an illness does in fact 
already contain the religious precursors of the mystical 
outcome of the total experience. I believe that a careful 
examination of the pesent-day experiences of despair and 
depression, especially if the examiner removes the blinkers 
which would restrict him to seeing the object of his study 
only interms of the models of psychological illness, will 
reveal the theological implications of those experiences 
to the people who undergo them. In particular, I think 
it is possible to draw striking parallels between the 
experience of depression and the experience of the 
consciousness of sin.
In an intriguingly - and very aptly - titled book, 
the American psychotherapist and theorist Karl Menninger 
considers the way in which the once-universally recognised 
and pre-eminent strand of human nature called "sin" has 
virtually disappeared from both the vocabulary and the 
self-understanding of contemporary Western people. (1)
He summarises the gradual transformation of the understanding 
of man®s sinfulness into such categories of self-under­
standing as sickness, or ignorance, or criminality. Thus 
"sin" became a shorthand term for failures, lapses, weak­
nesses or inadequacies for which the sinner could hardly 
be held responsible and which present us with far less 
damage to our self estimation. "Sin" as a theological 
category of understanding, with serious implications for 
our sense of self has virtually disappeared during the 
past century.
There remained, of course, sin in the sense of alienating 
oneself from God; for believers this was, and is, and will 
continue to be the sin. But articulate believers seemed 
to be fewer in number; their voices were drowned out by 
the cheers of the psychologists. (2)
Menninger argues that the word and the concept of sin
1 Menninger, Karl "Whatever Became of Sin?" Hawthorn
Books Inc. NY 1973
2 Menninger, Karl op cit p .kG
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or superfluous; not only replaced, but adequately replaced 
by other categories of understanding. If, however, what 
has replaced it does not seem adequate, and if our diminished 
understanding seems to be missing just those features of 
experience which were entailed in the concept of sin, then 
the disappearance of sin as an interpretive category of 
human experience is premature and unjustified. Menninger 
argues that this ia the case; that there are whole areas 
of human experience for which psychological theory provides 
inadequate understanding. He mentions in particular that 
the human experiences of guilt and depression need the 
larger concept of sin if we are to understand and respond 
to them properly. (3)
Meninger quotes with approval a number of observations 
made by Paul Tillich, to the effect that the concept of sin 
cannot be either superseded or avoided.
There is a mysterious fact about the great words of our 
religious tradition; they cannot be replaced. All attempts 
to make substitutes - including those I have tried myself - 
have failed; they have led to shallow and impotent talk.
There are no substitutes for words like"sin" and "grace".
But there is a way of rediscovering their meaning, (k)
The implication of the above is that we do away with the 
category of sin to our great loss.
He also quotes Tillich to call to mind the true 
theological meaning and depth within the concept of sin.
Have the men of our time lost a feeling for the meaning of
sin? Do they realise that sin does not mean an immoral
act, that "sin" should never be used in the plural, and
that not our sins but rather our sin is the great, all-
pervading problem of our life? To be in the state of sin 
is to be in the state of separation. Separation may be 
from one's fellowmen, from one's true self, or from God. (5)
However, I think it fair to say that Meoninger himself does 
not always use the word "sin" in this deep way, but sometimes 
talks of sin in the sense of immoral acts, not making clear
3 Menninger, Karl op cit p. 178
k & 5 Quoted from Paul Tillich's "We are Accepted" in 
Menninger op cit p. ^7 & p. I89
However, although we must hear in mind that sins, 
in the common usage of immoral acts or evil deeds, are 
different from the deeper theological understanding of 
the human condition implied in the technical use of the 
word sin, nonetheless there is a continuum of identity 
between them. Our wickedness and immorality arise out of 
our sinful state. Our response to our wickedness and 
immorality, in sucfi feelings as guilt or shame, locate the 
wickedness or immorality in the deeper awareness of ourselves 
as being not what we ought to be. Thus our evil deeds are, 
as it were, the outgrowth of our sinfulness. Tillich, in 
the previous quotation, rightly indicates the unity of 
identity which underlies our wide ranging understanding 
of sin. He points out that the separation entailed in sin 
may be a separation from fellowmen, from oneself or from 
God; and although each seems distinct, in truth they are 
all of a piece. The sinner may, however, be more immediately 
and acutely aware of one or two of the three. But each is 
an indicant of the others. Compare this with the less 
insightful assertion of John MacKenzie*
Sin and guilt as used.even in common conversation does not
connote anything in man's relation to God, but rather an
inner experience of emotional conflict which may or may
not be referred to a breach of failure to reach some personal
standard or cultural standard of morality. Seldom is
such a breach felt as falling short of the glory of God. (6)
It is true that sins are rarely felt to be a falling short 
of the glory of God. Yet it is that larger and deeper 
failure in the human condition of which they are symptomatic, 
and in as much as we feel we fail then we do fall short 
of God's intention for us. Although our perceptions may 
be of superficial shortcomings, they nonetheless set up 
echoes and reverberations in our deeper and more inclusive 
self-consciousness. Failure, immorality, wickedness are on 
a continuum with sin; and perception or apprehension of the one 
may be the chink in our self-awareness which lets in a beam 
of darkness, from the other.
6 MacKenzie, John G "Guilt; Its Meaning and Significance" 
G Allen and Unwin 1962 p.127
cerning the nature of theological sin and the meaning of 
the v/ord as I shall he using it, I think it is important 
to remember also that sin, so commonly associated with evil, 
does not at its deepest level entail human wickedness to 
any large extent. Far more significant features of sin 
at the deep level are the sense of being cast out from God, 
and therefore from all that is true, beautiful, positive.
There is the feeling of being utterly alone; utterly without 
worth; utterly without love; and utterly without hope.
Some would suggest that our propensity to do evil is, in a 
peculiar and negative way, an attempt to bring something 
positive in terms of action and affect and bodily satisfaction 
into lives which are spiritually empty.
However, it is our response to our own wickedness and 
immorality which, by reflecting our misdeeds back into our 
own awareness of ourselves, forces us to take stock and 
assess with misgiving what kind of creatures we really are.
It is these responses, arising out of "sins", which point 
us in the direction of "sin". Of these responses I have 
chosen to consider fouri the sense of guilt, the sense 
of shame, and urge to secrecy, the sense of worthlessness 
and lovelessness, and the sense of alienation and isolation.
It is my contention that all these, which are the marks of 
sin, are to be found developed to differing degrees in the 
self-awareness of depressed people. And that depressed 
people, far from suffering merely from an illness, are 
confronting - ortrying to avoid confrontation with - very 
real and unacceptable aspects of themselves. It is for 
this reason that I suggest that depression may be far more 
than just an illness; it may of itself be a religious 
experience, though of a negative and fearful kind.
The first and perhaps most fundamental feature which 
links depression as an illness with the theology of sin 
is the sense of guilt. From the very infancy of psychology 
as a corpus of material and theory seeking to understand 
mental and emotional aberrancy in terms of both conscious 
and unconscious dynamics, the sense of guilt has been
recognised as being crucial to a numDer 01 concu/u.Luiis anm 
complexes. But especially it has been seen as fundamental 
to depressive conditions.
And yet the attitude of psychology both in theory and 
practice toward guilt has been ambivalent. It has recognised- 
as it had to, if it was to avoid being totally unrealistic - 
the reality and crucial importance of the patient’s sense 
of guilt within his own psychodynamic. It is guilt which 
has the power to disturb and warp the patient's psychic 
equilibrium and leads to inappropriate, neurotic, behaviour 
and reactions. In particular, it can lead to depression.
The task, then, facing the therapist in the cure of 
depression entails handling in some way the guilt felt by 
the patient. It is at this point that the ambivalence 
arises, in that the overall response of psychological 
theory is to attempt to cut away the fundamental reality 
of the patient’s sense of guilt. It wants to convince 
the patient that, although he feels his sense of guilt tobe 
very real - indeed, perhaps the only reality of which he is 
really aware - nonetheless, the guilt is in some way 
fictitious, inappropriate, unreal. The task of therapy, 
therefore, is to allber the patient's attitude toward his 
own guilt, in order that the power of his guilt may be 
diminished.
The first stage of this process is remarkably similar 
to the Christian church's traditional method of helping 
folk cope with guilt. It consists of encouraging the 
person to recognise, make clear to himself, confront both 
the source and presence of his guilt feelings. However, 
the course of action which follows the initial confession 
(for such it is) differs markedly between church and 
therapist. The therapist then leads the patient into what 
is hoped to be a fuller understanding of his guilt, in 
order to diminish its actuality or its effect. This can 
be done in a number of ways. One is, for instance, to 
reassure the patient that both the source and the feelings 
of guilt are quite normal; everyone does something like 
this, and therefore he need not feel so acutely guilty 
about it. (Interesting to notethat this attempt to
establishing a community of identity betweenthe patient 
and his fellows, a community which he feels he has lost 
through his guilt. If he can be convinced that the effect 
of his guilt, as he sees it, in terms of isolation, is an 
illusion - ie. he is really like everyone else - then it 
is hoped that the source of the effect will likewise be 
understood to be illusory). Another way of removing the 
power of guilt is to try to demonstrate that the patient's 
guilt feelings arose through his involvement in a situation 
over which, interms of both involvement and circumstances 
he had no control. His actions were therefore determined 
for him, and it is thus inappropriate for him to feel guilty 
about matters in which he had no responsibility. It was 
not his fault. This is the interpretation frequently 
offered to dissipate guilt feelings arising over issues 
occurring in infancy.
There are probably as many minor variations on the 
ways to dissipate guilt as there are therapists working 
on the assumption that their patients' guilt-feelings are 
fundamentally unreal, and that the task of therapy is to 
offer the patient the insight also to realise this. Whether 
insight ever succeeds in effectively eliminating feelings 
is a matter which has been argued for decades. Whether 
therapy succeeds in its aim of cure by removal of 
inappropriateguilt, or merely enables the patient to live 
with and accept the fact of his guilt, and in some measure 
forgive himself for it, is a moot point. That the argument 
exists and continues indicates to me both the lack of 
clear-cut success in such treatment of depression and the 
dubious theoretical assessment of the origins and nature 
of guilt.
This same debate, together with observations from 
their own clinical experience, has led a number of 
psychological theorists themselves to question the accepted 
attitudes toward guilt and its source in conscience. The 
names of Stekel, Boisen, Mowrer, Frankl come to mind. Such 
thinkers maintain that guilt is very real, and is not 
simply to be explained away or learned to be lived with.
person whiih has profound and negative implications for 
the person's self-understanding. The source of guilt may 
he repressed from conscious memory, "but it remains in the 
sense of ill-defined guilt to warp and imbalance the person's 
psychic equilibrium. The person thus encapsulates within 
his life-history the source of his guilt, something of 
which he is ashamed, and which is the origin o£ a continuing 
feeling of self-condemnation and grief about the self.
Such feelings may exist in very subdued form, the person 
being able to live and functionadequately despite them. 
However, if the person undergoes circumstances - such as 
may happen in crisis - which refocus attention upon the 
repressed source of the guilt, crisis and underlying feelings 
of guilt may combine and support each other, thus plunging 
a person from an acceptable level of guilt to an unacceptable 
and intolerable level, with the consequence of depression. 
This goes to explain why the depressive response to crisis 
often seems so much more than the crisis warrants; the 
person is in fact responding to more than the crisis - he 
is responding to himself. It is the extra dimension to 
depressive grief which is one of the keys to understanding 
the Book of Job; Job is responding not only to what he 
has lost but to who he is.
This school of thought argues that guilt is real.
Guilt represents an accurate and appropriate response to 
the person's estimate of himself. It is traceable to 
actual occurrences in his life, and has its origins in a 
most real and suitably outraged conscience - outraged, 
that is, at the self.
It must be recalled that such real guilt does not
necessarily require a "real", indictable act as its source.
Such actual behaviour does not by any means always reveal
itself in patients' past lives. However, guilt may have
its source in tie often-overlooked yet very powerful and
important part played by fantasy in our mental and
emotional life. The substance of fantasy is, of course,
unreal, fictitious indeed fantastic. But the act of 
fantasising is very real, and an integral part of most
of which the fantasist feels ashamed; indeed, for many 
their fantasy world is the ultimate private experience, 
to he shared with none other. One can discern these 
features when one considers the guilt and shame so often 
associated with masturbation.
Although infantile masturbation usually earns 
parental condemnation, and there must therefore be an 
element of conditioned guilty response in the onanist's 
attitude to himself, this is of itself insufficient to 
explain the dag? guilt, shame and anxiety he can feel towards 
himself and his activity. The extreme self-condemnation 
which sometimes arises is largely accounted for by the 
nature of his fantasias with which the act of masturbation 
is invariably accompanied - fantasies which may include 
involvement in acts of lurid sexuality and aggression and 
for which the onanist severely condemns himself. The 
result is that a feature of his life which, as an activity, 
is essentially solitary and quite harmless and innocuous, 
can come to be associated with extraordinarily powerful 
feelings of guilt. Looked at from the outside, the guilt 
associated with masturbation is "unrealistic", inappropriate 
to the act| to the onanist the guilt is real, important 
and can, at times, reach an intensity which mars his life 
by subjecting him to perpetual self-condemnation.
Whatever its source, guilt is handled within our 
psychic economy by a number of processes which enable us 
to live with it. Consciousness of its source may be 
repressed, leaving us with an unspecified feeling of unease, 
of something being amiss. It may be converted into totally 
unconnected, neurotic behaviour. (Compare Job's diligent 
sacrificing on behalf of his children for sins which they 
might or might not have committed. ) It may, however, give 
rise to feelings of despair with self and overall moods of 
depression. When this happens, the depressive is coming 
close to making an appropriate response to a source of guilt 
which is not far from conscious appraisal. Yet depression 
is still also a way of avoiding contact with the ultimate 
reality of the guilt.
simultaneously avoid the substance of guilt can be 
evidenced when depression arises from guilt created in 
response to some present activity, the said activity 
being "ignored" as a circumstance relevant to the depres­
sion. CAH Watts cites an example of this, the case of a 
young commercial traveller who consulted him concerning 
a state of depression which centred around his belief that 
he had a "bad heart". (A significant sourceof the complaint, 
when "heart" is taken in its metaphorical meaning.) After 
exploration, it came to light that the young man, who had 
been married only a few months, had been unfaithful to his 
new bride during the course of a business trip to Scotland. 
Yet he had managed to obscure this memory quite successfully. 
He had been "drunk" and "wasn't quite sure, he may have 
seduced the girl." His unfaithfulness, which would have 
earned, so he (probably rightly) felt, his wife's 
condemnation and carried serious implications for his 
marriage, he transformed into a "bad heart" which gained 
him her sympathy and concern.
Then the picture became clear. He obviously had been 
unfaithful to his wife, and had done his best to repress 
the memory of the act. However, forgetting his 
misdemeanour did not remove his sense of guilt, which had 
emerged as a fear of heart disease. (7)
The bad heart thus became the adequate, though unrealistic, 
cause of his symptoms of depression, and enabled him to 
avoid his guilt.
In many other cases of depression, the source of 
guilt may be seemingly-effectively buried, either because 
it happened long ago in the patient's history or because 
of highly effective repression or both. Such a person 
may have become entirely adjusted to living with the guilt, 
but he carries with him a constant sense that all is not 
well, even though he cannot specify the source of his unease. 
He may show symptoms of both the guilt andhis need to keep 
it hidden by insisting on privacy or cleanliness or whatever,
7 Watts, CAH "Depression" Hodder & Stoughton 1973 p. 13
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person turns out his pockets or opens the drawers of his 
desk. In such ways the guilt remains to disturb the 
personal equilibrium.
The mounting internal stress of unrelieved conscience 
disturbs the equilibrium and organisation of the personality. 
The organism protects the painful andthreatening iceatment 
it is receiving (from part of itself) and attempts to escape.
Only when the escape routes are cut off - as may well happen 
in consequence of serious crisis - will despair and ensuing 
depression set in. The person succumbs to the "painful 
and threatening treatment" he receives as the guilt carried 
by the "unrelieved conscience" exerts itself. Thus Hobart 
Mowrer identifies many functional neuroses as attempts to 
escape the threat of conscience's condemnationi
  many functional neuroses are indications of a hidden
(but not forgotten) history of serious misconduct, which 
had not been adequately acknowledged, atoned for, propit­
iated or otherwise "cancelled out". (9)
Guilt arising from such hidden sources leads to two 
basic responses - obsessive or depressive. There are those 
who live as though they were always about to commit a 
misdemeanour; their behaviour is often obsessive in order 
to avert this. Others, however, live as though they have 
already committed the misdemeanour (which in truth they 
may) and they live as though some judgemental figure were 
for ever pursuing them. It is these latter who seem 
particularly prone notonly to anxiety but also to depression.
Those who feelthey have already committed a crime suffer 
depression as well as guilt and anxiety. Indeed, patients . 
with severe depressive illnesses which require their 
admission to hospital to reduce the risk of suicide, often 
assert that they have committed some crime. Sometimes 
this delusional idea is expressed in a more or less plausible 
form and they will claim that the recent death of some
8 Menninger, Karl op cit p. 180
9 Mowrer, 0 Hobart "The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion" 
Princeton, NJi von Nostrand 1961 p.49
but often it is couched in bizarre or nebulous terms* 
they have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost or 
were responsible for some recent natural disaster. (10)
Rycroft's mention of the depressives who believe that they 
have committed th sin against the Holy Ghost is of interest. 
It is met with comparatively frequently. It indicates 
that the depressive himself is willing to introduce a 
religious dimension into the assessment of his condition.
It is a "dramatic" belief, because of course this is the 
sin which cannot be forgiven; the depressive feels himself 
to be beyond even the mercy of God. But the theological 
understanding of the nature of the sin against the Holy 
Ghost brings an important insight into the understanding 
of depression. The sin against the Holy Ghost is not 
beyond forgiveness because it is a sin too heinous even 
for God to forgive; rather, the sin against the Holy Ghost 
is to be in the state in which God's forgiveness will not 
be accepted. This unique sin is not a comment on the the 
limit of God's willingness or ability to forgive, but upon 
the sinner's inability to accept that forgiveness. It 
reflects the theological insight that our state of sin is 
a reflection of our own thrusting of God aside.
This is a particularly good example to illustrate my 
contention that the illness known as depression and the 
religious condition of sin as known to theologians share 
common features. The experiential phenomenon of guilt 
is of central importance in both; and the response of the 
sinner to his guilt - the despair, the sadness, the hope­
lessness, etc. which he exhibits - parallel the way in which 
the depressive responds to his guilt.
Let me turn now from the sense of guilt which is 
common to both the consciousness of sin and states of 
depression to a second feature frequently shared by them. 
Both sin and depression can contain the factor of shame, 
and the urge to secrecy which is its consequence.
10 Rycroft, Charles "Anxiety and Neurosis" Allen Lane 
The Penguin Press 1968 p. 45
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are in fact different in origin and implication. Although 
both can and often do arise from similar sources of wicked­
ness or immorality, it is possible for the one to exist 
without the other. A hardened criminal may feel guilt 
but no shame. It is possible to have a sense of guilt 
without specifically knowing the source of its origin? one 
cannot feel shame for that which is not specific. The 
guilty person may hide his misdeed in order to escape the 
consequences? the ashamed person will hide it because of 
the disgrace or belittlement it entails. Guilt implies 
culpability, a consequence which will have pnfound 
implications for who the guilty person is and how he lives; 
shame implies disgrace, diminishment in the eyes of others. 
Guilt will bring condemnation? shame may bring condemnation, 
but may just as easily bring mockery, or ostracism.
Although guilt may have more profound and long-term 
implications, shame brings a pain which is more acute.
Some of the features of shame are well-illustrated 
in the example already provided by CAH Watts (p.l^3)«
The man involved felt guilty about his unfaithfulness, 
and aware of the implications it might have for himself 
and his marriage. He also felt ashamed of it, feeling that 
the circumstances disgraced and belittled himself. His 
reluctance to acknowledge it, even to himself, arose partly 
out of his desire to hide from others the low levels to 
which he could stoop.
It is extremely painful, both mentally and emotionally, 
to confront a shameful act. It is perhaps even more painful 
to be confronted by others as the doer of a shameful deed, 
or thinker of shameful thoughts. It is for this reason 
that shame is invariably accompanied by the impulse to hide 
its source. The impulse may take one of two broad paths, 
but each is potentially a causative factor in depression.
The first is the conscious hiding of the act. People 
will sometimes go to extraordinary lengths to cover up 
deeds of which they are ashamed. Th^rwill weave a "tangled
with other people's knowledge of the act. But this has 
two possible consequences. Firstly, there is generated a 
kind of internal "pressure" which can cause disequilibrium 
to a serious extent. There has to be a constant vigilance 
on the pretence and deception, a constant wariness to 
maintain consistency, a constant effort -to keep the source 
of shame permanently hidden. This leads to a constant 
level of anxiety, associated with fear of exposure. In 
this way pressure builds up until it might almost seem 
better to face the shame than continue the effort. If, 
however, this exchange cannot be tolerated, the person 
finds himself trapped in a situation from which there can 
be no escape and in which he is locked with only his low 
self-esteem as a person capable of shameful acts. He is 
in prison with his bad self as cell-mate. This coupled 
vith the guilt that probably will also be associated, can 
lead to a state of depression.
The second path is when the person seeks to hide the 
source of his shame not only from others but also from 
himself. The psychological processes whereby this can be 
done need not be expanded upon here. Suffice it to say 
that it is quite commonly met with, and results - as in 
the previous case - in the person becoming anxious and 
often depressed.
That shame as an act, and the need to hide the act 
from the gaze of others and oneself, are features of 
depression is widely recognised. Frequently the shame will 
compound itself. It is very common for the depressed person 
to feel ashamed of being depressed. Just as the depression 
may have its roots in a shameful act which is being hidden, 
the hiding of that act requires that its consequences - ie. 
the (the disguisedly) attributable depression - must also 
be hidden. Depressives will often make strenuous efforts 
to live as normal; hence a possible source of the fluctuat­
ing intensity of many depressive moods.
That shame and the urge to hide the source of shame 
are central to the theological understandings of sin is
of much religious understanding of sin. In the story of 
the Fall, the first response of Adam and Eve after eating 
og the Tree of Knowledge was to realise their nakedness 
and to hide from God. ^he link between sexuality and shame
is one of mankind's oldest observations; the need to hide 
the source of shame is equally long observed.
Both psychotherapy and pastoral confessional practice 
alike recognise the obdurate resistance to revealing the 
source of shame. Each alike recognises the tremendous 
sense of relief which can arise if the source is revealed 
in a context in which the pain of the revelation is care­
fully handled and limited. That the impetus to hide and
v simultaneously the impulse to reveal exist side by side
A . _
i the same person remind us that s m  is both evil
ci*\£ tJir an(1 ahcufifc <x\ evil^jfla already a step toward the resolution
^  of the predicament. The urge to hide the source of shame
is also essentially the urge to reveal it. The more
powerful the repression of the awareness, the more powerful
the impulse toward it being brought into the open. This
seeming paradox fits with observations already made about
the nature of depression is of itself part of the process
toward its own cure; that only by yielding to its inner
pressures can it be relieved. In as much as depression
seeks to avoid a source of shame, its success (at the
avoidance) serves only to intensify the condition.
Conversely, its failure brings its relief.
In all my efforts (as hosptal chaplain and therapist) I 
rely upon a simple principle derived from my theological 
training which seems to me far too little understood. I 
refer to the view that the real evil in mental disorder 
is not to be found in the conflict but in the sense of 
isolation and estrangement. It is the fear and guilt which 
result from the presence in one's life of that of which 
one is ashamed and afraid to tell .... I would furthermore 
suggest that our findings indicate that the sense of guilt, 
the self-blame and the emotional disturbance which 
accompany it are not themselves evils but attempts at a cure.
(11)
11 Boisen, Anton "The Exploration of the Inner World" 
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struggle of Jacob, that the battle must be lost inorder 
that the struggling soul can be bessed. If depression 
serves to hide shame and its source, the depression must 
break under its own strain for the truth to be revealed.
The third area which I feel indicates a community 
of concern between consciousness of sin and depression 
is that complex of feelings which entails awareness of the 
lack of worth, love and meaning in the individual's life, 
and the fear that he himself is worthless and unloved.
As will readily be recognised, this complex is not unrelated 
to the previous sentiments of guilt and shame, just as they 
themselves may be coincident. These factors do not exist 
in isolation from one another, but give rise to, support 
and modify each other. In a negative way, the feeling of 
guilt and shame which forms part of the core of both sin 
and depression
 begins in love, is impossible without love, and
paradoxically is cured only by love. It is the most 
horrible and one of the most hopeful facts for man. It 
is the experience of antilife, anticommunity, antilove 
which as limit, as void of being, turns man to seek its 
opposite. It is "hell". It is life that is anxious for 
love .... It is life experiencing hatred, and the worst 
of all hatreds, the hatred of self.
Guilt is the special form of anxiety experienced 
by humans-in-society, the warring tensions of life principles 
violated, of conditions of human socialexistence trans­
gressed, of sociospiritual reality ignored or affronted, 
of God alienated, of self being destroyed. (12)
It is this hatred of self which can lead the depressive 
to contemplate suicide. But equally valid as a description 
of the depressive's feelings about himself are such words 
as "contempt", "dismissive indifference" or simply "emptiness 
The depressive feels himself to be beyond the love of 
others, and incapable of loving himself, because of the 
guilt which he knows - no matter howwell he believes he 
hides it from others - exists at the core of him. If
12 Stein, Edward V "Guilt* Theory and Therapy" 
G Allen and Unwin 1969 p.l^f-15
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he may well point out that those who loved him did not 
really know him as he is. The depression, and indeed the 
crisis which may have initiated it, are thus the accurate 
way of responding to his reality.
This state of "being almost defies description. It 
is something which only those immersed in it can know.
I have several times heard it described as hell, and the 
description is usually augmented by the depressed person 
adding that they are not using the word in any casual 
fashion, as we may say any bad experience is "like hell", 
^he true depths of depression are "hell" in that there is 
cold, hopeless emptiness to them, a sense of degradation 
and despair more numbing than any physical pain. This 
interior suffering, of an intensity which is indescribable, 
on the part of a person who seems to have everything they 
could need in life is very baffling to outside observers 
and can lead to some rather unsympathetic treatment. Most 
depressives find it difficult to do full justice to the 
pain of their feelings of worthlessness, and find that 
when they make the effort they are rarely properly heard.
On a personal note, I can recall how when myself in the 
depths of depression I told people that if the price for 
the depression being relieved was the amputation of both 
my legs, I would gladly pay. They received the information 
with blank incomprehension.
I also recall that when a very inexperienced minister 
I visited a man suffering from depression, and was 
interested to note that by his side was a Bible open at 
the Book of Psalms. I have since learned that poets - 
among whom are to be counted the authors of some of the 
Psalms and the Book of Job - can sometimes speak for others 
out of the depths of their own experiences of despair.
0 Lord, rebuke me not in thy wrathi 
Neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure.
For thine arrows stick fast in me,
And thy hand presseth me sore.
Neither is there any health in my hones because of my sin. 
For mine iniquities are gone over my head;
As an heavy burden they are too heavy for me.
My wounds stink and are corrupt,
Because of my foolishness.
I am pained and bowed down greatly;
I go mourning all the day 3-ong. (13)
We are here, I believe, attempting to describe feelings 
which are ultimate, beyond resolution into component parts. 
The sense of being utterly without worth cannot be expanded 
upon; the "stink" and the '^corruption" which arise from the 
wounded self merely express the repugnance which the person 
brought to this impasse feels toward himself.
A life felt to be without worth or love must therefore 
be without meaning. Victor Frankl is the theorist whose 
work is associated with the place of a sense of meaning, 
or its lack, in the teleology of mental illness. (14)
He maintains that many people live a pretence that their 
lives have meaning and purpose by accepting and following 
conventionalities. He is not alone in the observation.
There ae just as many people who become neurotic because 
they are merely normal as there are people who are neurotic 
because they cannot become normal. (15)
Jung's "merely normal/ characterises a condition in which 
the person obeys the conventionalities but lacks the inner 
sense of worth or loving reality. It is this lack of a 
deep sense of worth and meaning which engenders the 
threatening sense of void and despair. This is the condition 
of folk who
......have accepted the opinion of the majority so completely
that they have been spared the sharp pain of conflict which • 
the neurotic goes through. While they are healthy from the 
standpoint_of "adjustment", they are often more sick than 
the neurotic person from the standpoint of the realisation 
of their aims as human beings. (16)
13 Psalm 38 w l -6 See also, for instance, the first parts of 
Psalms 69 and 102 
1^ Frankl, Victor "Psychotherapy and Existentialism" Souvenir 
Press 1967 "The Doctor and the Soul" Souvenir Press 1955 
and other works.
15 Jung, CG Collected Works, Vol 16 Routledge KP p.70
16 Fromm, Erich "Psychoanalysts and Religion" Harper 
Books 1950 P«83
to the onslaught of reality concerning the self which can 
he precipitated by crisis. Despair is kept at bay by the 
maintenance of an outward sense of worth and status within 
the community, in counter to the essential emptiness and 
worthlessness. It is no coincidence that Jacob, Elijah 
and Job were all men who, before their respective crises, 
had created and maintained a strong outward display of 
worth and righteousness. Only when this exterior collapsed 
were they brought face to face with their own weakness, 
emptiness and guilt. Only when we are brought low do we 
confront our sinful reality.
A person may erect and mairtain a style of life with 
which he seeks to convince himself and others that his life 
is positive, worthy, valuable, right and so on. He may, 
however, feel deeply and in a vague way that this ig not 
in fact the case. If some crisis occurs in his life which 
indicates to him that he has got things wrong, has totally 
misunderstood circumstances, is un-valued by people to 
whom he thought he was valuable, is not loved by those he 
thought loved him, the carefully-erected life-style may 
well collapse and the deeper and disturbing feelings, 
formerly held in check andcompensated, come to the fore.
He is therefore not depressed by the crisis; he is 
depressed by an evaluation of himself which the crisis 
makes inescapable.
Fourthly and lastly, I wish to consider the sense 
of alienation which is at the root of sin, and which is 
a common feature of the depressive experience. As already 
mentioned (17), sin is understood to be the fact of being 
separated from other people, from one's true self and ultim­
ately from God; and these different separations are not to 
be thought of as unconnected, but rather to be of a piece 
with one another. Once again, the paradigm story of the 
Fall indicates that this sense of alienation has been 
recognised as essential to the human condition and the 
state of sin from the earliest times. The myth indicates
17 See the quotation from Paul Tillich on p .136
xne divorce xrom xne remainder 01 xne creaxion, and aiso 
the modification of that creation, consequent upon the Fall 
from grace. Originally created to be in harmony with the 
remainder of the creation of which he was innocently a 
part, fallen man is condemned to live by effort, his 
labour marked by pain and conflict. There is a hint that 
he is irredemably cut off from all that he might have been. 
David Bakan (18) observes that in the Old Testament, tobe 
"cut off" from the community and its world was perhaps 
the most disastrous event a person could suffer, and that 
such social alienation may have been symbolic of the 
deeper cutting off which occured at the Fall. Certainly, 
there is a profound sense of alienation in the crucial 
sections of the stories of such men as Jacob, Job and 
Elijah. And yet, as Bakan also remarks, assertions of the 
irredemable lostness and "cut-offness" of a person are very 
rare in the Old Testament. Alienation happens, but it is 
not irredeemable. The format of many of the Psalms - 
turning from destitution and alienation to acceptance 
and redemption - are indicative of the fundamental optimism 
to be found in the Old Testament.
The alienation which is the hallmark of the theological 
sense of sin is a fundamental feature of the experience 
of despair and depression. Crisis immediately alienates.
If it deepens into a developed form of depression, the 
person usually experiences a two-fold sense of being cut 
off. In the first place, he feels cut off from his fellows. 
This is partly due to his sense of shame being highly 
activated. But often he also feels to be of a different 
order of being, really unfit for the company of other, 
normal people. Frequently he looks with envy at other 
people and their lives, and wonders why he cannot be as 
them. He willusually seek to withdraw from the world, 
retreat into himself, finds himself a safe place where 
he can contemplate his misfortune and his differentness.
Job's retirement to his dungheap is a telling pece of
18 Bakan, David "Disease, Pain & Sacrifice" U of 
Chicago 1968 p.*fff
of place which depressives choose, in that it reflects his 
sense of his own worth and is extremely unlikely to he 
frequented. I sometimes feel that his maligned comforters 
do not have it sufficiently counted to them for 
righteousness, that at least they did visit him in such 
an unsavoury spot*.
That many of the religious experiences which seem 
to arise out of states of despair and depression also 
occur when the persons concerned are alone is no coincidence. 
Solitariness is the physical requirement and the physical 
expression of the "otherness", the "mis-placedness" that 
the depressive feels.
At the same time that the depressed person feels 
cut off from the rest of the world, he also feels alienated 
from himself. He may look hack on the way he was, the way 
his life was, before the crisis or onset of depression, and 
feel a gulf away from aspects of himself which now seem 
foreign and irretrievable. He is aware of the multiple 
facets of an "I" he once thought was whole - even though 
that whole self may have had some alien elements.
This twofold sense of alienation is reflected within 
the nature of sin. The sinner feels himself cut off from 
the rest of the world, from the creation of which he is 
rightly a part but cannot feel himself to be so. In as 
much as the creation is the expression of the Creator, 
he is also thereby alienated from God. And yet this goes 
along with the sense of being in some strange way alienated 
within himself from himself.
Here we may only refer to Romans 7 il^ff where man is 
portrayed in his inner division and discord. "I do not 
understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, 
but I do the very thing that I hate." We may not under­
stand this in terms of anthropological division, as though 
there are certain parts of man such as his will and his 
deed, or his body and his spirit stood in contradiction 
to each other. The subject of the willing and the doing 
is always the same "I". Man is in conflict with himself, 
in self-contradiction, and he suffers for this. Sin, which 
manifests itself in legalism as well as in antinomianisip,
has so taken hold of him and seized control that he himself 
is, as it were, expelled from himself and is no longer 
identical with himselfj thus the "I" disintegrate. (19)
The pain and bewilderment involved as the seemingly- 
homogeneous "I" disintegrates are known both to depressives 
and those confronted by sin. However, I do not favour 
Gerstenberger and Schrage's suggestion that sin is an 
agency which exerts a power over a person. Man is not 
seized or controlled by sin; rather, the condition which 
he recognises as his true nature is the condition of sin. 
And this true condition is one in which he is at variance 
with himself, within himself. However, it can seem like 
an alien - force or power because it seems to operate in 
contradiction to his own desires.
Both the sinner and the depressive feel anxiety at 
the awareness that the self, the "I", is not integrated; 
and both the sinner and the depressive feel despair and 
sadness at the awareness that powerful and unavoidable 
parts of that facetted self are bad or worthless. And 
whether he expresses it in terms of being cured or of being 
redeemed, a man who has realised his condition will yearn 
for the reintegration of the self, and the reintegration 
in terms of the good. He wants to be good, and to feel 
good, and to feel at one with other good people and things. 
This basic urge to be "whole" is expressed well in Spinks' 
suggestion that the life-force is to be thought of in 
terms of a motive or urge toward being complete. (20)
•fyiat such re-integration can only occur when the reality 
of the disunity is not only recognised but actually 
experienced in all its pain, is the substance of the 
religious insight that the work of redemption begins in 
repentance and confession. The sin has to be made real 
and horrible to the sinner. That there should be a fierce 
resistance to this is only to be expected; and it is in
initiating the process of recognising what has been avoided
19 Gerstenberger & Schrage "Suffering" Abingdon (Nashville) 
1980 p.15^-5
of sin is so important. This is clearly seen in both the 
Jacob story, when he is confronted by the "stranger" who 
is wrestled with, clung onto, wounds and yet blesses; or 
in the Job story, when crisis initiates a long but 
gradually eroded resistance against the recognition of his 
true nature vis-a-vis God.
It seems to be a necessity of human change that we 
must first fully accept the nature of that which we are 
to be changed from. We must embrace that which we would 
escape.
It is not so much that men have religion, as that religion 
has and claims them .... The believer, conscious of sin, 
is aware of the two voices "Depart from Me" and "Come 
unto Me". (21)
That the process of separation and re-union is one process, 
no matter how paradoxically disparate may seem its aims 
at different stages, achieves its ultimate expession in 
the light of our separation from God.
Faith recognises eternal life in God and His Kingdom as 
the highest good and ultimately the only true good. 
Conversely, the greatest evil, ultimately the only real 
evil, is eternal death, ie. definitive separation from 
the living God .... In its temporal form it is known as 
"spiritual death", the absence of all that makes existence 
worth having, and consisting- in exclusion from fellowship 
with God; an exclusion which reveals itself in inward 
dispeace and bitter self-dissatisfaction. (22)
"Spiritual death", "death in life", "hell" are all phrases 
readily accepted by the depressive to describe the terrible 
condition in which he finds himself. That Mackintosh, 
speaking of sin from the theological point of view, can 
so accurately speak for the depressed person almost by 
accident should give cause for thought.
At this point I end my comparative analysis of the 
state of depression and the consciousness of sin. I suspect
21 Mackintosh, HR op cit p. 139
22 " " " " p. i$9
I hope I have done enought to justify for consideration 
my suggestion that we find a great deal of common ground 
between the actual feelings and awarenesses entailed in 
depression and consciousness of sin; and also that there 
is some common ground between the psychodynamic and the 
theological understanding of the different elements which 
contribute to and mould the two experiences. Of course, 
the way in which we understand ourselves must lead to 
significant differences. The response of aman who believes 
himself ill will be different from that of the man who 
believes himself cast out from the presence of God. Yeti 
would contend that this is not as formative a factor as 
may be imagined. A man may have a deep, real and utterly 
frightening sense of worthlessness, despite being assured 
and accepting the assurance that he is"merely ill".
I therefore suggest that states of severe depression, 
and the process leading to them, contain elements of ultimate 
concern to do with the self which are properly the province 
of religion. Depression is a state of faith, albeit bad 
and negative faith. That at times this negative faith can 
be transformed to a positive faith should come, therefore, 
as no surprise, From depression to enlightenment is not 
the inexplicable shole, coherent experience. It is 
throughout a religious experience, and I believe that we 
do depressed people a grave disservice by seeing and 
encouraging them to see their condition as no more than 
illness. Not only is this perspective inaccurate; it may 
well impede the resolution of the condition.
Sin provides a "bigger", more ultimate perspective.
It pays more respect to the reality of the suffering 
person's feelings. Sin is not simply the old word for what 
we recognise now as a form of mental and emotional illness; 
rather, it is a word we can still use and perhaps should 
use if we wish to do full justice to deepest implications 
of conditions of despair.
It also carries implications for how we believe the 
condition may be ended. If one understands the condition
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about if one can restore the lost state of health. Thus 
the depressed person is subjected to a theraputic process 
whereby presently discordant elements are manipulated so 
that they are again brought into accord. The process may 
be reassuring and restorative ("Things are not as bad as 
they seem. You are essentially OK. Look, I can accept 
you as you are?); or it may be redirective ("If you can 
look at it from this viewpoint you will see it is all due 
to your over-sensitive imagination, with a measure of 
hormone imbalance*.") The fundamental assumption of the 
illness model is that before the depressive phase the person 
was essentially well, healthy and right in both the medical 
and moral meanings of the word, and the theraputic task 
is to restore that pre-depression rightness.
It is this fundamental assumption about the pre- 
depressive rightness of the sufferer which is challenged 
if we shift our perspective to consider depression as the 
state of consciousness of sin. For then we assert that 
the depression arises as the sufferer perceives himself to 
be in discord, alienation and lovelessness, and that this 
perception is essentially accurate. This is the way he is 
in the roots of his being. The pre-depressive life was 
such as enabled him to avoid full recognition of this, 
but either crisis or just the pressure of the truth has 
forced him into the recognition formerly avoided. Thus, 
the sufferer does not want his pre-depressive self restored. 
At best, the restoration would be the maintenance of a 
pretence; and he would know it for a pretence. If depression 
be consciousness of sin, what the sufferer seeks is not 
to be restored but to be changed.
And yet the sufferer, aware of the need for change, 
is also aware that all attempts made by him to change 
himself are ultimately of no avail. They constitute only 
a refinement of pretence, and have no effect on the core 
of his selfhood which is so disturbing to him. He knows 
he cannot be "cured" by the manipulation of parts of the
self; there is no course of thought or action wmcn wijljl 
alter his fundamental badness.
 "salvatiorY and "health" are given, not earned.... the
individual who has become hopelessly lost inself-condemnation, 
who feels alienated by a superego (conscience) which 
condemns him regardless of what he does (no matter how hard 
he tries, sacrifices, atones, purifies, compulsively works 
at acceptance or at righteousness through effort), such a 
person can only discover wholeness, peace, the capacity 
even to love, by experiencing the unqualified acceptance 
and affirmation of his being in all its self-hate. (23)
If the sufferer is to be changed and his sufferings brought 
to an end, the initiative must come from without himself.
And that initiative must take the form of a radical 
acceptance of the sufferer.
The necessity for such acceptance and affirmation is 
recognised as fundamental in "deeper" forms of psychotherapy. 
It is accepted as being highly important even in the more 
directive and manipulative forms. It is a basic tenet of 
the"faith" of such work. Much emphasis is laid on a non- 
judgemental, accepting approach to the patient, on the 
creation of an empathetic warmth and regard for him no 
matter what he may reveal about himself. It is believed 
that such warm acceptance will demonstrate that the patient 
is not entirely rejected, and may lead to his own acceptance 
of those aspects of self which he had formerly rejected 
and condemned. Thus the patient*s self-hate and guilt are 
modified, leading to a confidence within which he can re­
examine his experience of rejection. His self-condemnation 
icll then be revealed as having been based on experience 
which is conditional and partial.
I think that there is no doubt that such warm 
acceptance can bring effective results when used for some 
cases of anxiety and depression, particularly when these 
are locatable within a specific complex. I myself 
frequently use such acceptance almost as a technique within 
my own pastoral work. But whether such acceptance by 
another person is sufficient to move deep levels of guilt
23 Stein, Edward V op cit p. 1^5-6
within and between the different schools of theory and 
therapy. Each seems very ready to accuse others of lack 
of success, often being able to back up the accusations 
with clinical data. One wonders whether any school of 
theory or practice has any real success1.
Psychological theory usually fights shy of asserting 
that the therapist sould "forgive" the patient, but 
forgiveness is of the essence of non-judgemental acceptance. 
Theology asserts that forgiveness is of the essence, and 
is not shy of the assertion. A theological understanding 
of the depressed state as consciousness of sin, consdousness 
of the self’s state of evil and unworthiness and the guilt 
and alienation thus caused, recognises also that the only 
way in which this state can be ended and the sufferer 
changed is by his being encompassed - with his sin - in 
a reality broader and more ultimate than himself. Inasmuch 
as sin is a failing, a falling short, a partialness of 
being, then we are looking for the process affirmed by 
St. Paul - "That which is partial vanishes when wholeness 
comes." (2*0 But the sufferer, confronted with the 
reality of his sin, knows that neither himself nor another 
person has sufficient authority of being to encompasse his 
partiality. He recognises - and theology recognises - that 
we are strictly limited either as sufferer or helper in 
the process whereby the person convicted in his own sin 
can be changed.
The inconceivable evil of sin, the infinite need for a 
higher interposition if is ever to be removed, is indicated 
by the fact that no one has ever gained the sense of pardon 
by thinking hard abo ut it. The great religious biographies 
contain no record of men who argued themselves out of the 
consciousness of guilt .... The problem it exhibits cannot 
even be formulated, let alone resolved, by means of dialectic.
(25)
Religion recognises that the despair which comes through 
the intense consciousness of sin cannot be removed by the 
power of man. Its- resolution is the work of the grace of
2k I Corinthians 13*10
25 Mackintosh, HR op cit p.l*J4
forgiveness of God.
It is as well to remind ourselves at this point that 
such theological terms as grace, sin, redemption, etc., do 
not represent only notional categories of thought. They 
arise out of the actual experiences of faith. They do not 
signify an abstract commentary on the human condition, but 
grow out of the living experience of that condition and 
our reflection upon it. Theological categories may tell 
us that the despair of consciousness of sin can only be.^  
annihilated by a forgiveness which is ultimately autho:q|ative 
and which is only to be found in the love of God. But this 
insight arises from the experience of such forgiveness, 
together with the bliss and enlightenment which accompany 
it, which constitute an event of unparalleled power and 
significance in a human life.
Theology, being the fruit of reflection upon such 
experience, recognises that the source of such experience 
is a "mysterium". It can be neither manufactured nor 
manipulated. It is characterised utterly by that very 
quality of giveness of which Edward Stein speaks.
However, it is recognised that the experience of God's 
forgiveness is typically accompanied or prece ded by certain 
features. It tends to come to those who "confess their 
sins". The confession of sin is to become conscious of 
one's sinful condition and filled with horror and despair 
at its implications? the confession of sin as a form of 
lip-service to the demands of faith is not enough. It 
also comes to those who, having confessed their sins, repent. 
Repentance is the sincere, inner sense of shame at sin, and 
if sufficiently aroused will lead increasingly to despair, 
perhaps even to the point of believing that the sinner is 
beyond the love and forgiveness of God. It is only when a • 
person has been "brought low" in this way that he is open 
and vulnerable to the forgiveness of God.
Forgiveness is a marvel that baffles logic* God can only 
recognise those who feel they are utterly unworthy of recog­
nition. (26)
26 Mackintosh, .HR op cit p.210
This "bringing low" is necessary because forgiveness 
is a "soft" attribute. Not even God can force his 
forgiveness upon a person who refuses to be forgiven. God 
may be offering forgiveness all the time, but the 
forgiveness even of Him can only be effective when we are 
willing to receive it. Hence the seeming-paradox that only 
when we believe we are so reduced as to feel beyond it, yet 
desperately yearn for it, will we open ourselves to receive 
it. Or, better, do we become open to receive it. God's 
forgiveness may be freely available to all who will receive 
it; the difficulty is that not all wish to receive it.
It must be remembered that although the coming of 
God into a person's life may seem a most desirable event, 
in practice it is widely resisted. This is so whether 
one is conscious of sin or not. Initially one resists 
because of the fear that self-control and self-realisation 
will have to be abandoned. But in consciousness of sin 
one resists fiercely because it is realised that the self 
is sinful, and sin cannot exist in the presence of God.
The sin-conscious person hides from the presence of God, 
believing that His presence will annihilate himself.
Hence the experience of the presence of God is 
resisted and avoided. The sinner wrestles with God as 
with, a mysterious stranger who threatens his very existence. 
This widespread feeling is given utterance in the ancient 
question as to whether a man can see God and live. Yet 
the sinful self, divorced from the reality of love, cannot 
know that God's love is able both to annihilate the sin 
in forgiveness and restore the person to a new and wider 
fullness of being.
The experiences which bring this about - the experiences 
of confession, repentance, penance, etc. - have over the 
centuries been hardened by the Church into formal activities 
for the obtaining of forgiveness of sin. To what extent 
these formal avenues of activity ever succeed in bringing 
actual experience of consciousness of sin or of God's 
forgiveness I cannot say. Ido suspect, however, that to 
the extent to which they become an attempt to manufacture
or manipulate what is essentially an act of grace arising 
in the mystery of God's love, then they will fail. They 
may "bring a sense of ease, "but they will not bring the 
shatteringly powerful experience of God's forgiveness.
On the other hand, I believe it can happen that the 
processes which lead to the experience of forgiveness can 
occur outside the formal avenues, even to people who would 
not give formal credence to them. .The experience which 
the theologian calls the consciousness of sin is not 
confirmed to believers. Anyone may be wrenched by circum­
stances into an awareness of self filled with condemnation, 
despair and self-hate. That such a state is nowadays 
usually seen as an illness called depression only adds the 
further burden of bewilderment to what is already a painful 
process. And just as one needs not be a formally religious 
person to grow conscious of sin, so one need not be a 
formally religious person to experience the forgiveness 
of the sinful condtion. But the coming of this latter into 
even the non-believer's life will be felt with such force 
and have such powerful consequences that it will be 
immediately perceived as an experience having profound 
religious implications.
^hus, under certain circumstances and with certain 
people, a state accepted as being depressive illness may 
suddenly and quite unaccountably end in a blissful experience 
which is recognised as being religious. Both the experience 
and its religious implications cause initial bewilderment 
and confusion.
However, if - as I suggest - there is a strong identity 
between depressive illness and consciousness of sin, both 
the experience and its religious implications are understood 
to be appropriate. The whole sequence of events, from pre- 
depressive self through crisis and depression to the 
religious experience and the new sense of self, is set 
within the religious dimension of life. And although 
theology does not assume to explain it fully, it does offer 
the recognition that such things have been known to happen 
throughout human history.
for. Its coining is sudden and total. It releases the 
sufferer from his burden of guilt and sense of worthlessness. 
His self-hate is transformed into self-love, and from his 
self-love he can respond lovingly to others. The world, 
which had formally seemed alien, pointless, cruel and ugly, 
suddenly is perceived as being harmonious and beautiful.
He takes great delight in what formerly would have left him 
unmoved. He returns to this pre-depressive condition, but 
subtly changed. He is without the burden of sin which he 
bore even while strenuously avoiding its acknowledgement.
It is perhaps above all this sense of having been changed, 
irrevocably and for the better, which is the experience's 
own best witness.
 this means that while as far as personal identity
goes the man is still continuous with his old being, in 
a yet profounder sense what he was has ceased to be. (27)
I submit that when today we find states of depression 
resolved by experiences described as blissful and 
enlightening, which produce change in the experiencer 
and which may kindle a lively interest in previously- 
ignored matters of religion, we are witnessing a total 
religious experience. I would also submit thatthe reception 
of the initial part of this total experience - the depressive 
phase - as an illness to be cured, is one more hindrance to 
the work of grace and is a source of serious confusion to 
those who are caught up in it.
27 Mackintosh, HR op cit p. 211
Summary Conclusion
Those who claim to have undergone religious experience often remark 
on the presence of a state of despair or depression as a background 
to the experience. Sometimes, when such states are acute, they are 
suddenly resolved in a most striking way by the religious experience. 
One may hypothesise a link between the two conditions - depression 
and the ensuing state of bliss and enlightenment.
An examination of sacred literature - I chose to consider two 
incidents from the Old Testament - indicates that states of despair 
have long been recognised as having significance in the occurrence 
of important religious experiences. There is a suggestion that both 
the despair and its resolution have to do with the character and 
personality of the experiencer, particularly his own self-assessment.
Contemporary theories of psychology which treat depression as 
an illness seem baffled by the phenomenon of its sudden reversal.
Many ignore it. Some merely recognise its occurrence. The few who 
take more notice of it seem hard put to account for it within the 
context of their theories. It does not accord with the usual 
progression of depression and its cure.
I suggest that it may be that, rather tnan a religious experience 
arising unaccountably from an illness, that which is usually 
considered an illness is itself a phenomenon of the religious life. 
Links can be traced between depression and the experience of the 
consciousness of sin. There are also links to be traced between the 
experience of its sudden resolution and the sense of God's forgiveness 
I therefore suggest that sin provides an important insight into our 
understanding of depression. It offers a functional understanding 
of the sudden ending of depression in states of bliss. And it offers 
understanding of the after-effects of the experience in the life and 
sense of self of the experiencer.
